Libyan strong man Haftar combines force and now politics

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar commander in chief of the Libyan National Army associated with the House of Representatives(HoR) government appears to have given in to pressure to join in a political process to form a unified government.

The HoR government based in Tobruk is a rival to the UN-backed Government of National Accord ( GNA). Serraj Faiez is the head of the nine member Presidential Council(PC) of the GNA. According to the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat Morocco in 2015, the HoR must vote confidence in the GNA before its term starts as well as amend the Constitutional Declaration of 2011 to include the GNA. The HoR has twice voted a lack of confidence in the GNA, most recently on August 22nd, 2016.

On the second of May, Serraj held a meeting with Haftar in Abu Dhabi. There was no joint statement issued after the meeting and there was no deal signed. Nevertheless, many commentators were optimistic the meetings represented a breakthrough toward solving the political impasse of having two separate governments. I expressed skepticism about the meetings in two Digital Journal articles here and here.

Mattia Toaldo Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations has a long interesting article on recent developments following the meeting, in the Middle East Eye. Toaldo says of the meeting:Unsurprisingly, optimism soared among diplomats and policymakers when news came out of an Emirati-brokered meeting on 2 May held in Abu Dhabi between Fayez Serraj, head of the UN-backed and Tripoli-based Presidency Council, and Khalifa Haftar, the “field-marshall” who heads a rival administration in the country’s east.This is somewhat of an amazing description of Haftar. As a matter of fact it is Ageela Saleh who is head of the HoR administration not Haftar. Haftar was appointed commander in chief of the HoR armed forces as depicted in the appended photo. No doubt Haftar has control over the HoR and that is why you have the anomaly of one head of government not negotiating with another head but the commander of its armed forces. Toaldo notes that just hours after the meeting contents of a supposed deal that he claims included some of the following elements were posted on some pro-Haftar Arab media sites:A new, smaller Presidency Council of three (down from the current nine members) including Serraj, Haftar and his political arm, the speaker of the House of Representatives, Aghila Saleh. Haftar’s acceptance of civilian oversight by this body in exchange for him remaining as head of the army. A quick path towards new presidential and parliamentary elections to be held early in 2018.

Supposedly Serraj and Hafter agreed to finalize the deal last week with the blessing of Egyptian president el-Sisi. This did not happen. The elements of the deal quoted by Toaldo were simply the negotiating position of the Haftar side. Serraj`s statement issued some while after the conference mentions only an agreement to a ceasefire in the south and a peaceful transfer of power.

However, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the GNA, Mohammed Siyala, issued a statement in which he said that Khalifa Haftar was the commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces under the new government but that he accepted civilian oversight --apparently including himself as part of the new PC. There were protests with the ministry building being surrounded and demands made that he resign.

The key parts of the agreement as seen by the Haftar group which includes Haftar being kept as commander in chief and as part of the PC are non-starters. Most of the PC and the State High Council would absolutely reject any such government. Nevertheless Toaldo suggest:In most Western and regional capitals, there was talk of a “breakthrough” and of the need to accelerate the political process to include Haftar in the LPA and hold elections in a few months. A new emerging consensus focuses on accelerating the political process through a meeting of delegations from the House of Representative and the Tripoli-based High Council of State and a roadmap for parliamentary and presidential elections. The plan could then be endorsed by the UN at its highest levels.If the demands of Haftar being met are preconditions to an agreement then there is almost no chance of any actual agreement. However, if they are not met then the meetings will have been in vain.

Toaldo notes that Serraj really does not have the power to make a deal that Haftar would accept. Most Tripoli and Misrata militia have distanced themselves from the deal. As he notes there could be further tensions and even clashes between militia supporting Serraj and those opposed. Toalda notes that militia associated with the former Salvation Government may also gain power as they oppose Serraj. Haftar may actually have seen that his political actions would cause divisions among his opponents.

Toaldo notes that the meeting does appear to signal a change of strategy for Haftar since before the meeting he claimed that it was pointless to negotiate with Serraj since he sees his support as coming from militia and radicals his Operation Dignity intends to defeat. No doubt Haftar has been under considerable pressure from his backers in Egypt, the UAE and Russia to engage in political dialogue. Haftar could not afford to alienate his key backers. Toaldo describes his new strategy:Haftar’s new strategy is to abide by a reformed LPA with solid guarantees on his role as both military and civilian leader while pushing to have presidential elections early in 2018. The anti-Islamist former general would run in those elections as his moves to recruit campaigners throughout the country indicateToaldo thinks that he would win elections and then ask for help crushing his opponents and entering Tripoli.

However, Toaldo notes the numerous difficulties in carrying out this plan. Perhaps, it is not his plan at all. Haftar has always taken the view that their is a military solution the crisis. He may be going along with a plan pushed by his supporters and other in the international community which he knows will never be implemented because it will be rejected by his opponents inside and outside the GNA. When it fails because the other side will not negotiate an acceptable role for him in government he can ask the international community for military support to complete his Dignity Operation.

Toaldo himself notes:Ultimately, Haftar’s plan is not to abandon war to enter politics, but rather to use politics to strengthen his hand in a military battle that he knows he can’t win under current circumstances. For him, war is not the continuation of politics by other means, but rather the other way around: politics is a way to expand his support base and continue fighting.Toaldo warns that Europeans and Americans should think twice before supporting these negotiations that could lead to more war and help empower Haftar to take on well-armed militias in western Libya. Toaldo suggests that a better plan would be to concentrate on stabilizing the GNA government and making it more functional. This sounds sensible but seems unlikely to happen as most in the international community seem bound and determined to continue trying to give Haftar a prominent role in any unity government. It should have been evident some time ago this is not possible because so many are opposed to it.

Haftar has cleverly through his political move taken advantage of this opposition to create conflict among his opponents. A recent article reports that on the 8th and 9th of May militias opposed to the GNA mobilized south of Tripoli and deployed forces in the area in preparation for what they call `Libya Honor`. The group is led by Salah Badi a prominent Misrata militia commander and prominent in the Libya Dawn operation of 2014. The stage is being set for clashes among Haftar;s opponents. Haftar can wait until they are sufficiently weakened by internal fighting to carry out his vow in this tweet:

Khalifa Haftar: We will not leave our capital #Tripoli to become a haven for terrorists. #Libya

Mattia Toaldo's analysis of the Libya situation

Dr. Mattia Toaldo, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, recently released an extensive analysis of the present situation in Libya giving considerable background to help understand the present situation.

The entire article can be found here and is titled "Between Progress and Fragmentation". The good news about Libya for Toaldo is that the Islamic State is almost wiped out in its last main base in Libya, Sirte. However, he also claims that the other good news is that there is a Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) establishing the Government of National Accord (GNA).

While the defeat of the Islamic State is certainly a positive development, one could argue that the LPA, far from being a positive development, is part of the reason why there is still division in the country. The Libyan Dialogue meetings with representatives from the rival House of Representatives(HoR) government based in Tobruk and the Salvation government of the General National Congress based in Tripoli and other stakeholders considered several draft agreements promoted by former UN envoy Bernardino Leon. The meetings were meant to reach an agreement that would be approved by both parliaments. Leon was in an obvious conflict of interest since that at the same time he was in fact having conversations with officials from the UAE who favored the HoR government. He clearly tried to weaken the GNC and strengthen the HoR. He ended up taking a well-paying job as an academic in the UAE.

The new envoy, Martin Kobler, carried on trying to pass a final draft of the LPA through the two legislatures, but to no avail. What Kobler finally did was to gather together those members of the two parliaments who supported the LPA along with others and gather them together in Skhirat Morocco in December of 2014 to sign the LPA. Those from the two governments who signed were not authorised to do so by either government and neither parliament ever approved of the deal. In other words, the two parliaments were forced to accept a deal that neither had agreed to. Far from being a positive development the Skhirat agreement failed to produce the agreement the original dialogue was meant to forge. It alienated both parliaments.

The GNC resistance was solved by simply using the provisions of the LPA to reduce the GNC to virtual impotence. The LPA contained a provision that called for a State Council that would consist mainly of former members of the GNC. A member of the Presidential Council of the GNA drew up a list of members from those within the GNC who accepted the GNA. Hence, many members of the GNC left to take assured jobs within the State Council leaving the group with many fewer members. The GNA quickly took over ministries formerly run by the Salvation GNC government. The bizarre proceedings by which the State Council was formed are described in this article. State Council met as the GNC amended the constitutional declaration, accepted the LPA and then dissolved itself and then met as the High State Council. While the real GNC did not recognize the meeting, their offices were later seized by militia loyal to the GNA and then occupied by the newly minted High State Council. While the GNC governnemt has been reduced to an impotent shadow of its former self, the State Council remains problematic. It is meant to be a mainly consultative body but because the HoR has refused to vote confidence in the GNA there is not yet a legislature for the government. The State Council has declared itself the GNA's legislative body until such time as the HoR signs on to the GNA. As such it intends to appoint officials to key bodies. This is all happening because of another basic fault of the LPA, that the GNA never had but needs, the approval of the HoR in the form of a vote of confidence.

Those who framed the LPA apparently never realised that the HoR would not sign on to the LPA. The LPA gives a huge advantage to the HoR in that the HoR is the sole legislative body of the GNA. The former GNC government members dominated only the State Council which plays mostly a consultative role. Why did not the HoR members do as did most of the GNC members , jump at the chance of secure jobs? The basic reason is that to bring the GNC on board the UN had inserted two Articles 8 in the LPA one in the main body and another in the additional provisions. These provisions make the Presidential Council(PC) of the GNA, rather than Haftar, commander of the armed forces. It should have been crystal clear that Haftar would never accept this. He has been opposed to the dialogue and the LPA all along for this reason among others. Toaldo notes that this provision is blocking the approval of the agreement. Nevertheless he still sees the LPA as positive as among other things bringing forces together to fight the Islamic State. However, it is noteworthy that it did nothing to bring in Haftar to help defeat IS. He instead decided his time would be better spent seizing control of oil fields and attacking the jihadist Shura Council in Derna who were instrumental in driving out the Islamic State.

The UN has constantly violated the provisions of the LPA because otherwise it could not move forward with establishing the GNA. The most glaring violation was the avoidance of a formal vote on the LPA by the HoR. Instead, the UN went through a number of complicated gyrations designed to prove that really the GNA had been approved as described in this article. The next violation of the GNA will probably involve some way to work around Article 8 and provide Haftar a role to play in the new GNA armed forces. So far it is not clear that Haftar has the slightest interest in GNA proposals often advanced by PM Faiez Serraj.

As Toaldo notes, the country is still divided as it was before the agreement. As Toaldo puts it:Less optimistic is the fact that the country is as divided as ever, with the Tripoli-based GNA having only loose control of parts of the West and South of the country and the east being a de facto separate country under the dictatorship of renegade general Khalifa Heftar. Heftar receives support from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and increasingly from Russia.This is happening even though supporters of Haftar continue to give lip service to the primacy of the GNA and to UN resolutions on the issue.

Toaldo notes that Haftar started his Operation Dignity in the spring of 2014, with the goal "of wiping Libya clean of everything that smelled of political Islam'". He fails to mention that even earlier in February he tried to stage a coup against the government and that as part of Operation Dignity the parliament buildings were vandalized and burned as shown on the appended video. Included as targets in Operation Dignity are most militia associated with the GNA including the Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous mostly brigades from Misrata leading the offensive against the Islamic State in Sirte.

As Toaldo notes, extensive negotiations are under way to agree to some role for Haftar in a unified GNA. It is not clear how such an agreement can be successful without alienating Haftar's many opponents resulting in the breakdown of the GNA. Toaldo argues that Haftar actually benefits from the blockage as he has extended his power by seizing ports of the oil crescent along with land formerly held by the Petroleum Forces Guard that extend to within about 50 kilometers of Sirte. He is increasing his power by replacing civilian authorities in cities by military officials. Haftar continues to sabotage reconciliation attempts by the GNA.

Some see the division of the country, with Cyrenaica in the east coming under control of Haftar while the GNA controls the rest, as a solution to the impasse. Toaldo points out that there would be no consensus as to where the border line should be drawn. He thinks that there would be a contest for the oil crescent region. However, this is already controlled by Haftar. Toaldo could mention that the Zintan militia, loyal to Haftar, control a considerable portion of western Libya. It is not clear how willing parts of the south would be to join the GNA.

Toaldo suggests:A national dialogue initiative could be facilitated by the UN (Special Envoy Martin Kobler is already moving in this sense) and receive the logistical and financial support of the GNA while remaining independent from government control. It should support a country-wide conversation on crucial issues such as, to make a few examples, the fate of political prisoners, the distribution of oil wealth (with the goal of restarting oil production and avoiding the economic collapse of the country) or the social and political inclusion of members of the former regime without blood on their hands. This reconciliation initiative should go hand in hand with concrete moves by the GNA in Tripoli to reach out to the east, promoting decentralisation and addressing the issue of the building of a national army.We have already seen in a recent national dialogue that splits make such a dialogue difficult.

Toaldo is certainly correct that the GNA should move on and address key concerns of Libyans such as the liquidity crisis and power cuts. However, Toaldo says nothing about countering Haftar's aggressive moves to gain more power and over more territory except to reach out to the people of the east and address concerns that led them to support Haftar. It is not clear that Haftar will allow them to do that and he has already enlisted tribal support and placed military personnel in place of local authorities. They are unlikely to show any interest in unifying with the GNA. Haftar may very well be planning to continue with Operation Dignity and eventually with the help of militia allies in the west, liberate, Tripoli, Misrata, and also Sirte from the GNA which he considers dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist gangs.

Toaldo argues that the LPA itself contains the tools for a solution to the problem of stalled and perhaps fruitless negotiations to accommodate Haftar:That agreement contains itself the tools that allow to unlock the process: for instance, article 16 and 17 say that the House of Representatives must become a truly neutral body and not Heftar’s political branch. It should sit in a neutral location and all members should be free to express their vote, unlike what’s happened in the past.

Yet the two articles say nothing about the HoR becoming a neutral body and nothing about Haftar. It does say that a meeting of the HoR should determine a location for it to meet. The deadline for article 17 to be implemented was September 17 2015, over a year ago.These articles surely come into play only in the context of article 13:Article (13) The House of Representatives, elected in June 2014, shall undertake the legislation authority for the transitional period, granting the vote of confidence or no confidence to the Government of National Accord as per the items of this Agreement, adopting the general budget, performing oversight over the executive authority and endorsing the public policy submitted by the Government. In other words, it would seem that before the tools in the two articles can be used there must first be the vote of confidence in the GNA that has yet to happen.

Toaldo himself notes that the LPA and a constitutional amendment by the HoR represent the only way to extend the Tobruk's role as GNA legislature, as the mandate of the HoR expired last October. Yet it is not clear that the HoR is willing to vote such an amendment when it will not accept the GNA. The HoR is not worried about extending its mandate. It regards its own extension of the mandate as legitimate and could care less about what the GNA and its supporters think about that.

If the HoR does not vote through a constitutional amendment Toaldo argues that the US and EU should " stop recognising simultaneously the government in Tripoli and the political branch of its rival in Tobruk." The US and EU have already supported UN resolutions that expressly forbid them to recognize both. In reality, the GNA's own National Oil Company (NOC) recognizes Haftar and the HoR as does the Central Bank by paying salaries for the HoR and the LNA I expect. Not hedging their bets by supporting Haftar and the HoR would leave the way open for the UAE, Egypt, Russia, and others to gain influence in Libya through support of Haftar at the expense of the US and some EU countries.

In my opinion, one of the main priorities of the GNA should be to build up its armed forces and try to gain support from foreign countries for repelling any further advance of Haftar, which could very well include attacks on Tripoli as he has threatened in the past.

Suggestions for a way forward in Libya

Mattia Toaldo a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations has a recent article in the Middle East Eye recommending a way forward in Libya for the United States and the EU.

This article critically analyzes some aspects of Toaldo's position. Toaldo notes that it is important not to just look at what the US and others are doing militarily in Libya, but what their policies are and should be. Toaldo says that both the EU and Americans have been active in the process of setting up the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). He claims that the joint US and EU actions led Russia and powers such as Egypt and the UAE to "sign up for extended support for the GNA" even though their "hearts wallets, and arms stockpiles" were on the side of the rival House of Representatives (HoR) government. However, this appears to be mainly lip service rather than actual support. Russia, Egypt, and the UAE continue to support Haftar and the HoR government in actuality.

Toaldo says that the US and several EU countries are conducting negotiations with various countries in the region to try to get Haftar to serve under the leadership of the GNA and thus have a unified command for LIbya. But these negotiations appear to have gone nowhere. There has been no further meetings for the HoR to sign on to the GNA and there is no indication that Haftar has agreed to serve under a unified PC command. This would involve giving up the position that he is commander in chief of the Libyan National Army and will remain such in any new unity government. He has refused even to talk to Martin Kobler Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) even though Kobler requested talks several times.

While Toaldo is right that the UK and the EU tried to keep crucial institutions such as the National Oil Company and Central Bank independent, they were hardly successful in doing so as the east set up its own NOC and tried to export oil without approval from the NOC. The GNA in effect recognized the parallel NOC by negotiating a merged NOC. The merger is likely still not consummated as the HoR made further demands that wil have to be met before it will agree to it The HoR is still demanding that to export oil, tankers must have a permit from the eastern NOC. There was also an agreement with the eastern Central Bank of Libya (CBL) which in effect gives recognition to it. Separate banknotes were printed for the eastern CBL. The eastern NOC does not support the GNA. Toaldo notes: "Perhaps most critically, the US has been at the forefront of efforts to make sure that only Libya’s central government could sell oil, effectively discouraging any attempts to split the country. " The HoR is using the threat of military action against tankers if they do not have permits from the eastern NOC. Haftar and southern tribes who control oil fields feeding into the Oil Crescent ports are demanding that they and the HoR agree to any export plan before they will allow oil to be pumped to the ports

Toaldo claims rightly that the new US military attacks in Sirte are part of a coordinated campaign and approved by the GNA as contrasted with earlier raids. US special forces have been at work for some time both supporting the Sirte offensive and efforts in Benghazi. Compared to the French involvement on the side of Haftar and the HoR, the US air strikes have led to less negative reactions. Toaldo suggests that the objections of the HoR and Hafter are rather hypocritical in that they accept support and arms from regional powers in violation of the arms embargo. Perhaps the EU and western powers are also hypocritical in having special forces who support Haftar and the HoR. Toaldo suggests that if the US strikes end up killing many civilians there could be stronger negative reactions. The Islamic State (IS) appears to be using civilians as shields. So far there are no reports of civilian casualties.

Toaldo suggests three main priorities in Libya for the EU and US. First is to strengthen the GNA. Unlike Kobler who stresses the urgent need of a unified government and a unified command, Toaldo considers this outcome unlikely. Toaldo says: Despite all diplomatic efforts, Haftar, who effectively controls the government in Tobruk and Beyda, is unlikely to willingly serve under an effective civilian government. His regional sponsors in Egypt and the UAE are unlikely to accept a unity government that includes anything that seems “Islamist” in any way. This means that there wouldn’t be a unity government, and most likely not one working from Tripoli.While Kobler at least until recently has emphasized achieving a unity government, Toaldo thinks this unlikely.

Instead, Toaldo suggests a priority that Kobler also shares, strengthening the GNA. The legitimacy of the GNA, Toaldo argues, should not be held hostage to the HoR or Haftar who are unlikely to grant power to the GNA by voting in confidence of the institution, as required by the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA.) Significantly, Toaldo does not really discuss the Skhirat agreement or even mention it by name. His proposals are in effect a recipe that could bypass the requirements of the LPA. Kobler is adept at using means to avoid dealing with conditions which he is unable to meet. He did this in the Skhirat agreement itself which avoided having either parliament approve an agreement that was supposed to be between them. He did it again by considering a signed letter and a meeting of the dialogue members as a green light to activate the GNA since he could not get a formal vote from the HoR. Now he needs a way to avoid having the HoR vote confidence in the GNA.

Instead of worrying about a vote of confidence from the HoR and thus having the HoR become the legislature of the GNA, Toaldo suggests a representative body but not a legislature:

The GNA is supposed to be an interim government tasked with bringing the country to new elections. But in the meantime, Libyans deserve to have an interim representative body and, if the HoR is not working, a temporary solution could be to ask municipalities to designate their representatives for a national body that, together with the Political Dialogue (the delegations that signed the UN-backed agreement), would hold the GNA accountable. These representatives could include current HoR members, mayors, tribal and social leaders.

Toaldo thinks that empowering these groups would achieve stability and would also facilitate coordination between local and central authorities. However, many local authorities are dependent upon militias for security. The local authorities may not be able to coordinate with central authorities unless this furthers the interests of those who provide security for the area. The Political Dialogue is not a dialogue at all. As it is now, it is a meeting of a select few whom Kobler thinks will support whatever new plan he has up his sleeve.

Toaldo reserves the role of Libyan legislature for the HoR alone, although with no unity government it cannot play such a role. In effect Toaldo is suggesting that the GNA can continue on indefinitely without a legislature. Toaldo thinks that these local representatives could hold the GNA responsible. But there is no formal mechanism by which they could do so. They cannot pass a vote of non-confidence in the GNA. The orders and plans to "restart public services and solve the economic crises" come from above although Toaldo does suggest that the project should be agreed to by the Libyan municipalities and the GNA. However, municipalities in areas loyal to the HoR and Haftar are not likely to participate in such a project so the division would remain.

The second priority for Toaldo is De-escalation. The "West" he claims should make sure that conflict in other parts of LIbya do not escalate. He thinks Benghazi is key. However, in Benghazi, Haftar and his Operation Dignity are hard at work clearing out what is left of the Shura Council of Benghazi fighters. There has never been any sign that the West has been able to stop Haftar and Operation Dignity, and supporters of Haftar, such as Egypt, also support the Operation. Toaldo does not mention Derna or Operation Volcano at all.

Finally, Toaldo recognizes that once the Islamic State is defeated in Sirte that local authorities need to take control rather than having those who liberated the city govern it. This is certainly a worthy aim but the Misrata brigades and others who paid a heavy price for driving the IS out of Sirte also need incentives for them to turn over authority to locals. This final priority appears to have the most likelihood of being realized. The other other two priorities appear to me quite problematic.

Interview with Toaldo and Eljarh on the Libyan situation in the Middle East Eye

The Middle East Eye had a recent interview with Mattia Toaldo, Policy Felllow for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and Mohamed Eljarh, non-resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The two analysts are asked a number of questions in an attempt to make sense of the complex series of happenings in Libya. The whole interview is well worth reading in its entirety and much superior to the reporting in most coverage of Libyan events in my opinion. Toaldo gives an interesting account of why the Libya Dawn militia did not come out in support of the Tripoli government and mount a fight against the GNA when it arrived in Tripoli.

He also suggests: Some people in Libya fear that the GNC might try to take the lead [in the GNA] because of the HOR not moving forward with its implementation. They fear that some Europeans and the United States might say "okay, the HOR doesn't want to play ball, the GNC State Council has been purged of its hardliners, so let's work with the GNC".Toaldo thinks that will not happen because the HoR has the backing of Egypt and the UAE. He does not think France or Italy will go against the wishes of these supporters of the HoR. Actually, they are supporters of Khalifa Haftar the commander in chief of the Libyan National Army who virtually controls the HoR. Some might worry that members of the Muslim Brotherhood could dominate "Libyan politics" but Toaldo thinks this unlikely. What could happen however is that to bring the HoR on board and support the GNA, the UN might allow Haftar to keep his position and if this happens the GNA might implode with Islamists and many others leaving.

Mohamed Eljarh notes that the HoR must meet and vote an amendment on the constitutional declaration of 2011 and also vote confidence in the GNA. Eljarh believes that there will most likely be a positive vote but Article 8 of the additional provisions still is an obstacle:Article 8 of the additional provisions states that all senior military positions would be reset as soon as the agreement is signed, but that has not been the case because the House of Representatives about seven weeks ago met and voted to drop Article 8 or freeze it completely. I think that will be one of the sticking points there. But my reading is that there will be a compromise and that we will see Article 8 frozen or dropped altogether and then we will see the GNA approved.

There are two articles 8. One in the main text and one in the additional provisions, the one that Eljarh refers to. What it actually says is this: All powers of the senior military, civil and security posts stipulated in the Libyan legislations and laws in force shall be transferred to the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers immediately upon signing this Agreement.This appears to say that the power of commander in chief is transferred to the PC. As I argued in an article back in the middle of January. Haftar lost his job back on December 17. Is that incorrect? Exactly why?

Eljarh says that it is "because the House of Representatives about seven weeks ago met and voted to drop Article 8 or freeze it completely." However, the article came into force immediately upon signing the agreement at Skhirat. Seven weeks ago is some time in February. It was already in force for some time but was ignored. The GNA ignored its own responsibilities under the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA).

The HoR has no power to drop an article or "freeze" an article, whatever that means. Even Kobler pointed out that the LPA had to be passed as it is before it could be amended. So how can there be such a compromise? It is legally impossible. Perhaps there will be more illegalities. The compromise Eljarh suggests breaks the terms of the LPA.

There is another section 8 that Eljarh does not even discuss that comes into effect immediately upon the vote of confidence in the GNA by the HoR, that is as soon as the term of the GNA begins:2. Terms of Reference of the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers: a. Assume the functions of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan army

The GNA has already declared itself alive and up and running without a vote by the HoR. One should think then that even if the GNA somehow managed to "freeze" the article 8 in the additional provisions the article in the main text should now be in force. These are plain and rather simple illegalities perpetrated by the UN and the GNA but somehow they are not considered even by serious analysts.

Eljarh notes the Haftar's position is that he is head of the army and he does not do politics, and that he will back any government that is approved by the HoR. But arguably Haftar controls the HoR. The PM has twice been prevented by Haftar from flying out of Libya. Note that he still insists that he is head of the army and if both sections 8 are somehow frozen or deleted he will remain in his position. There will be huge conflict within the GNA if and when the GNA names a new commander in chief. Haftar being beyond politics but having plenty of loyal followers with guns may just ignore any appointment as commander in chief that is not himself or someone who has his blessing.

Rome ministerial meeting supports signing of Libya Political Agreement

Foreign ministers from 17 countries and four international organizations wrapped up a meeting today in Rome with a statement supporting the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement(LPA), which also sets up a Government of National Accord(GNA).

John Kerry was a co-chair of the meeting along with Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni. All the participants expressed their willingness to cooperate with the GNA, which has yet to be formed or even agreed to. Someone or other, it is not yet clear who, is supposed to sign the LPA as of December 16. So far over several months neither parliament has signed the deal. All along, the UN has acted as if there were no question of the GNA coming into being. The senior officials named by the UN as part of the GNA have had talks with international officials from various countries and there have been several meetings to discuss mechanisms for delivering aid to the GNA. The fact that neither of the two rival governments have approved of the GNA is neither here nor there. The UN is going ahead regardless. The Tunis meeting of dialogue members, no doubt chosen because they approve the LPA, gave the appropriate veneer of legitimacy to the UN-sponsored LPA by agreeing to it and setting a date for signing it. This was followed by another stage of legitimizing the process when Kobler got the support of the UN Security Council. Today we have the final blessing by a huge gathering of international officials in Rome.

There is extensive coverage of the meeting by the BBC and the Guardian as well as VOA.among many others.

The BBC reports: "US Secretary of State John Kerry said he expected Libya's rival governments to sign a UN-backed agreement on Wednesday to form a unity government."Amazing that Kerry should say this. Neither the GNC nor the HoR have yet approved the LPA and there is no sign at all that Kobler intends to get their signature. The GNC has rejected the whole process going back to the Tunis meeting. The BBC report also says:Delegates from the two opposing administrations were at the talks in Rome, along with members from Western and Middle Eastern countries and the UN.It is not clear that these are "delegates" in the sense they were chosen by the rival governments. The presidents of both the rival governments support the alternative to the UN plan, the Libya-Libya agreement. The BBC continues with a statement which is an outright falsehood:

The rival governments agreed at talks in Tunis two days ago to sign the UN-backed political agreement on Wednesday, and Mr Kerry said he expected that to go ahead.

This is astonishing. What happened at Tunis was that Kobler gathered together select members of the Libya dialogue, including some from both the HoR and the GNC. That group approved the LPA. Neither government did so and there has been no meeting to vote on the issue.

Many of the reports on the Rome meeting consist of statements by select officials about their support of the LPA and the threat of the Islamic State in Libya, which makes a speedy setting up of the GNA imperative. There are a few who bring up very troubling issues. Mattia Toaldo, a policy expert at the European Council of Foreign Relations in London, said it was not known whether the two parliaments as a whole will go along with the deal. He also wondered whether the new government would be able to sit in Tripoli because there might not be any security. As I see it, the UN is going ahead whether the two parliaments go along or not. There is no mention by Kobler that either parliament needs to sign. The GNC has rejected the UN meeting in Tunis and warned the UN that Al-Makzhoum the GNC member who signed the LPA was not authorized to do so or to announce the agreement, and was not even a member of their negotiating committee. He is not authorized to sign on Wednesday.

Emma Bonino, a former Foreign Minister of Italy, and Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the president and CEO of International Crisis Group, the independent conflict-prevention organization, also note the head of the GNA will be Faez Serraj, a little-known politician prior to his nomination by the UN to head the GNA. In fact his name was not suggested by the HoR. The GNC did not submit any names. The two suggest security conditions will prevent the GNA meeting in Tripoli. Actually it is not clear the GNA could meet anywhere in Libya under control of the forces of the GNC or the HoR since both the Libya Dawn militia and General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the HoR Libya National Army, reject the LPA. Haftar considers the forces of the rival GNC Islamist terrorists and refuses to negotiate with them or agree to a ceasefire. It is not clear who if anyone will pay the least attention to the ceasefire call from the Rome meeting. Haftar wll agree to it but on condition that he continue with the war against Islamic terrorism. He will go on with his Operation Dignity meant to clear Libya of Islamists that he started back in May 2014.

The two authors suggest any attempt to locate the GNA in Tripoli could result in faction-fighting in Tripoli for control of the capital. They also point out the GNA might have little influence in the east, where there is significant opposition to the UN deal and that the GNA could fuel secessionist settlement there. It is General Khalifa Haftar and allies in the east who represent the significant opposition to the GNA.

The previous UN envoy, Leon, said several times that any LPA is unenforceable without a parallel military agreement. Leon had no success in his own attempts to progress on this front. All he did was take advantage of a split in the GNC-linked militias and get some of them to sign on to the LPA. Since the Tunis meeting, the GNC has clearly denounced what has happened and disassociated itself from the UN process. From the HoR side there has been virtual silence even though the president of the HoR has so far opposed the LPA and supported the rival Libya-Libya plan. There are no reports as to what Haftar thinks of what is happening, even though he rejects the LPA. Meanwhile countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE all support the LPA now but they also support Haftar. These two positions are inconsistent. Perhaps there are deals being made behind the scenes we know nothing about. There may be some arrangement being made with Haftar that has prevented him from acting so far to disrupt the UN push for the LPA or even speak out against it. As events unfold what is actually happening may become clearer. It seems difficult to believe that the UN and international community would go ahead without some idea as to what the security situation would be for their new government.

CIA-linked Khalifa Haftar's alternative plan for Libya

A recent article in the Middle East Eye describes what the author, Mattio Toaldo, calls Khalifa Haftar's Plan B. The plan would replace that of the UN to create a unity Government of National Accord(GNA) supported by the existing two rival governments.

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The author is a policy fellow in the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations in London. The plan for the GNA is still ongoing. The UN special envoy to Libya, Bernardino Leon, who is organizing the dialogue between the rival governments, hoped to announce the names of the main officials of the GNA last night. However, that did not happen as the General National Congress(GNC) government requested more amendments to the final draft of the Libyan Political Agreement(LPA). Leon says there can be no amendments. Neither parliament, including the internationally-recognized House of Representatives(HoR) has agreed yet to the final draft even though both sides sent negotiators to the recent meetings in Skhirat Morocco. The HoR earlier rejected the draft since it already contained some amendments to address concerns on the GNC. Leon managed to convince the HoR to send representatives to recent meetings at the UN in New York and now at Skhirat.

The alternative plan by Khalifa Haftar, the CIA-linked commander of the HoR armed forces, would wreck or stall the UN talks while continuing the already existing division of the country but giving him greater control of the HoR. Taldo notes Haftar started the whole conflict back in 2014. Haftar first launched a failed coup in February and then his Operation Dignity, designed to rid Libya of Islamists in May of the same year. Ironically as part of Operation Dignity, the Libyan parliament buildings were burned down while at the time Abdullah al-Thinni was prime minister. He denounced Haftar's action. Now as prime minister of the HoR he appointed Haftar commander of the HoR armed forces, the Libyan National Army.

Recently the HoR unilaterally extended its mandate beyond October 20. This was Leon's deadline for the new Government of National Accord(GNA) to take over as the HoR mandate expires. The UN plan was also to extend the HoR mandate but with the agreement of the GNC and under the terms of the GNA. The HoR claims that their move was necessary to avoid a "power vacuum" should the UN plan fail. According to Toaldo the HoR discussed several options. One would just see the HoR continue to govern without agreeing with the rival GNC or accepting the UN plan. Other options included conferring all powers to a temporary president or declaring a state of emergency with a military council governing the country. This last option is part of Haftar's Plan B with himself as head of the council. Haftar has from the first rejected the UN LPA since under it, the function of commander in chief of the GNA armed forces would be carried out by senior officials of that government. He would be sidelined temporarily and likely permanently as the military leadership would be "reset." The GNC and other opposition groups will never accept Haftar as commander of the national armed forces voluntarily.

Toaldo notes Haftar has all along been attempting to scuttle any deal. The possibility of a power void after October 20 gives him an opportunity to consolidate his power over the HoR government. Haftar had to make it clear to prime minister Al-Thinni who was in charge. Haftar has twice stopped Al Thinni, supposedly his boss, from flying out of Libya, once to a meeting, and the other time for a holiday at Eid. Toaldo claims: Last weekend, the two met at Haftar’s headquarters in the eastern city of al-Marj. The agreement they reached establishes Haftar’s “oversight” over Thinni’s cabinet. From now on, the names of the minister of defence and of the minister of the interior will have to be “agreed” by the two. A peculiar agreement if one thinks that theoretically Libya is due to have a national unity government in less than two weeks.

Even under the continuation of the "fiction" of a civilian government, Haftar would have the advantage of continued recognition. In spite of being threatened with sanctions, Haftar has the support of Egypt, the UAE and the Arab League. He recently signed a military deal with Jordan. Toaldo says Haftar would be disappointed by a joint statement in which the U.S. and many other countries said the UN agreement “will also grant legitimacy to the institutions of the future state of Libya. Any step which jeopardises this agreement is unhelpful.” No doubt Haftar will take such a statement as meaningless rhetoric, just as was the EU naming him as a person to be sanctioned for trying to scuttle the peace process. Haftar no doubt looks at what the international community does, not the rhetoric meant to show how committed to a peaceful political settlement it is.

Toaldo says western reaction to Haftar's plan will be important in determining the future of Libya. He believes the U.S. and EU have little to gain by supporting or not opposing Haftar's plan. He claims it would be a green light for de facto partition of the country. Of course Haftar believes that with support from Arab States and no doubt Russia, he can gain enough military might to defeat the GNC and retake the rest of the country. He is not in favour of division of the country. An Operation Dignity spokesperson has even announced a planned military operationalong the lines of that in Yemen. Toaldo points out that without the GNA the EU would be without a partner for negotiations on EU operations in Libya and its coastal waters to deal with the immigrant issue. However neither of the two rival governments would agree to EU plans since both regard them as a violation of their sovereignty. There is no guarantee that the GNA would agree either. The international community no doubt hopes that in return for a great deal of aid they will be allowed by the GNA to carry out their planned military intervention in Libya to fight the Islamic State and "ensure security".

Toaldo suggests that if there is no agreement by October 20, the U.S. and EU could suspend any recognition for any Libyan government until there is a deal. This would just help out Russia, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states who would continue to recognize the HoR. The EU and US would lose influence in the HoR. Even if there were agreement on a unity government, there would be no parallel military agreement. This is essential, as Leon admits, for the LPA to be implemented. Haftar vows never to agree to a ceasefire with the GNC forces, considers them terrorists and continues Operation Dignity against them as well as the Islamic State.

Rival Libyan governments meet to discuss unity government UN draft plan

Talks to form a unity government in Libya resumed in Skhirat Morocco resumed on Friday June 26. The UN special envoy to Libya Bernardino Leon, provided the two rival governments with the 4th draft of a unity government plan prior to the meeting.

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The meeting is taking place nearly three weeks after Leon had provided the two sides with the draft. The Tripoli government was positive from the beginning but suggested an amendment that would give some recognition to the Supreme Court decision back in November that ruled the elections for the rival House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk were unconstitutional and the Tobruk-based parliament should be dissolved. The internationally-recognized government in Tobruk has always rejected the ruling and the international community has paid no attention either. The UN said it was studying the matter after the decision. It has said nothing about it since. The Tripoli amendment will not be acceptable to the HoR representatives. I expect the amendment might be used as a negotiating tool to extract concessions from Tobruk. Samir Ghattas, spokesperson for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) said that he hoped that this would be the final session of the unity talks. That same hope was expressed at the last meetings.

The Tobruk government at first simply rejected the fourth draft entirely. No doubt it was pressured by western powers to approve the draft and continue with the talks. The government at first was split upon whether it would continue with the talks but eventually agreed to attend after proposing amendments that would in effect take away any significant political power from the Tripoli government. There is no way the Tripoli government can accept the Tobruk amendments. More details of the amendments and their significance can be found in this article.The HoR would be the sole legislative body and the State Council would be reduced to an advisory role with no power to block legislation if the Tobruk amendments were accepted. The Tripoli representatives would have far less than a majority in the Council even at that. Nevertheless Leon said:"We are getting closer to a solution. Obviously, the fact that all the participants in the dialogue have accepted the fourth draft as a basis for a final solution is extremely encouraging."Amendments proposed by Tobruk cannot possibly be accepted by Tripoli since they would render the Tripoli government completely impotent. The Tripoli amendment can never be accepted by Tobruk either since Tobruk does not even recognize the legitimacy of the decision. The acceptance of both of the fourth draft as a basis for negotiation does nothing to solve a continuing conflict about the nature of the unity government.

Mattia Toaldo of the European Council on Foreign Relations had a more realistic assessment:"It is as complicated as it has ever been, but now there is a solution that takes into account the complications. Local ceasefires cannot hold for long absent of a national agreement."It remains to be seen whether there actually is a solution. The ceasefires Toaldo refers to were negotiated between the Tripoli government and various militia in the west with which they have fought. The UN was not involved.

Leon realizes that any political solution is possible only if there is a parallel military solution. He intends to meet with the military forces of each side. However, he met with the Misrata militia without ever clearing the issue with the official military of the Tripoli government. This resulted in a complaint to the UN by the Tripoli government. Leon has yet to meet with the military of the Tobruk government. The head of that military, Khalifa Haftar, has said many times he would never agree to a ceasefire with the Tripoli militias. Leon cannot even go to Tobruk. Last time he went his plane could not land because of protesters. He is to meet representatives of the Libyan military in Cairo. Khalifa Haftar's name is not even mentioned even though he is the most important person in the armed forces of Tobruk. Haftar thinks that there is a military solution to the problem of a divided government and that is his Operation Dignity that began in May 2014 and continues to this day with the support of the Tobruk government. The UN manages to somehow ignore all these relevant facts. How do you negotiate a ceasefire with someone who refuses to negotiate with the other forces, that is Libya Dawn. He calls them terrorists to be defeated. Leon so far has reported only that he met with the Misrata militia as part of the parallel military meetings.