Mattia Toaldo's analysis of the Libya situation

Dr. Mattia Toaldo, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, recently released an extensive analysis of the present situation in Libya giving considerable background to help understand the present situation.

The entire article can be found here and is titled "Between Progress and Fragmentation". The good news about Libya for Toaldo is that the Islamic State is almost wiped out in its last main base in Libya, Sirte. However, he also claims that the other good news is that there is a Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) establishing the Government of National Accord (GNA).

While the defeat of the Islamic State is certainly a positive development, one could argue that the LPA, far from being a positive development, is part of the reason why there is still division in the country. The Libyan Dialogue meetings with representatives from the rival House of Representatives(HoR) government based in Tobruk and the Salvation government of the General National Congress based in Tripoli and other stakeholders considered several draft agreements promoted by former UN envoy Bernardino Leon. The meetings were meant to reach an agreement that would be approved by both parliaments. Leon was in an obvious conflict of interest since that at the same time he was in fact having conversations with officials from the UAE who favored the HoR government. He clearly tried to weaken the GNC and strengthen the HoR. He ended up taking a well-paying job as an academic in the UAE.

The new envoy, Martin Kobler, carried on trying to pass a final draft of the LPA through the two legislatures, but to no avail. What Kobler finally did was to gather together those members of the two parliaments who supported the LPA along with others and gather them together in Skhirat Morocco in December of 2014 to sign the LPA. Those from the two governments who signed were not authorised to do so by either government and neither parliament ever approved of the deal. In other words, the two parliaments were forced to accept a deal that neither had agreed to. Far from being a positive development the Skhirat agreement failed to produce the agreement the original dialogue was meant to forge. It alienated both parliaments.

The GNC resistance was solved by simply using the provisions of the LPA to reduce the GNC to virtual impotence. The LPA contained a provision that called for a State Council that would consist mainly of former members of the GNC. A member of the Presidential Council of the GNA drew up a list of members from those within the GNC who accepted the GNA. Hence, many members of the GNC left to take assured jobs within the State Council leaving the group with many fewer members. The GNA quickly took over ministries formerly run by the Salvation GNC government. The bizarre proceedings by which the State Council was formed are described in this article. State Council met as the GNC amended the constitutional declaration, accepted the LPA and then dissolved itself and then met as the High State Council. While the real GNC did not recognize the meeting, their offices were later seized by militia loyal to the GNA and then occupied by the newly minted High State Council. While the GNC governnemt has been reduced to an impotent shadow of its former self, the State Council remains problematic. It is meant to be a mainly consultative body but because the HoR has refused to vote confidence in the GNA there is not yet a legislature for the government. The State Council has declared itself the GNA's legislative body until such time as the HoR signs on to the GNA. As such it intends to appoint officials to key bodies. This is all happening because of another basic fault of the LPA, that the GNA never had but needs, the approval of the HoR in the form of a vote of confidence.

Those who framed the LPA apparently never realised that the HoR would not sign on to the LPA. The LPA gives a huge advantage to the HoR in that the HoR is the sole legislative body of the GNA. The former GNC government members dominated only the State Council which plays mostly a consultative role. Why did not the HoR members do as did most of the GNC members , jump at the chance of secure jobs? The basic reason is that to bring the GNC on board the UN had inserted two Articles 8 in the LPA one in the main body and another in the additional provisions. These provisions make the Presidential Council(PC) of the GNA, rather than Haftar, commander of the armed forces. It should have been crystal clear that Haftar would never accept this. He has been opposed to the dialogue and the LPA all along for this reason among others. Toaldo notes that this provision is blocking the approval of the agreement. Nevertheless he still sees the LPA as positive as among other things bringing forces together to fight the Islamic State. However, it is noteworthy that it did nothing to bring in Haftar to help defeat IS. He instead decided his time would be better spent seizing control of oil fields and attacking the jihadist Shura Council in Derna who were instrumental in driving out the Islamic State.

The UN has constantly violated the provisions of the LPA because otherwise it could not move forward with establishing the GNA. The most glaring violation was the avoidance of a formal vote on the LPA by the HoR. Instead, the UN went through a number of complicated gyrations designed to prove that really the GNA had been approved as described in this article. The next violation of the GNA will probably involve some way to work around Article 8 and provide Haftar a role to play in the new GNA armed forces. So far it is not clear that Haftar has the slightest interest in GNA proposals often advanced by PM Faiez Serraj.

As Toaldo notes, the country is still divided as it was before the agreement. As Toaldo puts it:Less optimistic is the fact that the country is as divided as ever, with the Tripoli-based GNA having only loose control of parts of the West and South of the country and the east being a de facto separate country under the dictatorship of renegade general Khalifa Heftar. Heftar receives support from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and increasingly from Russia.This is happening even though supporters of Haftar continue to give lip service to the primacy of the GNA and to UN resolutions on the issue.

Toaldo notes that Haftar started his Operation Dignity in the spring of 2014, with the goal "of wiping Libya clean of everything that smelled of political Islam'". He fails to mention that even earlier in February he tried to stage a coup against the government and that as part of Operation Dignity the parliament buildings were vandalized and burned as shown on the appended video. Included as targets in Operation Dignity are most militia associated with the GNA including the Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous mostly brigades from Misrata leading the offensive against the Islamic State in Sirte.

As Toaldo notes, extensive negotiations are under way to agree to some role for Haftar in a unified GNA. It is not clear how such an agreement can be successful without alienating Haftar's many opponents resulting in the breakdown of the GNA. Toaldo argues that Haftar actually benefits from the blockage as he has extended his power by seizing ports of the oil crescent along with land formerly held by the Petroleum Forces Guard that extend to within about 50 kilometers of Sirte. He is increasing his power by replacing civilian authorities in cities by military officials. Haftar continues to sabotage reconciliation attempts by the GNA.

Some see the division of the country, with Cyrenaica in the east coming under control of Haftar while the GNA controls the rest, as a solution to the impasse. Toaldo points out that there would be no consensus as to where the border line should be drawn. He thinks that there would be a contest for the oil crescent region. However, this is already controlled by Haftar. Toaldo could mention that the Zintan militia, loyal to Haftar, control a considerable portion of western Libya. It is not clear how willing parts of the south would be to join the GNA.

Toaldo suggests:A national dialogue initiative could be facilitated by the UN (Special Envoy Martin Kobler is already moving in this sense) and receive the logistical and financial support of the GNA while remaining independent from government control. It should support a country-wide conversation on crucial issues such as, to make a few examples, the fate of political prisoners, the distribution of oil wealth (with the goal of restarting oil production and avoiding the economic collapse of the country) or the social and political inclusion of members of the former regime without blood on their hands. This reconciliation initiative should go hand in hand with concrete moves by the GNA in Tripoli to reach out to the east, promoting decentralisation and addressing the issue of the building of a national army.We have already seen in a recent national dialogue that splits make such a dialogue difficult.

Toaldo is certainly correct that the GNA should move on and address key concerns of Libyans such as the liquidity crisis and power cuts. However, Toaldo says nothing about countering Haftar's aggressive moves to gain more power and over more territory except to reach out to the people of the east and address concerns that led them to support Haftar. It is not clear that Haftar will allow them to do that and he has already enlisted tribal support and placed military personnel in place of local authorities. They are unlikely to show any interest in unifying with the GNA. Haftar may very well be planning to continue with Operation Dignity and eventually with the help of militia allies in the west, liberate, Tripoli, Misrata, and also Sirte from the GNA which he considers dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist gangs.

Toaldo argues that the LPA itself contains the tools for a solution to the problem of stalled and perhaps fruitless negotiations to accommodate Haftar:That agreement contains itself the tools that allow to unlock the process: for instance, article 16 and 17 say that the House of Representatives must become a truly neutral body and not Heftar’s political branch. It should sit in a neutral location and all members should be free to express their vote, unlike what’s happened in the past.

Yet the two articles say nothing about the HoR becoming a neutral body and nothing about Haftar. It does say that a meeting of the HoR should determine a location for it to meet. The deadline for article 17 to be implemented was September 17 2015, over a year ago.These articles surely come into play only in the context of article 13:Article (13) The House of Representatives, elected in June 2014, shall undertake the legislation authority for the transitional period, granting the vote of confidence or no confidence to the Government of National Accord as per the items of this Agreement, adopting the general budget, performing oversight over the executive authority and endorsing the public policy submitted by the Government. In other words, it would seem that before the tools in the two articles can be used there must first be the vote of confidence in the GNA that has yet to happen.

Toaldo himself notes that the LPA and a constitutional amendment by the HoR represent the only way to extend the Tobruk's role as GNA legislature, as the mandate of the HoR expired last October. Yet it is not clear that the HoR is willing to vote such an amendment when it will not accept the GNA. The HoR is not worried about extending its mandate. It regards its own extension of the mandate as legitimate and could care less about what the GNA and its supporters think about that.

If the HoR does not vote through a constitutional amendment Toaldo argues that the US and EU should " stop recognising simultaneously the government in Tripoli and the political branch of its rival in Tobruk." The US and EU have already supported UN resolutions that expressly forbid them to recognize both. In reality, the GNA's own National Oil Company (NOC) recognizes Haftar and the HoR as does the Central Bank by paying salaries for the HoR and the LNA I expect. Not hedging their bets by supporting Haftar and the HoR would leave the way open for the UAE, Egypt, Russia, and others to gain influence in Libya through support of Haftar at the expense of the US and some EU countries.

In my opinion, one of the main priorities of the GNA should be to build up its armed forces and try to gain support from foreign countries for repelling any further advance of Haftar, which could very well include attacks on Tripoli as he has threatened in the past.

Libyan Presidency Council meets to select new cabinet

The Presidency Council (PC) of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is meeting today (August 28) to choose eight new ministers to present for a vote of confidence to the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR)

There had been earlier reports that the list of new members had already been presented to the HoR as discussed in a recent Digital Journal Article. The meeting today was discussed yesterday by the Libya Herald :

Tomorrow it will be back to the drawing board when Faiez Serraj and his fellow members of the Presidency Council sit down for the third time to produce a cabinet for the Government of National Accord acceptable to the House of Representatives. Their second attempt, drawn up way back in February, was finally thrown out this week by parliament. It has demanded that the PC come up with a smaller cabinet with no more than eight ministries.This report confirms the fact that the HoR has demanded a cabinet of just 8 ministers. Achieving such a reduced number may be difficult as there are 17 ministers now although 4 have resigned. The report notes that Omar Al-Aswad from Zintan had ended his boycott so he could take part in selecting the new reduced cabinet. The Libya Herald claimed the other boycotter Ali Gatrani, a close ally of General Haftar, commander of the HoR forces, was unlikely to rejoin even though he had been urged to do so by Martin Kobler the UN envoy to Libya.

There are conflicting reports about whether Gatrani will rejoin the PC. Koblerhimself tweeted: "long, positive meeting w/ PC member Ali Qatrani. happy that he intends to re-join the Presidency Council". On the other hand the Libya Heraldreports: "Boycotting member of the Presidency Council (PC) Ali Gatrani is refusing to rejoin it, ostensibly on the grounds that that it is meeting in Tripoli." Another tweet claims that he has rejoined conditionally: "Deputy PM Ali Gitrani announces his conditional return to #GNA PresidencyCouncil but says PC should leave Tripoli." The return of the two boycotters, especially Gitrani, will ensure that the demands of the HoR and Haftar have more weight in determining the makeup of the new cabinet. The present defense minister is unlikely to be on the list since he is an opponent of Haftar.

Even though the two boycotters have rejoined, they along with two others of the nine member PC are not present at today's meeting, according to a recent tweet: "4 members are absent from the meeting: Musa al-Koni, Ali al-Gitrani, Omar al-Aswad, & Abdessalam Kajman (the latter3 are out of the country)." it is surprising that the PC is meeting with just over half of the members present. If decisions are made today then the others will be angry. No doubt more meetings will be required. PM of the GNA, Faiez Serraj, said that the meeting was crucially important: “It is taking place at a fateful and difficult time as the country suffers serious crises. This imposes on us the duty to forget our differences and make the country’s wider interests a priority”.

No mention is made of any solution to the status of General Khalifa Haftar. He rejects the role of the PC as commander in chief of the GNA armed forces and wants himself to be in that role. The present Libya Political Agreement(LPA) requires that the PC not Haftar be commander in chief. Until this issue is solved a new cabinet will not unify the country. However, it is quite likely that there will be continual problems even getting a vote of confidence from the HoR in a new cabinet and one can expect divisions within the PC on the issue.

LAT

HoR may meet in desert Libyan town of Al-Jufra to vote on GNA

The internationally recognized House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk was supposed to have voted confidence in the UN-brokered Government of National Accord on Tuesday February 23 but the vote did not place.

The meeting is discussed in a recent article in Digital Journal. Descriptions of what happened vary. At first the reason for not voting was said to be because there was lack of a quorum. However, later, 100 members of the HoR signed a document indicating they supported the GNA. Many reports then came out claiming that there was a quorum but about 10 spoilers described as Cyrenaican/Federalists disrupted the meeting and hence there was no vote.

The meeting was postponed until next week. There were also suggestions that the venue of the meeting be changed to avoid disruptions. Mohammed Al-Read, a member of the HoR, said on TV that a group of members of the HoR had gathered and proposed that the next meeting be held in the desert oasis town of Al-Jufra or Kufra. He claimed the members who endorsed the GNA are willing to hold a session in the town. Al-Jufra is an oasis town far in the south-east of Libya, probably best known as a stopping place for immigrants on route to the coast and then Europe. There is an airport at Al-Jufra so a plane could be chartered to fly the pro-GNA members there. It is not clear why the opponents could not do the same but perhaps there is some arrangement to prevent this. Who knows?

In a recent news release, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Martin Kobler doesn't even explicitly mention a vote of confidence in the HoR — instead there is vague phraseology. After welcoming the statement of support for the GNA signed by 100 members Kobler says:Martin Kobler welcomes this development that demonstrates the strong determination of the people of Libya and the overwhelming support by the majority within the HoR for the proposed GNA. In view of this public statement by the majority of parliamentarians, Mr. Kobler calls on the leadership of the HoR to take immediate steps to formalise this endorsement.While to formalize the endorsement could mean having a vote of confidence, perhaps the way is left open to get around the vote and use some other means. He could just gather together all those who favor the GNA in Kufra, have them vote approval and call that the vote of confidence. He used a similar stratagem to pass the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) on December 17 in Skhirat. Neither parliament ever approved the LPA. Skhirat was a gathering convened by Kobler of members of the Political Dialogue who approved the LPA. Of course, the meeting in Kufra would not be organized directly by Kobler, but by the prime minister-designate of the GNA, Faiez Serraj, with members of the HoR.

Al-Reaid's explanation of the disruption attributes it solely to demands for a better share of ministerial jobs:“I feel so disappointed with the riot and chaos that took place on Tuesday as the President of the HoR, Aqilah Saleh, was prevented from chairing the session and kick-starting it due to some MPs’ demands of ministerial posts for their own.”Other reasons given for opposition are that the Presidency Council is two large at nine and should be reduced to the original three. Also, some of the particular choices for cabinet positions are objected to. The official stories are suspicious. The lack of a quorum story contradicts the now prominent story of the spoilers preventing a vote together with the appearance of the letter with 100 signatures supporting the GNA. The latter story claims there was a quorum.

The letter signed by 100 HoR members provides a convenient device to bring in the cheerleaders. The international choir intones amen to approval of the GNA: The ambassadors – from the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the US and the UK – called on HoR President Ageela Salah “to acknowledge the approval by a majority of MPs” of the GNA and its programme.

We seem to be evolving towards a similar situation that happened before the Skhirat signing.

Back in October 2015 the UN Special Envoy to Libya, Bernardino Leon said in a press release:

As you know there has been a position announced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives followed by a statement signed by what seems to be a majority of the members insisting that there was no proper vote and that was no proper decision taken by the House of Representatives on the agreement. This has created some confusion and I am coming here today, first of all, to insist that the process goes on, that there is no chance for small groups or personalities to hijack this process, that a majority of the Libyans want a political solution, they don’t want any more confrontations. The Libyan people are the ones suffering the consequences of these confrontations and the responsibility of the Libyan actors involved in this process and the international community and the United Nations that are supporting them is mainly to respond to these Libyans that are suffering.A majority of the HoR were then also said to be in favor of the LPA but with the proviso that Haftar keep his job a requirement inconsistent with the GNA. The appended video is from Iranian Press TV at the time.

The HoR never did pass the GNA and Leon's term ended. Kobler carried on with the same Leon LPA draft allowing no changes. As mentioned, he did a run around the two parliaments, by having those favoring the LPA sign an agreement in Skihirat on December 17, but now is faced with the same problem as he needs the approval of the HoR before the GNA term can start. As with Leon, there is this narrative of the majority wanting the GNA as they did the LPA, but being stopped by some spoilers. This time though, the issue of the status of Haftar has been expunged from the story altogether. Perhaps the situation is evolving as Jason Pack describes recently :In an attempt to save the situation, UN envoy to Libya, Martin Kobler travelled hurriedly to Tubruq to meet with HoR President Ageela Salah as well as Fayez Serraj on 21 February, to push for a majority vote and immediate endorsement of both the LPA and the proposed GNA. Despite international pleas to save this process, PM-designate Serraj left Tubruq for Cairo, a day before the all crucial vote on the GNA Gov list. It is very evident from these developments that Haftar continues to enjoy widespread support in the East, especially now as the offensive to retake Benghazi has so far succeeded more than any other before it. The meaning of these developments is that a pro-Egypt or pro-UAE solution is materializing with International/Western plans for a GNA largely stymied. This solution could undo the gains of the UN negotiations making it easier for the Islamist-aligned groups (such as various militias in Misrata and Tripoli) to support ISIS and other jihadis against Haftar and the anti-Islamist forces. This reassertion of the binary blocs is a very dangerous place for Libya as the country teeters on the verge of an international intervention.

Pack ignores that other jihadist groups such as the Shura Council in Derna are having fierce fights with the Islamic State. The bombing by the Americans in Sabratha was applauded by the rival Tripoli-based General National Council(GNC) and condemned by the HoR. In Sabratha jihadists loyal to the GNC are fighting the Islamic State. The relation ot IS to the two competing governments in complex. The problem is that the Haftar does not distinguish between the Islamic State and other jihadist groups as his Operation Dignity intends to defeat them all. However, the GNC has links to many jihadist groups that Haftar is fighting.

Read more: http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/politics/op-ed-libyan-hor-may-meet-in-desert-town-of-al-jufra/article/458651#ixzz41QKieWaB

UN Libya special envoy presses for HoR approval of Government of National Accord

In a news release, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Libya, Martin Kobler, stresses the importance of a vote approving the new GNA cabinet list by the internationally recognized House of Representatives (HoR).

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The release was issued after Kobler met with HoR President Agila Saleh in Shahat, in eastern Libya on February 5. Kobler said the two had a long conversation about the political process. Kobler mentioned he had just returned from Rome where he met with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and a number of foreign ministers.

Kobler conveyed the message that it was now very important that the political process move ahead quickly. He said the Presidency Council of the GNA was meeting to draft the new list of cabinet ministers. Kobler said the list had to be based upon competency and the HoR should be ready to endorse the list when it was presented to them. President Saleh was in the past accused of being in opposition to the LPA and GNA and as having prevented the HoR from voting approval of the LPA. For a time, he cooperated with his rival the president of the General National Congress (GNC) in promoting a Libya-Libya dialogue in competition with the UN process. However, he is now said to support the GNA and LPA. Kobler gave no indication when the new cabinet list might be ready or when the HoR might vote on it. The earlier list of 32 ministries was rejected by the HoR back on January 25 or 26 and theGNA was given 10 days to send them a new short list. That deadline has run out as of today at latest. Kobler fails to mention the deadline in his news release. This is probably a sign that the deadline will be missed and he does not want to set another to be missed as well.

Kobler provides three reasons as to why the GNA needs approval so urgently. First is the expansion of Daesh or the Islamic State in the east, west and south. While this is true to some extent it is a bit exaggerated. The Islamic State actually lost the first and foremost city where it had its first foothold in Libya, Derna. It has been driven out of the city by the Shura Council and allies and has retreated to the mountains and one outlying area near the city. The threat of the Islamic State is being used to justify foreign military intervention. In turn, the GNA will be used as a means of legitimizing the intervention by requesting help to combat the Islamic State. A passage from this article sums up the plan: The West now seems to be concentrating its efforts on cobbling together some kind of fragile “unity government” that can provide a legal cover for the next war by inviting foreigners in to help defeat ISIS. But Italy, France and others are (rightfully) terrified of what ISIS strength in Libya could mean in terms of migrant flows and terrorists. Also, if ISIS gets access to Libya’s oil and gas fields, even at todays prices, this would be a lot of money for a group that has vowed endless war against the West.The narrative about the Islamic State obtaining revenue from gas and oil is also part of this process of manufacturing consent for foreign intervention. However, Daesh's strategy, seen clearly in its actions, is to destroy oil supplies by burning oil tanks and blowing up pipelines. This is hardly a revenue-producing strategy. Daesh is depriving Libya of revenue it needs desperately but this fact is not nearly as useful to justify intervention as the threat of the Islamic State getting more revenue and expanding.

Secondly, Kobler cites the humanitarian situation. All those foreign countries which are so anxious to have the GNA up and running so they can intervene militarily are not being prevented from providing aid now through the two rival governments.

The final reason is the the declining financial resources in the country. No doubt if the parties agree to the GNA much aid, financial and otherwise, would flow into the country. If the UN and foreign countries were so concerned with the financial situation in Libya they could offer financial aid now. They are using financial aid simply as a lever to pressure Libyans to accept the UN-brokered GNA. Kobler says that the GNA must be approved and move to Tripoli as soon as possible. The GNA needs to be there so that it can gain control of the Libyan Central Bank and National Oil Company and then proceed to starve the GNC of funds. The HoR is not likely to attempt to continue as a separate government since it will be the sole legislative body of the HoR. However, it remains to be seen if the HoR will actually approve the GNA. It must approve the LPA as well and pass a constitutional amendment. The HoR has insisted that Section 8 of the LPA that gives the function of commander in chief of the Libyan National Army to the Presidents Council of the GNA rather than Khalifa Haftar, be deleted. Haftar probably still has sufficient power to prevent the HoR approving the LPA unless they are assured he will stay on as commander in chief of the LNA. GNC signers of the LPA will not tolerate this and will leave the government if this happens. We will soon see whether a deal has been worked out with Haftar. Kobler mentions nothing about these crucial issues. This is standard protocol for UN news releases to leave out crucial facts when they interfere with the narrative they are pushing.

According to terms of LPA commander in chier Haftar on LNA lost his job back on December 17

At last, the UN has actually published the English text of the Libyan Political Agreement signed on December 17 in Skhirat, Morroco. There are some changes from the earlier draft of July 2, 2015.

The draft as of July 2 has long been available on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) website. I was surprised the draft as it was when signed by members of the Libyan Dialogue, including some from each of the rival governments, has just been published in English on the UN website. The draft was signed in Skhirat, Morocco on December 17, 2015. Publication of the English text is a welcome move towards some transparency by UNSMIL. I was particularly interested in seeing whether the status of Khalifa Haftar, the commander in chief of the Libyan National Army associated with the internationally-recognized House of Representative (HoR) located in Tobruk in eastern Libya, had changed. The rival General National Congress (GNC) government is located in the west in Tripoli. Once the GNA term begins after the HoR gives a vote of confidence suppporting the GNA, only the GNA will be recognized as the sole legal Libya government.

When I looked at Article 8 of the new text, in section 2, senior officials of the GNA, the Presidency Council are still assigned the job of commander in chief of the LNA once the GNA is approved by the HoR and its terms begins:2. Terms of Reference of the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers:

a. Assume the functions of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan armyI had always thought that it was this provision that those favoring Haftar had objected to in the LPA and why they support it only in principle and are demanding that Haftar remain as commander in chief of the LNA. However, to my astonishment there is an addition to Article 8 in what are called Additional Provisions added to the LPA. Part of the addition to article 8 reads as follows: Article (8)

All powers of the senior military, civil and security posts stipulated in the Libyan legislations and

laws in force shall be transferred to the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers immediately

upon signing this Agreement. The Presidency Council must take a decision on the occupants of such

posts within a period that does not exceed twenty (20) days. In case a decision is not reached during

this period, the Presidency Council shall take decisions on new appointments within a period that

does not exceed thirty (30) days...,

This is astonishing. The Presidential Council has had the powers of all senior military personnel including Haftar's role of commander in chief of the LNA since December 17. There is no sign that Haftar ever gave up his role nor has any other senior military official of the LNA. The Council was supposed to decide on who would occupy these posts within 20 days. There was not even an announcement as to whether the first 20 days deadline was missed. If the 30 days is to start after the 20 days then there would be 50 days in all so there would still be time for the appointments to be decided. However, this would be past the deadline for the formation of the GNA last Saturday in any event. What is clear is that the GNA has been violating the terms of the LPA since December 17, unless I am reading the text incorrectly.

Some time ago I criticized an article that suggested that the authority of the GNA was being challenged by Haftar since he was continuing as commander in chief of the Libyan National Army, even though the terms of the LPA stipulated that the Presidency Council had this role immediately upon the LPA being signed. I have not been able to locate the article but I must apologize to the author. He apparently was correct. It is astonishing that no one else has remarked on what is happening. Article 64 of the LPA states:Article (64)

The Libyan Political Dialogue may convene after the adoption of this Agreement at the request of

any party to the Agreement to examine what it deems a severe breach to one of its items.

Perhaps it is time that some of the signers of the LPA convene the Libyan Political Dialogue to examine some of the severe breaches of the LPA that have already taken place.

What is important is not the LPA, but the power politics behind it. Those powers will pay attention to the LPA only when it serves their purposes. Those powers are roughly the same countries that planned the first regime change in Libya, again under the auspices of the UN, with a no-fly zone resolution. Now you have a UN Security Council resolution pledging support and assistance for the GNA and sanctions against those who interfere with its establishment.

The powers behind this could not even be bothered to change the dates. You have ridiculous articles such as this:Article (65)The Constitutional Declaration shall be amended in accordance with the stipulations of this. Agreement as per the legally stated procedures and according to the proposal in Annex 4 of this Agreement within a date that does not exceed 20 October 2015.

Why would no one change the date? What sense does it make to sign an agreement with dates that ensure that as soon as you sign the agreement you have violated it? The agreement was signed on December 17, 2015.

UN press release fails to explain why GNA deadline was missed

The UN now has a press release on the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) website that discusses the missed deadline for formation of the Government of National Accord. The deadline was Saturday at midnight.

The first paragraph of the UN release says:

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) takes notes of the Presidency Council’s statement of 16 January informing of its decision to postpone announcement of the Government of National Accord (GNA) by 48 hours beyond the deadline stated in the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). While the Mission regrets the delay in announcing the GNA, it urges the Presidency Council to adhere to the new target date it has set itself. In this regard, UNSMIL emphasises the need for all concerned parties to ensure that the timelines outlined in the LPA are respected.The press statement does not see any consequences from the terms of the LPA being broken. Perhaps the signers of the LPA could feel differently. The UN stresses the need of all parties to see that the timelines in the LPA are respected. Given that there are no punishments for violating the deadlines why should the parties pay the least attention to admonitions not backed up by any punishments? The UN is no doubt telling the HoR that it must provide a vote of confidence in the GNA within the ten-day time frame. They will do so I expect only if their demands are met and this probably includes keeping Khalifa Haftar as commander in chief of the Libyan National Army.

Haftar just met at his military headquarters with 13 mayors who support the GNA. They issued a statement which said:The civic leaders, all from the east of the country, travelled to Hafter’s Marj headquarters. Afterwards they put out a statement warning that there was an uncrossable red line which must separate the armed forces from politics.This appears to be a roundabout way of saying that the political changes involved in the GNA must in no way impact or change the present structure of the armed forces with Haftar as commander-in-chief. This fits in with the claim by an HoR member that the GNA announcement was delayed because members from the east of Libya had threatened to suspend their membership in the GNA unless they were given assurances that Haftar would remain as commander-in-chief. The same member also claimed it was Kobler himself who pleaded for the extension of 48 so he could address those members' concerns. The Libya Observer also notes the eastern region officials are demanding Haftar be kept on as commander of the Libyan National Army(LNA) or there will be no Government of National Accord. However, if Haftar remains as commander in chief there likely will be no GNA either since the GNC members will never accept this. Also, for Haftar to remain as commander in chief of the LNA would violate the terms of the LPA since those terms say that the Presidency Council has the role of commander in chief of the LNA. Apparently Kobler does not wish to talk about these problems in public. Why there was no GNA at the deadline is not an issue worth discussing.

There is nothing in the UN's entire press release about this key issue nor any denial of the charge that Kobler himself had asked for the delay, but his statements imply that he regrets the decision and suggests that he had nothing to do with it. It was only the Presidency Council that decided this. The press release gives no explanation at all of why there needed to be a delay in the first place. What readers are supposed to be concerned about is the increased threat of attacks by the Islamic State or Daesh — the UN politically correct name — and the need for all Libyans to unite behind the GNA and fight terrorism. He actually mentions not only the Islamic State but Al Qaeda and Ansar al-Sharia as well. This last will please Haftar and no doubt the US, since Ansar al-Sharia are held responsible for the attack on the US consul in Benghazi that killed the US ambassador and several other Americans. Kobler constantly politicizes IS attacks in Libya, using them as a means to push for supporting the GNA.

The UN does not inform us in the news release that Kobler would meet with Ageela Salah, president of the HoR, and also separately with HoR members who have boycotted sessions. Obviously he is rounding up support to ensure that there will be a vote of confidence in the GNA within 10 days. In spite of claiming that a majority of the HoR members support the LPA and GNA, after four meetings there has never been a quorum. Salah made a point that explains why Kobler is suddenly trying to coax those who have boycotted the HoR to participate in the voting:Salah noted that to amend the Constitutional Declaration in order to integrate the LPA along with the Presidency Council and the new government into Libyan law would require a vote in favour by two thirds of the HoR. This, he reportedly pointed out would require the participation of the boycotting members.We could see some dramatic developments during the next few days in Libya. The HoR vote of confidence in the GNA must happen by January 26th. Of course, that is only if the LPA rules are followed. Meanwhile Kobler has to find some way of keeping Haftar as commander in chief of the LNA while not violating the terms of the LPA which take his position away at least temporarily. At the same time, he has to convince GNC members that Haftar will not stay on as commander in chief or that if he does there is nothing to worry about.

Kobler regrets missed deadline but one report claims he ordered the delay

As usual, the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Martin Kobler, ignores the most relevant facts in his statements. Even what he says is in direct contradiction to other reports.

According to the Libya Herald, Kobler condemned the extra 48 hours that have been taken by Faiez Serraj the Prime Minister designate of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord to create that government.Kobler said: “I regret the decision of the Presidency Council to postpone the formation of the Government of National Accord. Libya can no longer wait”. The UK ambassador Peter Millett called the delay disappointing because the GNA was needed to deal with terrorism and rescue the economy. Translated, this means the GNA is needed to give permission for foreign intervention and in return will receive economic aid. It is also needed so that a western-approved government controls the National Oil Company, the Central Bank and the $57 billion in frozen Libyan assets. This will give the GNA a great deal of ammunition to buy off opposition. Reportedly, Kobler is talking with HoR president Ageela Salah pressing him to ensure that the HoR approves the LPA along with a vote of confidence in the GNA. For some time now we have been assured that a majority of the HoR favor the LPA and GNA and this includes Salah. Yet the HoR met four times with no quorum. What on earth could be wrong, SRSG Kobler? The deadline under the LPA for the GNA to be formed was yesterday. There is likely no legal basis for extending the time, and signers of the LPA could claim the agreement is now void and needs to be redone. Kobler says nothing of all this.

Anyone observing the spin put on events by Kobler and others can see what might be coming. The majority support in the HoR for the GNA has always been in principle, with at least one proviso being that Khalifa Haftar remain as commander in chief of the Libyan National Army(LPA). The LPA, at least according to the last text available in English, assigns the function of commander in chief of the LNA to the Presidency Council of the GNA, not Haftar. Haftar could later be appointed again as commander in chief,but if he is, the GNA will probably not be able to function, because of the divisions this would create. Those from the GNC and the militias associated with it would never agree to Haftar as leader of the LNA. Haftar's Operation Dignity. that for the most part started the civil war in May of 2014, is aimed at ridding Libya of Islamists and that includes those associated with the GNC, whom he calls terrorists. Kobler has insisted all along that no changes can be made to the LPA. It may be difficult to know if changes are made since the UN has not seen fit to post the text in English of the LPA as signed on December 17 at Skhirat. Given this is claimed to be such a historic document it is strange that it appears impossible to find it on line, in English at least. If anyone has a link please post it in comments. My version is from July. Those opposed to any changes made will certainly make public what has happened if it is changed.

The pro-GNC Libya Observer claims that the UN Support Mission in Libya(UNSMIL) is in limbo because of the fate of General Khalifa Haftar in the GNA. The Observer reports: Tobruk parliament hardliner Issa Al-Araibi said Saturday that Cyrenaica members in the government of concord were about to issue a statement announcing their membership suspension from the Presidency Council due to lack of guarantees for what he called "the Libyan army", Khalifa Haftar's de facto armed groups.In other words, many who are now in the government from the east or Cyrenaica, are there only because they believe they were promised that Haftar would remain as commander in chief, even though this clearly would violate the LPA.

Even more revealing, the Observer reports that on Jordan-based 218 TV channel Al Araibi claimed that it was Kobler himself who asked for a delay of 48 hours so that he could fulfill their demands: “Kobler called Ali Al-Gotrani (deputy prime minister) and begged him for a span of 48 hours promising to bring the needed support for the army from the United Nations, so we are here waiting for the approval of our demands.”

Al-Airibi said the group would not discuss any names for ministerial portfolios until their demands are guaranteed. Those demands he said include support for General Khalifa Haftar's army, the LNA, lifting the arms embargo on weapons sales to the army and keeping in place the army leadership. They also demand a funds commission for helping to rebuild Benghazi, and also distributing the political occupations between the three regions equally. I thought the last demand was agreed upon by all sides. Al-Araibi said that the presidency council had not responded yet to these demands.

The GNC meanwhile re-iterated their rejection of the Serraj GNA government. The Libya-Libya dialogue is still in process as described in this article. However, it is much weakened by the departure of the president of the HoR Ageelah Salah from the group.

Meanwhile, without noting the likely illegality of the GNA extension of the time for its formation Kobler tweets:Translated from Arabic by Bing

Urge the Presidential Council to abide by the new calendar proclaimed and ensure the formation of a Government of national reconciliation as soon as possibleTranslated this means he is urging himself to get to work to find a new fix for the disaster that is looming closer and closer.

GNA announcement postponed for two days after deadline missed

According to the terms of the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) signed on December 17 in Skhirat, Morocco, the Government of National Accord(GNA) must be formed and its political program presented to the House of Representatives by midnight tonight.

The Libya Herald reports the announcement of the formation of the GNA has been postponed for 48 hours or two days. This violates the terms of the LPA. It is hardly a surprise that there is a rumour that the Libya Dialogue team who signed the LPA insisted that if there were no government chosen by the deadline, the present Presidential Council would be sacked and a new group chosen.

The membership of the Presidency Council is described in Article 8 of the LPA together with its functions. The latest text available is from July of last year. Since then, the membership has been enlarged. No text of the agreement signed in Skhirat back on December 17th at Skhirat has been made available on the UN website. The failure of the GNA to meet the LPA deadline has not yet been announced on the website.

The designated Prime Minister of the GNA, Faiez Serraj, announced the postponement shortly after the deadline was missed at midnight. He simply said the Council had given itself another two days to complete its task. There is nothing in the LPA that allows such an extension that I have seen. Serraj makes no reference to anything in the agreement that would allow this. There have been rumors about rows within the group over the names of ministers and deputies, the latest being about who would become foreign minister.

The Council has been meeting in the Residence Hotel in the Tunis resort of Gammarth. According to the various politicians and mayors gathering there, the government will consist of the nine-member Presidency Council, plus 22 ministers plus another 44 deputy ministers. The legislature is the former HoR or House of Representatives. The resulting 75 members are split equally between the three main areas of Libya: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan in the south. The heads of 17 state institutions including the key Central Bank and National Oil Corporation also have to be appointed.

A politician waiting hopefully to be appointed to a top ministerial post said: “It’s like a father at the hospital waiting for his wife to give birth, not knowing if it is going to be a son or a daughter. Except in this case we don’t know if the infant is going to be born damaged or with little chance of survival – or maybe stillborn.”Even if it is born during the next 48 hours, it still will begin to breathe and its term start, only after it receives a vote of confidence in the HoR. This must happen within 10 days. The last four times it has met it has failed to achieve a quorum.

Haftar allies reject Security Team of UN-brokered Government of National Accord

- Deputy Prime Minister of the UN-supported Libyan Government of National Accord(GNA), Ali Al-Gotrani, rejected the 18-member temporary security committee that might make it possible for the GNA to move to Tripoli.

Al Gotrani said in a complaint letter to Sirraj. the designated PM of the GNA:

 "We strongly reject the formation of the committee without concord or vote from the presidency council. We will never accept this committee which includes controversial figures who led armed militias."Al-Gotrani demanded that the committee contain only officers from the LNA or the police. This is surely unrealistic. The Tripoli area is controlled by Libya Dawn militias for the most part. They are the main armed forces of the General National Congress government, located in Tripoli. To send forces from the Libyan National Army and police would in effect send enemy forces into Tripoli and almost ensure violence.

The announcement contrasts with the recent statement from the GNA Presidency Council praising the role of the Libyan National Army in its attempts to eliminate terrorism from Benghazi and Libya in general. Haftar, the commander in chief of the Libyan National Army includes Libya Dawn, the main militia supporting the GNC as terrorists. In this case, the release of the statement was objected to by anti-Haftar members of the GNA who claimed the statement was issued without the approval of the Presidency Council.

The committee will be headed by Brigadier-General Abdurrahman Attawil and Major-General Hamed Abud and comprises army and police officials. General Paolo Serra has been busy trying to convince militias in Tripoli, Misrata, and Zintan to ensure security for the GNA. No doubt the militia are being offered incentives to provide security, such as positions in the Libyan National Armed forces after the GNA takes power. Attawil was serving as a support commander for the army head linked to the Tripoli-based GNC. The main forces linked with the GNC are Libya Dawn. This connection will cause Haftar backers to completely reject Attawil. However, his acceptance of a role with the GNA will also cause an uproar within the GNC. Kobler's predecessor Bernardino Leon exploited divisions within Misrata militia and was able to bring some on board to support the GNA some time ago.

The GNC government has ordered the Military Prosecutor to start an investigation into the decision of the GNA Presidency Council. The GNC claimed the decision would instigate civil violence and military disobedience. The Prosecutor was also ordered to question the 18 committee members. While most commentators are urging the UN on and indicating how important the GNA is with the IS state launching attacks on oil facilities and elsewhere Libya-Analaysis suggests that: The international community’s attempts to impose a Government of National Accord on a divided and unwilling Libyan populace appear likely to backfire creating more fragmentation and state collapse — the exact petridish in which ISIS prefers to breed. ISIS attacks on oil facilities at Sidra on 4 January 2016 and on a training facility at Zliten on 7 January showcased the groups commitment to targeting key infrastructure and derailing the UN-mediated political process.The IS actions may not at all derail the UN political process. It may hasten the process. If the process is derailed it will probably be because of internal divisions within the GNA and the refusal of many in the rival governments to cooperate in setting it up.

The UN appears determined to push ahead with installing the GNA. This is another internationally sponsored regime-change program for Libya. This time around two rival governments are to be replaced by one. The hope originally was that this would be voluntary. When that did not work, the UN envoy Kobler gathered together a group in favor of the agreement and had them sign on to the new regime via the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). It was immediately supported by the UN Security Council and dozens of foreign ministers in a meeting at Rome. Neither parliament approved the LPA and none of their members who signed on to it were authorized to do so.

The GNA is supposed to be appointed and its program decided by this Saturday and presented to the HoR for a vote of confidence. This could take place as early as Monday or Tuesday. However, the HoR has tried four times already to vote on the GNA but has been unable to achieve a quorum. The Libya Herald reports: A number of advisors to Serraj have told the Libya Herald that he and the council are determined to stick to the 16 January deadline. Others, however, have said that he intends to take at least 10 more days, possibly longer. If announced, the House of Representatives is supposed to meet and vote on the GNA by 26 January.If these "deadlines" are missed then the UN will be violating the LPA conditions. The UN will not notice and just forge ahead with whatever it is planning. Do not be surprised if the LPA, which Kobler claims cannot be changed, ends up being altered. The UN refuses to put the LPA, as signed December 17 in Skhirat, on its website so we may not even be able to determine what is changed.