UN envoy to Libya speaks to UN about situation in Libya and his action plan

UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame spoke to the UN Security Council about the situation in Lbya on November 16. He announced his action plan back in September of this year.

The Action Plan for Libya

Salame notes that it is now two months since he set out his Action Plan for Libya. The Action Plan he describes is made up of a number of ingredients including: amending the Libyan Political;Agreement (LPA), organizing a National Conference, as well as preparing for elections.

I discussed Salame's plan in an article back in September. The plan he argues is based on article 12 of the LPA. He failed to note that there are two articles 12, one in the main text and one in the additional provisions. He does not say which one he refers to.

Only article 12 in the additional provisions is relevant because it does make reference to the House of Representatives (HoR) and the State Council (SC). However, the article is not about amending the LPA at all. It is about amending the Constitutional Declaration.

Even then the amendment can take place only after the LPA has been endorsed and adopted in its entirety. Surely this has not happened. The amendments are surely designed so that the HoR will accept the LPA and agree to the Government of National Accord (GNA) as restructured among other things. They also have yet to incorporate the GNA in the constitutional declaration. The whole edifice of the GNA as it is now has no legitimacy according to Article 12.

What does article 12 in additional provisions say?

Although in his original statement of the plan and this report Salame refers to article 12 to explain what he is doing, he never actually quotes it. The full text of the LPA as signed in December of 2015 at Skhirat Morrocco can be found here at a UN site in PDF form.

Article 12 of the additional provisions reads:"Article (12)All institutions stipulated in the Libyan Political Agreement shall derive their legitimacy from the Constitutional Declaration and its amendment as annexed to this Agreement after its endorsement and adoption in its entirety, signing and entry into force.

Should it be necessary to introduce subsequent amendment to the Constitutional Declaration that affects, whether directly or indirectly, the Agreement or any of the institutions that emanate from it, the House of Representatives and State Council shall commit to achieve consensus among themselves to agree on the format of such amendment. The final endorsement of this amendment shall be given by the House of Representatives, without amendment, based on the mechanism stipulated in the ConstitutionalDeclaration."

Notice there is not a word about amending the Libyan Political Agreement itself, but only the Constitutional Declaration. Even this can take place only after everything has been endorsed and implemented. Is it any wonder that Salame never actually quotes the article he is supposedly using?

Here is what Salame reports as progress:"I am pleased to report that over the last two months, the Action Plan has made significant headway. The United Nations convened two sessions of the Joint Drafting Committee, composed of members from both the House of Representatives and of the High Council of State to agree on a set of amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement in UNSMIL’s offices in Tunis. For the first time, with these meetings, Article 12 of the Libyan Political Agreement has been implemented. I welcome the mutual recognition of the two assemblies, and their acknowledgment of the Libyan Political Agreement as the sole available framework to end the crisis in Libya."

Salame does not explain how the two meetings implement Article 12 of the LPA. Where are all the experts on Libya? Why is nothing said about this issue? The LPA is not used as a basis for a process. It is avoided while the UN continually claims that it is being used as a basis for a way forward.

The enclosed video shows that the meetings ended with no agreement and with no date set for a future meeting.

Salames remark about the HoR and High Council of State(HCS) glosses over the fact that the HoR supports only an amended LPA without section 8 that gives the PC the job of commander in chief . The HCS wants to ensure that Haftar does not remain commander in chief. This is why there is no final agreement.

The National Conference

Salame also is preparing for a National Conference to take place next February 18. There is nothing in the LPA about such a conference. It appears to be an attempt to bring important stakeholders together.

Salame says: "The National Conference will give Libyans from all across the country the opportunity to come together in one place; to renew their common national narrative; and to agree on the tangible steps required to end the transition. I insist that the Conference be inclusive, in order to allow the adoption of a true National Charter, and provide guidelines for the legislation needed to end the transition."

This appears all quite idealistic and vague.

It remains to be seen if the conference actually takes place and has any effect.

Recent Developments

The HoR has met and apparently accepted some amendments to the LPA. Chris Stephen tweets:More

#Libya Libya reform: Today's Tobruk parliament vote sees UN-backed GNA government's executive in Tripoli, the 9-strong Presidential Council, cut to 3 members, to be chosen by Tripoli + Tobruk parliaments. As before, PC recommends cabinet, Tobruk votes yes/no. In theory, anyway.

6:10 AM - 21 Nov 2017

Where in the LPA does it say the HoR can amend the LPA? Note there is no mention of deletion of article 8 or whether they have amended the Constitutional Declaration as required.

Apology: I had all sorts of problems with the editing of this article. An earlier posted article had material that I used as reference that I deleted but it was not deleted but saved. This is a shortened version of the article with the extraneous material hopefully deleted.

Previously published in Digital Journal

Mixed reactions in Libya for Presidency Council's head Faiez Serraj's call for elections next March

                                                       Faiez Serraj head of Presidential Council
  
Recently as part of his road map for peace,  head of the Presidential Council (PC) of the Government of  National Accord,  Faiez Serraj, said that there should be parliamentary and presidential elections next March. I discuss the entire road map in a recent article. While there has been strong support from some of the members of the High State Council of the GNA for Serraj's proposal, the House of Representatives members have been largely negative.

The speaker of the HoR Ageela Saleh dismissed the proposal in spite of the fact that he himself had called for elections next year. Saleh objects that Serraj has no legal powers to make such a call as he has not been appointed to such a role by the HoR. The HoR has not yet recognized the GNA in any event so naturally Serraj will be regarded as not having the status to call an election.

Ziyad Daghim, a member of the HoR from Benghazi said that Serraj's call for elections was fanciful and contradictory. He pointed out that for such an election to take place a two-thirds vote in favor of such action by the HoR would be required. In the present circumstances Daghim thought this impossible. Another member from Benghazi Essam al-Jahanni claimed the elections were a "sugar-coated bomb" that was aimed at Haftar's Libyan National Army that would lead the company to disaster.

Another HoR member, Abu Bakr Buera claimed that the proposal was unworkable. He said the proposal would soon be forgotten. He said that proposal showed that earlier efforts at conciliation by the UAE and others to mediate between Serraj and Haftar had failed. Buera claimed that to resolve the crisis joint efforts by the HoR, PC, and armed forces were required. Presumably he means Haftar's Libyan National Army by the "armed forces". Other HoR members claimed that security conditions made elections impossible for now. Some saw the proposal as coming from the Muslim Brotherhood, a group reviled by those loyal to Haftar. One of the few HoR members who praised the plan was Mohamed Raied from Misrata who called the plan excellent.

The elections would have repercussions for the HoR as there would be legislative elections but the members of  State HIgh Council would remain safe in their seats. This might explain why most members supported Serraj's plan. However, some members such as Nuri Elabbar who was former head of the High National Elections Committee did have concerns about the security situation making free elections difficult if not impossible. He noted that security would need to be guaranteed and well funded. Local organizations would have to cooperate in facilitating the elections. As with members of the HoR, Elabbar had concerns about the legitimacy of  holding the vote asking: Would it come from a vote to amend the Constitutional Declaration by the HoR? Was it based on the authority of the Libyan Political Agreement? And would the State Council have to be involved in the decision? He had no answer for his own questions.

Aref Nayed, of the Libyan Institute for Advanced Studies, and former Libyan ambassador to the UAE welcomed the call for elections but said they should occur in five months time on the 17th of December. In a letter to the new Libyan special envoy, Ghassan Salame, Nayed said that fresh elections would renew the legitimacy of  Libya's legislative and executive institutions. However, he claimed, some of the proposals in the Serraj's road map would prevent polls from actually taking place.

Nayad proposes that the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, along with the Arab League and the African Union, help organize parliamentary and presidential election by the 17th of December. He  sets this date because this is the deadline Haftar set for a political solution and is the date upon which he claims the Libya Political Agreement expires. The elections avoid a political vacuum. Others do not think the time period for the agreement begins until the HoR accepts the political agreement. It is not clear that either the HoR or the PC and GNA would accept these arrangements. Many would see the elections as being organized by outsiders to satisfy their interests. After all the talk of the LPA being the basis for any agreement this plan appears to be a substitution for an LPA that expires!

UN convoy ambushed in Libya but members now safe

(June 29)The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) members whose convoy was ambushed near the town of Al-Zawiya are understood to be free and in a safe place.

The details of what exactly happened remain unclear. However UNSMIL head Martin Kobler thanked the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and also House of Representative (HoR) from nearby Al-Zawiya as well as local authorities for helping to ensure the safety of the UN staff. Sources told the Libya Herald that UN members were human resource specialists who were visiting the Department for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM) in Sorman. UN officials had kept back from making any statements until they were sure that all their personnel and their guards were out of danger.

A tweet by Martin Kobler said: "Criminal attacks on @UN & others working to support #Libya is deplorable. Perpetrators must B brought to #justice.No #impunity for offenders."A UN tweet said: ".@UN welcomes #GNA's decision to investigate the attack on UN convoy, yesterday. Perpetrators must be identified & held accountable."

The five-car UN convoy carrying 13 UN staff was attacked at Farouk Bridge checkpoint. The third vehicle in the convoy was hit by an RPG. The fourth and fifth vehicle were able to turn around and head for Tunisia, while the first vehicle sped on to Tripoli. The second vehicle stopped and helped their colleagues out of the damaged vehicle. All seven were taken to a place of safety by locals where the GNA made arrangements to bring them back to Tripoli. A dozen security guards were also involved.

Kobler claimed that there were no injuries even though photos, circulating in social media, said to be one of the UNSMIL vehicles shows severe damage to the right-hand side of the SUV and bullet impacts on two shatter-proof side windows. A UNSMIL spokesperson said that she could not make any statement on the circumstances until those who had been involved were debriefed. One report claimed two people had been injured.

The Libya Observer also reported on the incident, quoting local sources from Al-Zawiya city as saying four men and two women were released after being held on Wednesday evening for hours by an armed group. The sources said:"The armed group was persuaded into letting the UN staffers go without any harm and any further escalation; and they are fine and will be flown back to Tripoli." The source said that elders, municipal members, and other notables from Al-Zawiya city convinced the gunmen to set their captives free without satisfying any demands from them. Local security sources also said :"The car that attacked the UNSMIL convoy by small arms was for someone called Ali Al-Kardmin, who is a Dignity Operation-linked fighter." These same sources said that the attack was in retaliation for the arrest of some of the attacking group by the Special Deterrent Force based in Tripoli. Apparently, the aim of the armed group was to trade the UNSMIL staffers for their arrested fighters. Al-Zawiya city has been witnessing clashes between groups linked to Haftar's Dignity Operation and others linked to Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room.

Lebanese academic to be new UN special envoy to Libya

The former Lebanese Minister of Culture from 2000 to 2003, Ghassan Salame has been appointed as the new UN envoy to Libya by the UN Secretary General Antonio Gutterres according to a number of media sources.

Salame will also be the new head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Salame will be the sixth envoy appointed since Gadaffi was overthrown in 2011. In November 2015, the present envoy and Special Representative of the (Secretary General(SRSG) in Libya, Martin Kobler, took over from Bernardino Leon, the fourth envoy. Leon was offered a well-remunerated position in the UAE after he left his post.

Salame is the second Lebanese person to take on the role. Tarek Mitri was the second head of UNSMIL but held the job for less than two years leaving the job in August of 2014. The job is a tough task. Kobler was unable to push through the Libyan Political Agreement(LPA) by having the House of Representatives (HoR) vote confidence in the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA). The vote of confidence failed twice, the last time on August 22 last year. Since that time, Kobler has not been able to gather together a group to amend the LPA and call together the HoR to hold another confidence vote as required by the LPA. Salame will be faced with the immediate task of trying to carry on the process which so far has had no success. Salame is apparently the 29th person to be offered the job of UNSMIL head. Salame is expected to take up his unenviable task the end of June.

After his stint as Lebanese Minister of Culture, Salame served as Senior Adviser for the UN Secretary-General from 2003 to 2006. Salame has taught international relations at the American University of Beirut, Saint Joseph University in Beirut and later at the University of Paris. While Lebanon's Minister of Culture Salame served on various ministerial committee including one on the reform of the higher education system and another on productivity in public administration. He was also appointed Chairman of the Committee and Spokesman for the Arab Summit (March 2002) and the Francophone Summit (October 2002) both in Beirut the Lebanese capital.

At present, Salame is Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs and also a professor of International Relations. He is the author of several books, and sits on the board of several organizations including the International Crisis Group, and the International Peace Institute. Salame will face the so far intractable task of trying to form one united Libyan government by altering the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement in a manner that the main opposed parties will accept.

Arab League, African Union and UN Support Mission joint statement on Libya

On the 25th of October the League of Arab States, African Union and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) held a meeting to discuss the situation in Libya.

The meeting also talked of ways for the three organizations to cooperate to "advance the political process and assist Libya in its democratic transition". It could be argued that there has been no democratic transition but a UN-supported Government of National Accord that has been manufactured by external forces as much as by Libyans and forced upon the Libyans. The government is not able to satisfy basic needs and has been unable to unify with the east which is becoming more and more under military control led by Field Marshal Haftar.

The statement consists of 15 separate points and the entire document can be found here. The meeting was with Ahmed Gheit, Secretary General of the League of Arab States, Jakaya Kikwete of African Union representative for Libya and Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and head of UNSMIL.

In the third point the parties "reiterated their rejection of any foreign intervention in Libya". Presumably, the three do not object to foreign intervention that is requested. The problem is that foreign military intervention may be requested by one government such as the UN-supported GNA while rejected by their rival government of the House of Representatives (HoR). While the GNA welcomes and asked for US bombing support of the Sirte offensive, the HoR regards the bombing as unwarranted foreign intervention. There is already intervention of special forces from the U.K., U.S. and France, and Jordan and perhaps others. There is also intervention by Egypt and the UAE and support for Haftar that often violates the UN weapons ban on Libya.

The statement notes that a Troika of representatives from the three organizations would be set up to held enhance cooperation on Libya by the three bodies to help facilitate the Libyan Political Agreement. The envoys of the three organizations are to "conduct joint missions" that would encourage key Libyan stakeholders to advance the political process.

The document condemns the recent coup attempt saying the action hindered the political process. They called for swift de-escalation of the process and consolidation of security and rule of law in Tripoli. No recommendations are made as to how this can be done. There is no mention of the defection of the Presidential Guards, who are supposed to defend the GNA, to those attempting the coup.

There is no change from the long existing plan to have the HoR vote confidence in the GNA:The parties expressed their support for the PC and urged it to continue to assume its responsibilities, in an inclusive manner, as mandated by the LPA, and to present a revised cabinet of the Government of National Accord. They also expressed their support for the House of Representatives, as the legislative authority of the State, and urged it to continue to fulfill its responsibilities towards the LPA.

So far the HoR has exercised its responsibility twice by rejecting the GNA, the last time on August 22. The GNA had ten days to present a new cabinet, that is over two months ago. The HoR is functioning as a legislature but of the rival HoR government in Tobruk not that of the UN-recognized GNA.

The parties emphasize the need for cohesive and professional Libyan military and security forces "operating under a unified chain of command as mandated by the LPA". They do not mention that this makes the PC commander in chief for now. There is no mention of Haftar and the demand of him and his supporters that the LPA section on this issue, article 8, be deleted. Support was expressed for the fight against terrorism in Sirte but also in Benghazi and other areas. No specific mention is made of Derna which is under siege by Haftar.

The parties welcome efforts to restore oil production. No mention is made of Haftar's seizure of the oil ports. They support a unified oil company. They do not mention the unification agreement that has the headquarters moving to Benghazi and has the NOC reporting to the HoR. They stress as well the importance of a unified Central Bank to oversee funds collected. The group said they were ready to provide technical support to assist the PC in dealing with the Central Bank on issues of public financing and expenditures. The group wants to help mobilize and coordinate international support for Libya. There is a high-level meeting on Libya to be held in London soon. The final point of the communique is that the group is committed to having further meetings.

The group stick with the long-standing policy of regarding the LPA as the only way forward even though so far any attempt to pass it through the HoR has failed. There is no discussion of the problem of Haftar or any reason provided to think that a new cabinet will result in a vote of confidence in the GNA by the HoR. Given the length of time since the GNA was voted down there is not even any good reason to believe the PC can ever agree to a new cabinet. No deadlines are set. That is probably a better approach than setting a deadline and then breaching it continually.

UN, EU, and others condemn the attempted coup in Libya

The UN, the EU and the Libyan Government of National Unity (GNA) have all condemned the attempted coup yesterday by members of the Salvation Government of the former General National Congress (GNC).

Although the Interior Ministry of the GNA was ordered to arrest those involved in the coup, so far no action to do so appears to have been taken. There is tension and some violence in Tripoli but it is not clear that the violence is related to the attempted coup. As a tweet reminds commentators: User Actions "#Libya Worth noting there are pre-existing Tripoli militia disputes, some skirmishing may that + not related to rival govts. power struggle." Another tweet notes there are clashes between two militia in Tripoli: "Avoid BenGasheer,#Tripoli, due to ongoing fighting (tanks being used) btwn militias of BGasheer and Warshiffan. #Libya." So far, there appears to be no violence at the Rixos hotel buildings that the coup leaders seized which are now guarded by militia. The leader of the coup, Khalifa Ghwell is subject to EU sanctions for impeding the implementation of the LPA.

A recent DJ article gives details on the attempted coup. While the coup leaders captured the former headquarters of the Salvation Government, the Rixos Hotel, it did not occupy the naval base or quarters where the Presidential Council of the GNA meets. In fact the PC is meeting today to discuss the situation.

The EU issued a statement on the situation. The statement claimed that the use of force to claim power could only lead to "further disorder and a spiral of violence" with Libyans being the main victims. Of course, force is being used against the Islamic State and Haftar used force to seize four oil ports and is using it not only against the Islamic State (IS) but against jihadists in Derna who fought against IS. There is the standard never-ending call to support the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). The statement calls for the Presidency Council(PC) to set forth an inclusive new proposal for the formation of the GNA on which the House of Representatives(HoR) need to vote "in a fair and orderly manner". On October 22nd it will be two months since the GNA vote of confidence went down to defeat in the HoR. Yet there is no sign yet of a new cabinet nor a date for a meeting of the HoR on the issue. The EU offered continued support for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. The UN envoy, Martin Kobler, was not named.

Kobler condemned the coup attempt warning that it would bring "further disorder and insecurity". A tweet sums up the reaction of several stakeholders to the coup: "UNSMIL, EU & Western ambassadors to Libya condemn takeover of #StateCouncil HQs in Tripoli by members of exGNC,reaffirm support for GNA &LPA."

The U.S. State Department issued its own statement and demands that the seized buildings be returned back to the GNA: The United States is concerned about reports of violence in Tripoli and the use of force to take over the headquarters of the State Council. Government buildings in Tripoli should be returned to the control of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and all parties should exercise restraint. The United States reiterates its support for the Government of National Accord and the Libyan Political Agreement, and calls on all parties to work together toward creating a safe, prosperous and free Libya that provides for the needs of its people.The statement does not mention that the buildings were originally seized some time ago from the GNC by militia loyal to the GNA.

The reaction of the HoR government does not condemn the coup. A recent tweet notes: "The Interim Govt declares it is following Tripoli events with utmost interest, acknowledging the Salvation Government's declaration'" The coup leader Ghwell may attempt to renew a Libya-Libya dialogue and an agreement without foreign intervention that was discussed in Malta back in December of 2015. The weakness of the GNA has been shown by the lack of any quick reaction by security forces to put down the coup and retake the High Council of State headquarters.

Statement by 22 countries EU, UN, and others on situation in Libya

22 countries plus the European Union, the United Nations, the League of Arab States and the Arab Union all signed a joint statement on the situation in Libya after a meeting of the UN General Assembly on Thursday.

The statement reiterates positions often taken by members of the international community. In spite of the fact that under the leadership of Faiez Serraj the Government of National Accord (GNA) has been unable to convince the House of Representatives (HoR) to vote confidence in the GNA, the statement praises his leadership. There are many other problems Serraj has not solved, such as hydro outages, and cash shortages that Serraj has not yet solved.

The statement also supports the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) although the statement does not mention Martin Kobler by name. While many of the countries are actively intervening in Libya, the statement says that Libyans should decide their own future without foreign interference. The statement also promises: "The international community will not provide support to or maintain official contact with parallel institutions that claim to be the legitimate authority, but which are outside the LPA as specified by it."

It could be argued that the HoR government of Al-Thinni and the LNA under General Haftar are parallel institutions as of now since they do not recognize the GNA and consider themselves legitimate authorities. While many of the signatories give lip service to the monopoly of the GNA to legitimate power, in practice many countries deal with the government and officials of the HoR as well as Haftar.

The statement calls once more for the Presidency Council (PC) of the GNA to present a new cabinet to the HoR. For once, the necessity for amending the constitutional declaration of 2011 is also mentioned. There is no mention of the fact that the HoR has already twice rejected the GNA, as well as having had numerous meetings which were without a quorum. Two were disrupted without a vote. Unless there is some agreement to change the LPA so that Haftar does not lose his job it is not likely that a vote of confidence in the GNA will be taken. It is not clear that the PC will ever be able to come up with a satisfactory cabinet. The vote which rejected the GNA was on August 22. The deadline for the presentation of a cabinet with only eight members has long passed and there is no new deadline presented in the statement.

The significance of the statement is in a large degree what is left out. The statement notes:Given recent tensions in various parts of the country, we urge full de-escalation and avoiding provocative actions. We share the Libyan people’s desire to transform Libya to become a secure, democratic, prosperous, and unified state, where state authority and the rule of law prevail. This can only be achieved peacefully through inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation.

There is no specific mention of the seizure of the four oil export ports of the Oil Crescent from the forces of the Petroleum Facilities Guard headed by Ibrahim Jadhran. This group already had a deal with the GNA and National Oil Company before being seized by the Libyan National Army of General Haftar. The statement already accepts the provocative actions of Haftar and is in effect urging that there be no counter attack. Earlier six of the countries had urged that Haftar withdraw. No further mention of withdrawal is made.

In a recent article Mattia Toaldo, a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, notes that the altered situation on the ground had changed the situation considerably and perhaps brings into question the policy that the west has been pursuing up to now:First, the House of Representatives (HoR, the internationally recognised parliament based in Tobruk) has rejected the list of ministers for the GNA. The EU and some member states had been engaging with the ministers designated as if they were already in charge. It is hard to predict whether a new list will be submitted soon, how different it will be from the current one and whether it will stand any chances of being approved by the parliament. At the moment, the implementation of the LPA is blocked while the government in Tripoli seems to be suffering from lack of domestic political support and an inability to deal with the many economic challenges it faces.

The joint statement neglected to mention the failure of vote of confidence on August 22 by HoR. This is already the second failure, after numerous meetings which were without a quorum and two that were disrupted without a vote. Toaldo could have noted that the list of new members is long overdue. There is no sign of it. No deadline. Just urging that it be done. Western states have been dealing with ministers and other officials for ages as if there were no question that they were legitimate. There seems no good reason to think that a new list will fare any better than former ones. There is some doubt that the PC can even arrive at a new reduced list of eight cabinet ministers, as there are no doubt divisions within the PC itself, especially as two boycotters who favor Haftar have returned to the PC. Toaldo is certainly correct to point out that the GNA has been unable to gain support by solving the economic challenges it faces. It also faces other failures such as constant power outages.

Toaldo mentions another key change in the situation that is virtually ignored in the statement:The second development is that the main force which remained outside of the LPA - namely general Khalifa Heftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and his political supporters in the HoR - have made significant progress both politically and on the ground. On 11 September, the LNA seized the main oil terminals in the so-called Oil Crescent from the Petroleum Facilities Guards of Ibrahim Jadhran, a backer of the government in Tripoli who had demanded payment in exchange for unblocking exports.Haftar gave control of the terminals to the Tripoli-based National Oil Company. Toaldo fails to mention that negotiations for the merger of the Tripoli and Bayda-based NOC's are still ongoing with the heads of the two NOC's working on the final agreement. The HoR had rejected the earlier agreement. Even under the existing agreement the revenues will ultimately go to pay civil servants in both governments and armed forces including the LNA as well. Far from causing parallel institutions to wither and collapse for lack of funds, the GNA has created a stituation where its oil revenues provide funding for an opposition government and forces. No wonder Haftar can hand over control to the NOC. However, if the arrangement goes awry, Haftar has the upper hand through control of the oil ports and fields.

In the light of these changes Toaldo suggests that the sky may be falling on existing plans. The international community may consider alternative scenarios and adapt their policies to the changed circumstances. Toaldo argues that the changed conditions make it actually possible that Haftar's Operation Dignity that would see many of the miitia associated with the GNA defeated. As Toaldo points out Haftar already has advanced to within 50 km of Sirte which is now occupied by brigades mostly from Misrata. There are forces in Bani Walid and other cities east, south and west of Tripoli that might side with him. Of course there are Zintan militia near Tripoli and others who might make deals with him such as non-aggression pacts.

Any deal with Haftar will involve giving him a strong mililtary role that would marginalize the Islamist and anti Haftar forces that support the Presidential Council. Indeed, this would surely destroy the PC and the GNA government altogether. It could very well result in an all out civil war with constant clashes between pro-Haftar and anti-Haftar forces. Toaldo puts the matter quite aptly: "Europeans and Libyans should consider whether having avoided a new Raqqa on the Mediterranean, they are ready to have another Cairo."

Toaldo says that there will likely have to be a renegotiation of the terms of the LPA, either formally or informally, and there could be fighting. Toaldo says external stakeholders such as the EU should try to ensure that the negotiation happens without the fighting. Toaldo claims the renegotiations cannot just reflect Haftar's goals. Presumably, Toaldo wants a new model with more control on the armed forces. Toaldo says of Haftar. " He hasn’t clarified how different his model would be from Sisi’s Egypt in which the armed forces are unaccountable and therefore above civilian authorities." Surely Haftar's actions in replacing civilian local authorities such as mayors by military commanders should make his views clear. Haftar admires Sisi and takes him as a role model. He even replaced civilian corporate officials in the electric company with military figures.

Toaldo suggests that the U.K., France, and Italy could use the handover of the oil terminals and resumption of oil exports "to build a shared economic governance, help factions agree on a budget, and guarantee transparency on how oil revenues are spent." Haftar surely has the upper hand on this. He will share only in a way that he regards as favorable to him and his supporters or else he will shut down facilities. It is not clear that the "factions" as they exist now can reach agreements on sharing or if they do that the agreement would be stable.

Toaldo also suggests a rewriting of the ground rules for the interim statement. He notes that the joint statement suggests quick approval for a new constitution. However, Toaldo claims it is not clear that in the current environment Libyans could approve a definitive constitution. The existing draft and the process of generating it are also questionable I should think. Toalda thinks that the call by in the statement for amending existing constitutional rules is the way forward. However, this would be going beyond the LPA which only requires an amendment to incorporate the GNA into the constitution as I understand it. Elections would be held under the new constitution. Nevertheless it seems a possible way forward.

Finally, the EU and others should provide logistical and technical support to create a dialogue on reconciliation over issues that could create further hostilities. This would include the fate of prisoners, conditions of detention centres, and monitoring of ceasefires. All of this presupposes that the UN and others are willing to completely abandon a policy that they have invested in very heavily. What appears to be happening is that the same formulae about the LPA and the GNA are being mouthed and supported officially while in practice, many countries are in effect switching sides, and giving more support to Haftar. I expect that anti-Haftar forces are going to be sidelined if there is any agreement with Haftar. The State Council has already tried to assume the power of the HoR as legislature of the GNA in order to assert its power. The situation appears very fluid but Haftar is growing constantly stronger and the GNA and the international community are simply accepting that fact. There is absolutely no sign that the international community will confront Haftar. Haftar is probably not interested in negotiations. His agenda is the completion of Operation Dignity.

Libyan High State Council makes controversial decision

In a rather bizarre move the State Council of the UN-backed Libyan Government of National Accord(GNA) has said that it will take over full legislative authority of the GNA until the House of Representatives (HoR) votes confidence in the GNA.

According to the Libya Herald, the Council declared what it terms the "non-existence" of the HoR as it was envisaged by the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). What this seems to mean is simply that the HoR has not yet voted confidence in the GNA. It has twice rejected the GNA as presented to it. It has met many times to vote without achieving a quorum and had two meetings disrupted without a vote. The last rejection was on August 22nd and a new cabinet was to have been presented long ago with several weeks having passed since the deadline.

A recent statement by over 20 countries on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) website, reaffirms the position of most of the international community that the HoR remains the sole legitimate legislative authority of the GNA even though it has yet to actually become the legislature of the GNA. It will do so only when it amends the constitutional declaration of 2011 to incorporate the GNA and vote confidence in it.

The Council claims that it is acting in accordance with articles 16,17, and 18 of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). The articles referred to have nothing to do with the GNA but are all about the HoR and some of its duties. There is nothing in the LPA about the State Council taking over the legislative functions of the HoR. In fact, the State Council is clearly intended to be a mainly consultative body. The members of the Council are former members of the Salvation Government of the General National Congress (GNC) a former rival government to the HoR government of Abduallah Al-Thinni. The Salvation Government no longer exists as an actually functioning government with any power.

The second deputy president , Mohamed Muazeb said the actions of HoR president Ageela Saleh in helping the military take power in eastern Libya obliged the State Council to take its action. He said a military takeover, had been made evident when General Haftar's Libyan National Army began to replace elected mayors by military officials. He claimed this forced the State Council to assume legislative power.

At a press conference at the State Council's offices, Muazeb, together with Council president Abdulrahman Sewehli, and first deputy president Saleh Makhzoum, claimed that the refusal of the HoR to vote confidence in the GNA resulted in Libyans suffering from serious economic hardships and lack of security. Sewehli, while insisting that the LPA presents the only viable solution to the Libyan crisis also called on Libyans to close ranks and resist the military's attempted coup. He rejected any attempt by the HoR to change the LPA. Sewehli is no doubt making indirect reference to Article 8 that makes the PC serve as commander of the Libyan armed forces. He also said that Libyan allies should prevent "some countries" from interfering in Libyan affairs. He specifically mentions that some countries are helping Haftar's Operation Dignity campaign and violating the arms embargo.

It makes little sense to speak of the LPA as the way forward when the State Council move has no basis whatsoever in the LPA. Of course, everyone on the GNA side speaks of the LPA as the way forward including a recent declaration of more than 20 countries mentioned earlier who also reaffirm their position that the GNA is the only legitimate government and that countries should not recognize any parallel governments or institutions. The declaration is signed by among others, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arabe Emirates all of which have relations with and support Khalifa Haftar, or officials of the HoR government of Abdullah al-Thinni. The entire declaration of the State Council can be found on the Libya Herald's website.

Not all State Council members agreed with the statement. Belgassem Igzeit, a Council member from Misrata, said the move would escalate current divisions and for this reason was unacceptable. Even the UN envoy Martin Kobler was critical in a tweet: "Kobler: Concerned w/ unilateral decision of state council. LPA clear on separation of powers. HoR is the legislative authority of the state." He also said that there could be no unilateral action "politically or on the ground." Of course Kobler now accepts the unilateral action on the ground of Haftar's seizure of four Oil Crescent oil ports and his advance towards Sirte. He has said nothing about Haftar replacing elected authorities by military officials.

The HoR Deputy President Shouaib and HoR spokesperson Abdullah Bulaihak described the Council move as a coup. Shouaib also said that the move escalated the crisis in Libya and did nothing for dialogue. So far it seems as if dialogue has not done anything either. Shouaib said that Sewehili should be ignored. Bulahaik accused Sewehli off attacking the basic principles of the LPA which sets out the HoR as the sole legislature. That is true enough but as long as the HoR has not voted confidence in the GNA and amended the constitutional declaration the GNA as it exists has no legislature. Indeed, legally, I expect it could be argued that the GNA does not exist lawfully. So far the Presidency Council (PC) has not made a statement on the issue. It is not clear what practical effect if any the declaration by the Sate Council will have aside from making the situation even more divisive and complicated.

Press conference of Martin Kobler Special Representative of Secretary General in Libya

After a meeting with members of the State Council of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) held a press conference.

Excerpts from the conference are published on the website of the United Nations Support Mission in LIbya (UNSMIL). Kobler starts out by expressing condolences to those who lost relatives in the recent offensive of Misrata militia groups against the Islamic State east and south of Misrata. However, he uses the losses to argue how "urgent the situation here in Libya to come to an agreement on how to implement the Libyan Political Agreement and to go the way of peace and prosperity in this country." Notice he cannot bother to be specific about who is to come to agreement with whom but adds in the emotively useful phrase "peace and prosperity." He uses a tragic loss to press for his own political agenda of having everyone unite behind the GNA.

Kobler stresses the importance of implementing the Libya Political Agreement (LPA), noting that all the ministers at the recent Vienna meeting agreed on this:The Libyan political agreement needs three strong institutions, the Presidency Council, the House of Representatives and the State Council. We had very good, very extensive, and very frank discussions on these questions. It is important that these institutions go ahead to serve the people, to provide them food, to provide them electricity and to pass the necessary laws for it because also Ramdan is right in front of the table and there are many economic problems here in the country.

However, it makes no sense of talking about the HoR going ahead as part of the GNA since it does not recognize the GNA and will not until it has taken a formal vote of confidence and amended the constitutional declaration of 2011. Kobler mentions the necessity of the passing of an amendment to the constitutional declaration. He recognizes in effect the State Council is not yet legal, although he does not exactly put it that way. The State Council can fully function only if the constitutional amendment is passed in its entirety. In addition, the House of Representatives has to pass the Constitutional Amendment in order to give full strength to the SC here in Tripoli. Of course, there are different perceptions now in the country about the State Council and as United Nations and as a member of the international community I would like to assist both State Council and the House of Representatives and others in order to bring the different views together.Note that Kobler says that the State Council "cannot fully function" unless the amendment is "passed in its entirety." Of course Kobler does not clarify why the State Council cannot fully do its job without the amendment or if he thinks that the amendment has been partially passed. Probably he is referring to the fact that at a meeting of the State Council, it convened first as the rival parliament to Tobruk the General National Congress (GNC) and passed the required amendment to the constitutional declaration and then voted in favor of the GNA before dissolving itself and transforming the meeting to one of the State Council. Perhaps this is to be thought of as a "partial amendment" to the declaration that now needs to be amended in its entirety by the HoR. Kobler says he needs to bring Libyans together as the HoR.and supporters have some of those " different perceptions now in the country" about the Council. Among these perceptions are that the process of establishing the State Council was illegal. The Council, a mainly advisory body is composed of former members of the General National Congress, including many Islamists opposed by the HoR and Haftar, commander in chief of the associated Libyan National Army.

Kobler says that the State Council and the HoR are like twins. The problem is that the HoR already exists and up to now has shown no desire to be reborn as the GNA legislature until the GNA mother agrees that the father of the HoR, Khalifa Haftar, be given proper recognition as the commander in the chief of any new Libyan National Army(LNA).

Kobler says that politics, not military developments on the ground, should determine guidelines for the way forward: "That’s why it is very important that the politicians sit together, members of the State Council and members of the HoR; the presidents of both, SC and HoR, together with the Prime Minister to tackle the very urgent problems in the country." This appears to recognize the HoR as a partner, yet it is a parallel institution no longer supposed to be recognized or to be dealt with according to what was urged at the Vienna meetings. Whether, Kobler likes it or not the military situation on the ground will be an important factor in bargaining between Haftar and the HoR and the UN-backed GNA. Kobler and the GNA know this, which is why exemptions to the arms embargo will only apply to forces loyal to the GNA and not Haftar. Haftar has ways of getting weapons without the embargo being lifted however.

Kobler claims the military situation can only be tackled by "united Libyans." This is simply not true. The situation is being tackled even though not efficiently without unity. What bothers Kobler is that Haftar is fighting on his own terms attacking Derna, securing oil fields, and clearing out pockets of Islamist resistance in Benghazi. Kobler wants him to attack the main stronghold of Sirte but so far Haftar has not. Kobler never mentions Haftar by name.

Kobler claims Libya's main problem is fragmentation and division. It could never be that this is in part caused by his own single-minded attempt to impose the GNA on many who resist it and see it as a foreign imposition. Of course he simply rejects such "perceptions":The Political developments must be much faster and the political dialogue among all political stakeholders is a must. I also requested from the members of the State Council to give me ideas what they expect from the international community. We are here to support you, not to replace your decisions. This is Libya. These are your institutions, and this is your agreement, and these must be your decisions and we are here to help you and to support you.

As Kobler himself said many times the time for dialogue is long over and that the LPA cannot be amended. By dialogue he means talks that using threats or rewards convinces those opposed to support the LNA. If you don't agree the international community will help you and support you by imposing sanctions on you, or making sure you do not get any arms legally. In answer to a question Kobler said: Our task is to stop the bloodletting and to sit together. It is very clear that the weapons embargo is on all over the country, everybody must respect this weapons embargo. Now you have the Presidency Council and a very clear guideline that the Government of National Accord will be in place and that the Presidency Council is the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army. Regular forces under the leadership of the Presidency Council can be exempted from the weapons embargo of the United Nations. This process has to be expedited. The PC issued already some decisions concerning the operation centre, but also concerning the structure of the future Libyan Army, and all stakeholders must be reflected in this joint Libyan army.Kobler made it clear that these "regular forces" would come from all areas of Libya. As it is now, the GNA depends upon militia for security. Khalifa Haftar has made it clear that he will never unite with militia groups. Even if some of them were to meld into the regular forces it is doubtful if Haftar would unite with them. Note that Kobler explicitly states that the PC is Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army, a feature of the LPA that the PC studiously ignored since just a while ago. Haftar and the HoR reject the sections of the LPA which give the PC this power.

Kobler presents no plan for having the HoR approve the GNA and pass the amendment. He did not suggest when and where a meeting should be. A planned meeting at Ghadames did not take place. I expect that Kobler will try again to gather together members of the HoR without those opposed to the GNA. However, even those in favor demand that Haftar remain as commander-in-chief.

General Haftar refuses to meet with head of UN mission in Libya Martin Kobler

General Khalifa Haftar, commander in chief of the Libyan National Army (LNA) of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), refused a meeting requested by Martin Kobler head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

Colonel Ahmed Mesmari, LNA official spokesperson, made the claim on his official Twitter and Facebook accounts. His tweet said: "LNA General Command rejects a meeting request by @Kobler SRSG." The message did not say when the request was made.

UNSMIL Public Information Officer Jean Alam said, when asked for a comment:" ...the United Nations is and will continue to engage everyone in the search for peace in Libya..We will knock on every door and we will meet with anyone we believe can help end the conflict and bring stability to Libya’’. The ”only people and organizations we will not talk to, are the groups designated as terrorist by the United Nations’.’

When comments were made that such a meeting might be a waste of time, Alam replied that, "the only time wasted is when we don't discuss peace. UNSMIL's had is always stretched to reach out to all sincere Libyans who want an end to the suffering of their people". The statement concluded:”(UNSMIL) will stop at nothing to seek and achieve what all Libyans want – peace and unity for the country’.’ When one removes all the rhetoric, Alam's reply simply confirm's the statement of the LNA General Command.

Haftar last met with Kobler in his eastern headquarters in Marj on December 16 last year. Kobler said the meeting had been a fruitful one. It had been just before the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat, Morocco, the next day. The Herald describes the agreement as between the two warring factions, the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC). This is a misleading description. The agreement was between members of both factions who agreed to the LPA. None of the signatories were authorized to sign by their respective parliaments nor did either parliament approve of the LPA. The agreement was a strategy used by the UN to avoid having the two parliaments agree.

According to the Herald:At that meeting, it was believed that Kobler had convinced Hafter to support the LPA in return for support of a Libyan National Army, fighting terrorism and supplying arms to the LNA after the approval of and a request by the Government of National Accord (GNA).I do not know who the people are who believed this. Haftar did not issue any statement saying he supported the LPA, and his supporters have consistently tried to avoid having the HoR vote on the issue. The Herald notes that relations between the two have cooled. I am not sure they were ever warm. The Herald claims:However, it seems that relations between the two have cooled as the Presidential Council and a large number of members in the HoR seem to be determined to avoid appointing Hafter as the General Commander of the unified GNA-led LNA.This is reflected in the refusal of HoR president Ageela Salah to convene the HoR for a meeting to approve the GNA prior to dropping article 8 of the LPA. Article 8 stipulates that upon the approval of the GNA by the HoR all main sovereign positions, including Hafter’s position, all revert to the PC/GNA.

While a large number of PC members and also the State Council members want to avoid appointing Haftar as commander of a unified LNA under the GNA, there is no evidence that a large number of HoR members want to avoid this. They want Haftar to remain as commander of the LNA, both those who support the GNA in principle and those who are against supporting it. Those, such as Salah, who oppose approving the GNA want Section 8 removed so that Haftar will remain. But so do those who support the GNA. Neither group in the HoR is reluctant to have Haftar inslalled as commander in chief of the LNA. Both parties demand he remain as commander in chief not just the minority who support Haftar. Both factions support Haftar.

There are more and more irritants developing between the HoR and Haftar and the GNA. The pro-active role of the State Council headed by Abdulrahman Swehli has enraged many in the east. The PC has, all of a sudden realized that they are commander in chief according to Section 8 under additional provisions, and requested there be no attack on Sirte until they had established a unified command. The GNA has established its own Operations Room for the battle against IS. President, Ageela Salah of the HoR has reacted with vigorous criticism of the move. The Presidential Council (PC) has appointed a unified leadership that excludes Haftar, ignoring the fact that their unified leadership excludes the strongest military forces in Libya. Perhaps, the GNA intends to supplement their own military forces by foreign troops.

Over a week ago, troops loyal to Haftar advanced towards Sirte from the south-east and east. He has stood by while the Islamic State launched successful attacks on Misrata militia on the west and south edges of the territory they hold. He seems in no hurry to attack the Islamic State — perhaps he wants to ensure that he has control of the oil ports being guarded by the Petroleum Forces Guard. As relations between the HoR and the GNA become progressively worse, it is not clear that Kobler will be able to get the HoR to sign on to the GNA.

There was a meeting planned in Ghadames of HoR members who support in principle the GNA but it did not happen. There is now a new initiative planned by some members of the HoR but no details were given as to what it involves.

If HoR does not vote confidence in GNA, UN may make an illegal move

Although no regular news media are yet reporting on what is happening, it appears that the planned meeting of the Libyan House of Representatives on April 18 may not take place.

The meeting was planned for the House of Representatives (HoR) to provide a vote of confidence in the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA) and also to amend the constitutional declaration of 2011. The meeting was to take place no later than April 18. Not too long ago the president of the HoR, together with two of the deputy presidents, met in Cairo to discuss the way forward. Afterwards, Emhemed Shouaib issued a statement clarifying what had been decided at the meeting.

Shouaib noted that part of the agreement was for the HoR to meet and vote on the GNA and the constitutional amendment. However, there were several other points as well including a meeting of the Libya Dialogue Committee on Thursday which appears not to have happened: Third, the head of the UN Support MIssion in Libya was to call a meeting of the Libya Dialogue Committee to discuss recent events. In particular the claim that the State Council was officially constituted at the recent meeting in Tripoli. He, Salah and the other deputy all consider the meeting a violation of the LPA under article 64.The meeting also agreed to denounce the sanctions imposed by the EU on the president of the HoR, Ageela Salah.

Martin Kobler, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), in his press release on the meeting of the three, made no mention of the sanctions or any meeting of the Dialogue Committee. It appears not to have happened. However, Kobler did say:“The House of Representatives remains central to the political process and to the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind about this,” stated Martin Kobler.

Yet just today, Kobler issued a tweet clearly indicating that if the HoR does not vote on GNA he will consider other ways of proceeding and seek the advice of the Dialogue Committee. Nothing at all about the formation of the State Council or seeking advice about that issue:To @skynewsarabia: if HoR didn't vote on the GNA, I intend to convene the Libyan Political Dialogue to seek their advice on how to proceedThe tweet may be intended as a threat to force the HoR to vote on the GNA but it could be a threat that he carries out should the HoR not vote. He did this before when the HoR did not vote confidence in the GNA. He called together the Dialogue whom he claims gave him the green light for the GNA to be declared operational and move to Tripoli. He also referred to a letter by an alleged majority of the HoR in which they affirm their support for the GNA. There was never any formal vote on the issue.

When the rival General National Council (GNC) did not support the GNA and the president Abusahmain did not submit a list of members of the State Council as required by the Libyan Political Agreement, the UN simply avoided that requirement. Makhzoum, who supported the GNA and signed the agreement, drew up a list of members that was accepted by the UN and GNA. They held a meeting in Tripoli. At first they met as the GNC, passed motions approving the GNA and amending the constitutional declaration and then dissolved the GNC, becoming the State Council. The same type of action could happen again as I suggested in a recent article with the part of the HoR that supports the GNA pretending to be the Tobruk HoR.

Instead of more fruitless attempts to pass a motion through the HoR, Kobler can just gather together members of the HoR who approve the GNA in Tripoli. There they can pass the required vote of confidence and constitutional amendment and then become the legislature of the HoR leaving the Tobruk HoR isolated and probably without any funds coming from the Central Bank.

Another sign, that there will be no vote of confidence in the GNA is the fierce criticism of Kobler and the GNA of Faiez Serraj by Ageela Salah the president of the HoR. It does not sound as if Salah is about to do Kobler's bidding. The failure to address the issue of the State Council will make Salah and others even angrier. The east could be planning an exit from any unity government altogether. Supporters of Haftar and the influence of former members of the Gadaffi regime are becoming stronger in the east and they will have nothing to do with any government containing Islamists or other figures who oppose them. As a recent tweet put it:Ahmed El-Gasir ‏@amelgasir 46m46 minutes ago

Return of leading figures from #Gadhafi regime & holding meetings w/ #Haftar in #al_Marj

#Libya #GNA @UNSMILibyaOf course one never knows what is going to happen in Libya. Perhaps, Kobler will be able to make some deal over the weekend and the HoR will meet and vote confidence in the GNA and approve an amendment to the constitutional declaration of 2011.