New UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame reveals action plan for Libya's transition period

New UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ghassan Salame has finally outlined his action plan for moving Libya through the transition period with a new constitution and elections next year for the presidency and parliament.

Salame notes that six years ago Libyans were promised a transition but the transition is continuing with no end in sight unless action is taken. Salame does not explain why. He does not mention that the House of Representatives (HoR) has twice refused to vote confidence in the UN-brokered Government of National Accord(GNA) as required by the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). The last negative vote was on August 22, 2016 and a new cabinet was to be suggested within ten days. Nor is there any mention of the role of Khalifa Haftar the commander of the Libyan Armed Forces who from the first refused to recognize the GNA. He was so obstructive that there were plans to sanction him by the EU:"Two military leaders in the east of Libya, who say their forces will not respect any peace accord, also face sanctions. They are General Khalifa Haftar, commander in chief of the eastern forces and air force head Fakir Jarroushi. " Of course nothing of the sort happened. Haftar continued and met with many foreign leaders. Indeed he is now regarded as an indispensable part of the political solution: "Italy, along with France, the UK and other Western states and the UN have swung round to the view that Hafter, previously seen as an impediment to peace in Libya, has to be part of the political set-up." Salame does not even deign to mention Haftar by name let alone discuss his role in helping the transition to fail by refusing to recognize the GNA. This must be forgotten.

Also forgotten is UN Resolution 2259 of 2015: "Through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2259 (2015), the 15-nation body endorsed the 13 December Rome Communiqué to support the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate Government of Libya. It called on Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions claiming to be the legitimate authority, but which were outside of the Political Agreement. " Yet many international authorities have dealt with members of the rival House of Representatives (HoR) government which does not recognize the GNA. There was great press coverage of a supposed crucial meeting and agreement in Paris hosted by France which included Khalifa Haftar who commands not the armed forces associated with the GNA government but those of the HoR parallel government. No one seems to bother to comment on the fact that the agreement is not between two rival heads of governments but between the head of the GNA and a military commander on the other side. It is not toothless UN resolutions that count but power. Supposed supporters of the GNA are led to ignore resolutions they supported. In all Salame's outline of his plan, I cannot find one explicit mention of the GNA except for noting that the advisory Hight State Council must be represented at a conference to consider amendments to the LPA.

The first stage in Salame's plan is described as follows:" The first stage in the process must therefore be to amend the Agreement. There is a broad consensus on the issues requiring amendments. Next week, on the basis of article 12 of the LPA, I am convening, in the UNSMIL offices, a drafting committee to formulate these amendments."

Salame does not explain what article 12 says or how it justifies convening a drafting committee to formulate amendments to the LPA. I am eager to see what the experts on Libya from various think tanks have to say about this. They may face some difficulties. The UN before has been involved in skirting parts of the LPA as illustrated in this post. The links to the LPA or Skhirat no longer take you to the text of the LPA but to the UN Support Mission in Libya website. A search for the text does not reveal the text. Fortunately, I have a copy of the text. The first problem is that there are two articles 12, one in the main text and one in the additional provisions. Here is the one in the main text:Article (12)The legislative authority of the State, during the transitional period, shall be undertaken by the House of Representatives, which was elected in June 2014; it shall practice its competencies based on the Constitutional Declaration and its amendment as per this Agreement.

This would seem to indicate that the HoR not the UN should be calling the conference. Anyway the HoR does not accept the sole legitimate government the GNA and so is not yet the legislative authority until it votes confidence in the GNA. How does this section justify the calling of a conference to make amendments? It does not even mention making amendments.

The other article 12 is in Additional Provisions: 

"Article (12)All institutions stipulated in the Libyan Political Agreement shall derive their legitimacy from the Constitutional Declaration and its amendment as annexed to this Agreement after its endorsement and adoption in its entirety, signing and entry into force. Should it be necessary to introduce subsequent amendment to the Constitutional Declaration that affects, whether directly or indirectly, the Agreement or any of the institutions that emanate from it, the House of Representatives and State Council shall commit to achieve consensus among themselves to agree on the format of such amendment. The final endorsement of this amendment shall be given by the House of Representatives, without amendment, based on the mechanism stipulated in the ConstitutionalDeclaration."

Perhaps this is the section that Salame is using as his basis for calling the group to draft amendments. The amending process referred to is only of the Constitutional Declaration not to the GPA. Notice that before there can be any amendments the Constitutional Declaration must have been amended and added to the agreement. The HoR has not yet done this or even adopted the agreement. The HoR would need to have done this before the amendment process could even take place. Neither article 12 can be a basis for whatever Salame is doing.

 In spite of continuing to spout the line that the LPA is the basis for future developments it would seem that violating the terms of the LPA is what will be happening. Note that Salame does not even bother to tell you who is to be the drafting committee. According to article 12 it should be the HoR and State High Council who draft the amendments by consensus. Salame talks of the two being at a conference to consider the draft amendments but also adds other stakeholders. Salame has simply added the process of drafting amendments but there appears to be nothing about that in the LPA. Note that this process is to be a Libyan process according to Salame but who decides who drafts the amendments and who will attend the conference to consider them? The UN it would seem.

Eastern commander gives opponents 6 months to reach an agreement

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) associated with the House of Representatives (HoR) government based in eastern Libya gave the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA) 6 months to reach a reconciliation.

If there is no agreement based upon a modification of the Skhirat Libya Political Agreement (LPA) of December 2015 then Haftar will take action to forge a military solution. In a meeting with eastern tribesmen and elders on Tuesday Haftar suggested that he would overthrow the GNA and end the suffering of the people: "December is very near. All these officials on the scene now will go down in the ash heap of history once we decide that enough is enough in Libya. Only the coming six months or even less will define what Libya would be like. We will act tough when we feel fit and we will never listen to any party."

Both Haftar and his spokesperson Ahmed Al-Mismari gave the six-month ultimatum. HoR member Ziad Daghi wanted to know exactly what was meant by the threat and why it was not carried out right away.: "Why not act now and end the suffering of the people if there are some solutions on the table? Why wait for December." Haftar said that efforts were underway to form a committee coming from all Libyan cities to study and analyse all the current initiatives to put an end to the present unrest and end the suffering of the cities. There is no mention of the LPA or a meeting of the Dialogue committee already chosen by both the GNA and HoR to discuss amendments to the LPA. The former envoy Martin Kobler was to set up a meeting but nothing ever happened and the new envoy has not yet said anything.

The last GNA government was rejected by the HoR back on August 22 of 2016 and at the time there was to be a meeting within ten days. Ten months later there is still no meeting.

Haftar said: "We have liberated the oil facilities and all the money of the oil is going for the Central Bank of Libya and for foreign entities to the best interest of certain agendas in the current fight for power in the country instead of going to ordinary people standing in lines in front of banks." One can be sure that the money also goes to fund the House of Representative (HoR) salaries and also to fund Haftar's LNA. Haftar would not allow the National Oil Company to operate if this were not the case. If there is no resolution, Haftar promises: "A force from western Libya, another from southern Libya particularly from Sabha and a third one from the eastern region will enter Tripoli."

This is just another of several earlier announcements by Haftar that he would liberate Tripoli. Back in December of 2016 Haftar called for war in Tripoli and asked groups loyal to him west of Tripoli to help him. As far back as 2015 Haftar said he was betting on a milltary solution. While he had what some described as a breakthrough meeting with head of the Presidential Council of the GNA back in May there was no real agreement that came out of it. It probably was a ruse to make it look as if Haftar would accept a political solution. Haftar was likely forced into the meeting by pressure from his powerful supporters.

The Libya Herald and mainstream media have yet to say anything about Haftar's pronouncement. Nor has the UN or the GNA. However, there are several tweets on the issue. One tweet claims: " Haftar gives politicians 6mos to end #Libya conflict. Given his successful obstruction of talks, he's really saying: do what I want in 6mos." Another says: "Hafter We already have troops inside #tripoli Our Army will enter the capital soon. We r building strong army now To make all respect #libya." Probably for now nothing much may happen. We will see what reaction if any the UN and GNA have to Haftar's threats. I expect it will be muted as more and more countries which claim that they are solely in support of the GNA are actually changing their tune including most recently France. Suddenly the LPA as the sole basis for negotiation appears to be vanishing as if it were reduced to the grin of the Cheshire Cat. Everone is now to see Haftar as part of the solution even though he has been such an obstruction to the dialogue process that he was once listed to be sanctioned by the EU back in July of 2015. Haftar claimed the sanction threats were meaningless. In this case, he was correct.

Unity Government Foreign Affairs minister suggests rival commander Haftar should head armed forces of new government

(May 10) At a press conference in Algiers, Mohammed Siyala the foreign affairs minister of the UN-backed Government of National Accord issued a controversial statement about Marshal Khalifa Haftar commander of the armed forces of the rival eastern government.

Siyala said that Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army(LNA) as he calls the armed forces of the House of Representatives' government, would also be head of the army of a unified Libya if he recognized the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA). Siyala said that Haftar was "the commander in chief of the Libyan Army" but later qualified that by adding that before becoming such he must recognize the GNA as the sole authority, not the government of the HoR. Siyala was an official in the Gadaffi government.

However, the present Libya Political Agreement (LPA), section 8, makes the Presidential Council(PC) of the GNA not Haftar commander in chief of the Libyan Army. Haftar has been a key figure in rejecting the authority of the GNA and has consolidated power in eastern LIbya. He not only controls the oil fields but has replaced many local authorities by military officials. The head of the PC, Faiez Serraj, and Haftar met in Dubai in the UAE last week. The meeting has been described by many as positive. However there was no joint statement made after the meetings and separate statements with different contents were issued by each side eventually. The statements are described in a recent Libya Observer article:Haftar's statement concentrated on the two parties' agreement on enabling the military institution in its war on terrorism, and making sure the ban on weapons purchase by what he called the Libyan army is lifted. Whereas, Al-Sirraj's statement hardly mentioned anything about lifting the arms ban or enabling the military institution, but rather it was centered on finding a comprehensive strategy to develop and build the Libyan army, reaffirming that it should be under the command of a civilian authority.Unlike Serraj's statement, Haftar's did not even mention the February 17th revolution that overthrew Gaddafi and focused mainly on enabling and supporting the military. The two did agree on alleviating the current economic situation, fighting terrorism, and the need to deescalate the military tensions in southern Libya. However, clashes went on between the two groups in the south even while the talks were on. There was no joint statement outlining a way forward to unify the two sides. There are to be further talks this week but it remains to be seen what if any final agreement is reached. Nothing had been signed.

Al Jazeera's Mahmoud Abdelwahed in Tripoli said that that the statement by the minister was met with a wave of criticism:"Many people are angry and are wondering how a general whose forces have committed atrocities in Benghazi, whose aircrafts have been raiding ports and airports all over Libya, can be called by the UN-backed GNA as the commander and chief of the Libyan army.There is a contradiction here because Haftar himself does not recognise the UN-backed government."Siyala did qualify his statement by indicating that Haftar must first recognize the authority of the GNA. However, many people in the west and many within the GNA are vehemently opposed to Haftar becoming commander in chief of the armed forces of a unified government. Some oppose him having any role in a unified government and some consider him a war criminal. Haftar has never been in favor of the GNA and he has allies in the HoR including the head Ageelah who have been instrumental in seeing to it that the HoR does not vote confidence in the GNA as required by the LPA. He launched Operation DIgnity in May of 2014 designed to fight against Islamist armed groups not just in Benghazi and Derna but also in the west where he includes many of the militia supporting the GNA as his enemies.

The Central Security Branch for North Tripoli known as the Nawasi Brigade reacted to Siyala's claims about Haftar with strong words:“We have followed with concern the remarks issued by the Minister-designate of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Sayala, in which he described Khalifa Haftar as a legitimate part of the solution, although he is not a part of the Libyan Political Agreement. Also disregarding Haftar’s attempts to undermine the security and stability of the capital Tripoli, the Libyan south and the massacres committed by his armed militias in the eastern region, which are blatant violations of human rights.”The group sent a letter to Sayala asking him to resign. It seems that the brigade is using the threat of force to enforce their demand for his resignation. According to a recent tweet: "Nawasy brigade entered ministry of foreign afairs." There are ongoing clashes in Tripoli involving other militia groups as well. Perhaps what is happening will be clearer in the morning.

Six point plan for peace in Libya by UN envoy Martin Kobler

Martin Kobler, head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) yesterday tweeted the outline of a six-point "road map for peaceful Libya".

As he has said many times he regards the Libyan Political Agreement(LPA) signed in Skhirat, Morocco in December of 2015 as the core of any forthcoming peace talks. Yet the LPA has been one of the main roadblocks keeping the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) from voting confidence in the rival Government of National Accord (GNA) and its Presidency Council (PC). The last vote was on August 22, 2016 and failed to pass. There has been little progress since. Though there has been a meeting recently between head of the PC Faiez Serraj and head of the armed forces of the rival HoR government, Khalifa Haftar, and it was claimed to have been positive and resulted in an agreement. However, no formal statement was issued after the meeting, and the two sides ultimately issued separate statements that differed considerably. A number of contradictory accounts of details of what was agreed to have been circulating as indicated in a recent Digital Journal article.

As usual, what Haftar says is less important than what he leaves out. In order for the LPA to be used as a basis of a political solution it will need to be amended so that Section 8 making the PC rather than Haftar the commander of the Libyan Armed Forces is deleted. As opponents of the GNA have often pointed out the present GNA lacks any legitimacy:Article (12)

All institutions stipulated in the Libyan Political Agreement shall derive their legitimacy from the Constitutional Declaration and its amendment as annexed to this Agreement after its endorsement and adoption in its entirety, signing and entry into force. Should it be necessary to introduce subsequent amendment to the Constitutional Declaration that affects, whether directly or indirectly, the Agreement or any of the institutions that emanate from it, the House of Representatives and State

Council shall commit to achieve consensus among themselves to agree on the format of such amendment. The final endorsement of this amendment shall be given by the House of Representatives, without amendment, based on the mechanism stipulated in the Constitutional Declaration.

This would seem to allow a path to change the LPA, but Kobler appears to be seeking to amend the LPA by calling together Dialogue members chosen by the two sides, who he thinks, can simply amend the agreement. It is not clear exactly what sections of the LPA allow this if there are any. Kobler never gives details about such matters and reporters and analysts don't seem to bother about them at all, or at least discussion of the issue never makes it to the mainstream press. There is still no word about when and where the Dialogue members will meet. The HoR has chosen its members finally, after other members of the dialogue meeting in Tunis claimed to have already amended it something that has fallen off the press radar.

Kobler's second point is that the security apparatus should be united and they should be disallowed from using violence. Presumably he means unauthorized violence. I assume that he means disbanding the militias and forming a unified army and security apparatus instead of depending on militias as happens now..There are numerous militias with their own agendas often engaging in turf wars and some of them more like criminal gangs than groups providing security for the state. The LPA clearly saw this as necessary and has several portions dealing with the problem but virtually nothing has been done with results that are nothing short of disastrous. Clashes are endemic especially in the capital Tripoli. Kobler has no suggestions as how this unity of security can be accomplished.

The third point is that the financial and economic institutions should be supported so that they become stable and more in contact with the PC of the GNA. However, the Libyan Central Bank and the National Oil Companies must play a delicate balancing act as the eastern HoR government controls many areas where the oil wells's security is provided by forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar. Unless the funds from oil are divided in a manner acceptable to the east then the whole system could be shut down and everyone loses. There are signs that the Central Bank has at times refused necessary funds for the GNA to carry on all its activities. Again, Kobler has no advice as to how what he claims is necessary can be achieved.

Kobler then says: "Fourth is national reconciliation programs that include all the Libyan parties without any exclusion, while fifth is giving the governmental local bodies like municipalities more authorities, responsibilities and financial support to act each on the level of their municipal duties." The fourth point is well taken but may be difficult to set up in a manner that the meetings are not slanted in the direction of groups with their own agendas. The fifth point is complicated by the fact in the eastern part of the country under the influence of Khalifa Haftar many local authorities have been replaced by military officials. Kobler fails to even take note of this issue.

Kobler's final point is that neighboring countries should work with Libyan officials in both military and political divisions to facilitate a new round of "sincere dialogue". However, this ignores the fact that there are at least two significant sets of Libyan officials from the two rival governments. According to a UN resolution they should only deal with GNA officials but given the reality of the political division this makes no sense and countries violate the resolution all the time and no one says boo, They even deal with Ageela Saleh the sanctioned head of the HoR. While Kobler does point out some of the essential steps forward to solve the Libyan crisis, he says nothing about how what is necessary can be actually achieved. It remains to be seen if the recent meetings between Serraj and Haftar result in anything positive. There already appears to be renewed militia activity against the GNA by some militia in Tripoli.

Libyan House of Representatves fails to agree on new Dialogue members team

The House of Representatives (HoR) the legislature of the Tobruk-based Al-Thinni Libyan government has failed to agree on a new team of representatives to send to the Libya Dialogue.

The HoR is a rival of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA). The Libya Dialogue is to meet to suggest amendments to the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) designed to ensure that the HoR government will vote confidence in the GNA and amend the constitutional declaration of 2011 as required by the LPA.

A session of the HoR attended by just 114 of the 200 members was suspended after a stormy session until tomorrow. Saleh Lughma spokesperson for the HoR said there were different points of view. While there was an agreement on five team members from the east there was no agreement on the five members each from the west and the south The HoR does not control much of the west and also has minimal control over parts of the south of the country. There are understood to be informal talks happening overnight.

The Libya Observer also reported on the Monday meeting, with much more detail, claiming that chaos erupted after the HoR failed to choose a new dialogue team. Faraj Hashem an MP accused the parliamentary speaker Ageela Saleh of acting unilaterally: “The parliament speaker is trying to impose his opinion on other MPs." The session was broadcast on TV. Saleh wanted the selection on a regional basis to be made by him rather than by election. causing anger among some MPs. Saleh rejected the election choice saying: “The Presidency of the parliament is the one that is entitled to select the new team and the speaker of the parliament is the one who represents the parliament in and outside Libya." The discussion of the selection of the new dialogue members was put on the agenda Saleh said only to hear the opinions of MPs on the subject.

MP's loyal to eastern commander Khalifa Haftar wanted the group to be made up of those who reject the LPA. It is unlikely that the UN which sponsors the Dialogue and I understand controls who will belong within the Dialogue would not accept such members but I could be wrong. One would think that the Dialogue should consist of all those who originally signed the Dialogue as changes are being suggested to the document they signed. Although there were members of the HoR government and the rival Salvation government who signed the LPA at Skhirat in December of 2015, none were delegated to sign as representatives of either government. The LPA requires the HoR vote confidence in the GNA before its term is supposed to start. The HoR has twice refused to vote confidence in the HoR the last time on August 22, 2016.

There had already been meetings of the Dialogue back near the end of January in Tunisia but without any members from the HoR. On the 24th of January 19 member of the Dialogue signed an agreement to accept in principle changes to the LPA:These included: to reform the Presidential Council (PC) by reducing the membership from 9 to 3; to create a new council to assume the powers of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army (rather than the PC holding this power); and to appoint a separate prime minister to head the Government of National Accord (GNA) cabinet (rather than the head of the PC also being the head of the GNA).The HoR was scheduled to meet on January 30th to appoint delegates and discuss the amendments but there was no quorum. There has been no report of when a new Dialogue meeting is to take place or where or what the status of the amendments supposedly already agreed to are. It is now over six months since the last rejection of the GNA and progress towards creating a new unity government with the east and field marshal Haftar included seems to be close to zero. This may not bother Haftar who appears to be strengthening his position but the GNA appears to be losing power and prestige. The GNA is even unable to put down the revival of the rival Salvation Government. There are periodic clashes of different militia groups in Tripoli that the GNA seems powerless to stop or prevent.

Mattia Toaldo's analysis of the Libya situation

Dr. Mattia Toaldo, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, recently released an extensive analysis of the present situation in Libya giving considerable background to help understand the present situation.

The entire article can be found here and is titled "Between Progress and Fragmentation". The good news about Libya for Toaldo is that the Islamic State is almost wiped out in its last main base in Libya, Sirte. However, he also claims that the other good news is that there is a Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) establishing the Government of National Accord (GNA).

While the defeat of the Islamic State is certainly a positive development, one could argue that the LPA, far from being a positive development, is part of the reason why there is still division in the country. The Libyan Dialogue meetings with representatives from the rival House of Representatives(HoR) government based in Tobruk and the Salvation government of the General National Congress based in Tripoli and other stakeholders considered several draft agreements promoted by former UN envoy Bernardino Leon. The meetings were meant to reach an agreement that would be approved by both parliaments. Leon was in an obvious conflict of interest since that at the same time he was in fact having conversations with officials from the UAE who favored the HoR government. He clearly tried to weaken the GNC and strengthen the HoR. He ended up taking a well-paying job as an academic in the UAE.

The new envoy, Martin Kobler, carried on trying to pass a final draft of the LPA through the two legislatures, but to no avail. What Kobler finally did was to gather together those members of the two parliaments who supported the LPA along with others and gather them together in Skhirat Morocco in December of 2014 to sign the LPA. Those from the two governments who signed were not authorised to do so by either government and neither parliament ever approved of the deal. In other words, the two parliaments were forced to accept a deal that neither had agreed to. Far from being a positive development the Skhirat agreement failed to produce the agreement the original dialogue was meant to forge. It alienated both parliaments.

The GNC resistance was solved by simply using the provisions of the LPA to reduce the GNC to virtual impotence. The LPA contained a provision that called for a State Council that would consist mainly of former members of the GNC. A member of the Presidential Council of the GNA drew up a list of members from those within the GNC who accepted the GNA. Hence, many members of the GNC left to take assured jobs within the State Council leaving the group with many fewer members. The GNA quickly took over ministries formerly run by the Salvation GNC government. The bizarre proceedings by which the State Council was formed are described in this article. State Council met as the GNC amended the constitutional declaration, accepted the LPA and then dissolved itself and then met as the High State Council. While the real GNC did not recognize the meeting, their offices were later seized by militia loyal to the GNA and then occupied by the newly minted High State Council. While the GNC governnemt has been reduced to an impotent shadow of its former self, the State Council remains problematic. It is meant to be a mainly consultative body but because the HoR has refused to vote confidence in the GNA there is not yet a legislature for the government. The State Council has declared itself the GNA's legislative body until such time as the HoR signs on to the GNA. As such it intends to appoint officials to key bodies. This is all happening because of another basic fault of the LPA, that the GNA never had but needs, the approval of the HoR in the form of a vote of confidence.

Those who framed the LPA apparently never realised that the HoR would not sign on to the LPA. The LPA gives a huge advantage to the HoR in that the HoR is the sole legislative body of the GNA. The former GNC government members dominated only the State Council which plays mostly a consultative role. Why did not the HoR members do as did most of the GNC members , jump at the chance of secure jobs? The basic reason is that to bring the GNC on board the UN had inserted two Articles 8 in the LPA one in the main body and another in the additional provisions. These provisions make the Presidential Council(PC) of the GNA, rather than Haftar, commander of the armed forces. It should have been crystal clear that Haftar would never accept this. He has been opposed to the dialogue and the LPA all along for this reason among others. Toaldo notes that this provision is blocking the approval of the agreement. Nevertheless he still sees the LPA as positive as among other things bringing forces together to fight the Islamic State. However, it is noteworthy that it did nothing to bring in Haftar to help defeat IS. He instead decided his time would be better spent seizing control of oil fields and attacking the jihadist Shura Council in Derna who were instrumental in driving out the Islamic State.

The UN has constantly violated the provisions of the LPA because otherwise it could not move forward with establishing the GNA. The most glaring violation was the avoidance of a formal vote on the LPA by the HoR. Instead, the UN went through a number of complicated gyrations designed to prove that really the GNA had been approved as described in this article. The next violation of the GNA will probably involve some way to work around Article 8 and provide Haftar a role to play in the new GNA armed forces. So far it is not clear that Haftar has the slightest interest in GNA proposals often advanced by PM Faiez Serraj.

As Toaldo notes, the country is still divided as it was before the agreement. As Toaldo puts it:Less optimistic is the fact that the country is as divided as ever, with the Tripoli-based GNA having only loose control of parts of the West and South of the country and the east being a de facto separate country under the dictatorship of renegade general Khalifa Heftar. Heftar receives support from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and increasingly from Russia.This is happening even though supporters of Haftar continue to give lip service to the primacy of the GNA and to UN resolutions on the issue.

Toaldo notes that Haftar started his Operation Dignity in the spring of 2014, with the goal "of wiping Libya clean of everything that smelled of political Islam'". He fails to mention that even earlier in February he tried to stage a coup against the government and that as part of Operation Dignity the parliament buildings were vandalized and burned as shown on the appended video. Included as targets in Operation Dignity are most militia associated with the GNA including the Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous mostly brigades from Misrata leading the offensive against the Islamic State in Sirte.

As Toaldo notes, extensive negotiations are under way to agree to some role for Haftar in a unified GNA. It is not clear how such an agreement can be successful without alienating Haftar's many opponents resulting in the breakdown of the GNA. Toaldo argues that Haftar actually benefits from the blockage as he has extended his power by seizing ports of the oil crescent along with land formerly held by the Petroleum Forces Guard that extend to within about 50 kilometers of Sirte. He is increasing his power by replacing civilian authorities in cities by military officials. Haftar continues to sabotage reconciliation attempts by the GNA.

Some see the division of the country, with Cyrenaica in the east coming under control of Haftar while the GNA controls the rest, as a solution to the impasse. Toaldo points out that there would be no consensus as to where the border line should be drawn. He thinks that there would be a contest for the oil crescent region. However, this is already controlled by Haftar. Toaldo could mention that the Zintan militia, loyal to Haftar, control a considerable portion of western Libya. It is not clear how willing parts of the south would be to join the GNA.

Toaldo suggests:A national dialogue initiative could be facilitated by the UN (Special Envoy Martin Kobler is already moving in this sense) and receive the logistical and financial support of the GNA while remaining independent from government control. It should support a country-wide conversation on crucial issues such as, to make a few examples, the fate of political prisoners, the distribution of oil wealth (with the goal of restarting oil production and avoiding the economic collapse of the country) or the social and political inclusion of members of the former regime without blood on their hands. This reconciliation initiative should go hand in hand with concrete moves by the GNA in Tripoli to reach out to the east, promoting decentralisation and addressing the issue of the building of a national army.We have already seen in a recent national dialogue that splits make such a dialogue difficult.

Toaldo is certainly correct that the GNA should move on and address key concerns of Libyans such as the liquidity crisis and power cuts. However, Toaldo says nothing about countering Haftar's aggressive moves to gain more power and over more territory except to reach out to the people of the east and address concerns that led them to support Haftar. It is not clear that Haftar will allow them to do that and he has already enlisted tribal support and placed military personnel in place of local authorities. They are unlikely to show any interest in unifying with the GNA. Haftar may very well be planning to continue with Operation Dignity and eventually with the help of militia allies in the west, liberate, Tripoli, Misrata, and also Sirte from the GNA which he considers dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist gangs.

Toaldo argues that the LPA itself contains the tools for a solution to the problem of stalled and perhaps fruitless negotiations to accommodate Haftar:That agreement contains itself the tools that allow to unlock the process: for instance, article 16 and 17 say that the House of Representatives must become a truly neutral body and not Heftar’s political branch. It should sit in a neutral location and all members should be free to express their vote, unlike what’s happened in the past.

Yet the two articles say nothing about the HoR becoming a neutral body and nothing about Haftar. It does say that a meeting of the HoR should determine a location for it to meet. The deadline for article 17 to be implemented was September 17 2015, over a year ago.These articles surely come into play only in the context of article 13:Article (13) The House of Representatives, elected in June 2014, shall undertake the legislation authority for the transitional period, granting the vote of confidence or no confidence to the Government of National Accord as per the items of this Agreement, adopting the general budget, performing oversight over the executive authority and endorsing the public policy submitted by the Government. In other words, it would seem that before the tools in the two articles can be used there must first be the vote of confidence in the GNA that has yet to happen.

Toaldo himself notes that the LPA and a constitutional amendment by the HoR represent the only way to extend the Tobruk's role as GNA legislature, as the mandate of the HoR expired last October. Yet it is not clear that the HoR is willing to vote such an amendment when it will not accept the GNA. The HoR is not worried about extending its mandate. It regards its own extension of the mandate as legitimate and could care less about what the GNA and its supporters think about that.

If the HoR does not vote through a constitutional amendment Toaldo argues that the US and EU should " stop recognising simultaneously the government in Tripoli and the political branch of its rival in Tobruk." The US and EU have already supported UN resolutions that expressly forbid them to recognize both. In reality, the GNA's own National Oil Company (NOC) recognizes Haftar and the HoR as does the Central Bank by paying salaries for the HoR and the LNA I expect. Not hedging their bets by supporting Haftar and the HoR would leave the way open for the UAE, Egypt, Russia, and others to gain influence in Libya through support of Haftar at the expense of the US and some EU countries.

In my opinion, one of the main priorities of the GNA should be to build up its armed forces and try to gain support from foreign countries for repelling any further advance of Haftar, which could very well include attacks on Tripoli as he has threatened in the past.

Libyan High State Council makes controversial decision

In a rather bizarre move the State Council of the UN-backed Libyan Government of National Accord(GNA) has said that it will take over full legislative authority of the GNA until the House of Representatives (HoR) votes confidence in the GNA.

According to the Libya Herald, the Council declared what it terms the "non-existence" of the HoR as it was envisaged by the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). What this seems to mean is simply that the HoR has not yet voted confidence in the GNA. It has twice rejected the GNA as presented to it. It has met many times to vote without achieving a quorum and had two meetings disrupted without a vote. The last rejection was on August 22nd and a new cabinet was to have been presented long ago with several weeks having passed since the deadline.

A recent statement by over 20 countries on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) website, reaffirms the position of most of the international community that the HoR remains the sole legitimate legislative authority of the GNA even though it has yet to actually become the legislature of the GNA. It will do so only when it amends the constitutional declaration of 2011 to incorporate the GNA and vote confidence in it.

The Council claims that it is acting in accordance with articles 16,17, and 18 of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). The articles referred to have nothing to do with the GNA but are all about the HoR and some of its duties. There is nothing in the LPA about the State Council taking over the legislative functions of the HoR. In fact, the State Council is clearly intended to be a mainly consultative body. The members of the Council are former members of the Salvation Government of the General National Congress (GNC) a former rival government to the HoR government of Abduallah Al-Thinni. The Salvation Government no longer exists as an actually functioning government with any power.

The second deputy president , Mohamed Muazeb said the actions of HoR president Ageela Saleh in helping the military take power in eastern Libya obliged the State Council to take its action. He said a military takeover, had been made evident when General Haftar's Libyan National Army began to replace elected mayors by military officials. He claimed this forced the State Council to assume legislative power.

At a press conference at the State Council's offices, Muazeb, together with Council president Abdulrahman Sewehli, and first deputy president Saleh Makhzoum, claimed that the refusal of the HoR to vote confidence in the GNA resulted in Libyans suffering from serious economic hardships and lack of security. Sewehli, while insisting that the LPA presents the only viable solution to the Libyan crisis also called on Libyans to close ranks and resist the military's attempted coup. He rejected any attempt by the HoR to change the LPA. Sewehli is no doubt making indirect reference to Article 8 that makes the PC serve as commander of the Libyan armed forces. He also said that Libyan allies should prevent "some countries" from interfering in Libyan affairs. He specifically mentions that some countries are helping Haftar's Operation Dignity campaign and violating the arms embargo.

It makes little sense to speak of the LPA as the way forward when the State Council move has no basis whatsoever in the LPA. Of course, everyone on the GNA side speaks of the LPA as the way forward including a recent declaration of more than 20 countries mentioned earlier who also reaffirm their position that the GNA is the only legitimate government and that countries should not recognize any parallel governments or institutions. The declaration is signed by among others, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arabe Emirates all of which have relations with and support Khalifa Haftar, or officials of the HoR government of Abdullah al-Thinni. The entire declaration of the State Council can be found on the Libya Herald's website.

Not all State Council members agreed with the statement. Belgassem Igzeit, a Council member from Misrata, said the move would escalate current divisions and for this reason was unacceptable. Even the UN envoy Martin Kobler was critical in a tweet: "Kobler: Concerned w/ unilateral decision of state council. LPA clear on separation of powers. HoR is the legislative authority of the state." He also said that there could be no unilateral action "politically or on the ground." Of course Kobler now accepts the unilateral action on the ground of Haftar's seizure of four Oil Crescent oil ports and his advance towards Sirte. He has said nothing about Haftar replacing elected authorities by military officials.

The HoR Deputy President Shouaib and HoR spokesperson Abdullah Bulaihak described the Council move as a coup. Shouaib also said that the move escalated the crisis in Libya and did nothing for dialogue. So far it seems as if dialogue has not done anything either. Shouaib said that Sewehili should be ignored. Bulahaik accused Sewehli off attacking the basic principles of the LPA which sets out the HoR as the sole legislature. That is true enough but as long as the HoR has not voted confidence in the GNA and amended the constitutional declaration the GNA as it exists has no legislature. Indeed, legally, I expect it could be argued that the GNA does not exist lawfully. So far the Presidency Council (PC) has not made a statement on the issue. It is not clear what practical effect if any the declaration by the Sate Council will have aside from making the situation even more divisive and complicated.

Libyan Presidency Council meets with only 4 of 9 members attending

The nine member Presidency Council (PC) of the UN-backed Libyan Government of National Accord has only until Wednesday to select a new Cabinet of just 8 members, 9 fewer than the present 17.

The Presidential Council met yesterday as well with five present. Those missing included the two boycotters who had said they would rejoin the Council. Attendance was even worse today, August 29, with only four of nine members present. Again, the former boycotters did not show up. The PM Faiez Serraj, Ahmed Maetig, Musa Koni, and Ahmed Al-Ammari were the only members present. A Libya Herald report points out that Abdulslam Kajman could not be there as he is at a conference in Nairobi on African Development. It is not clear why Fathi Majberi, Ahmed Mahdi or Omar al-Aswad were not there. The Herald claims that Ali Gatrani will not go to any meeting in Tripoli as long as it was still controlled by militia.

While the meeting yesterday was supposed to be working on the new list, apparently Koni was angry with Serraj and Maetig because southern Libya, which he represents was not being assigned a fair share of ministers and officials. There were rumors he might boycott the PC, but obviously these were not true, as he was present today. A list produced by less than half of the PC will surely lack credibility.

Meanwhile Haftar seems to be busy extending the power of the military in the east. He suspended the Benghazi municipal council and replaced it by a military colonel. Mustafa Shaqour, a member of the HoR, criticized appointment of military governors in place of civilian mayors and councils in several cities. He said that the goal of these moves is to militarize Libya . He said that gradually Libyans would be faced with a military coup. However, this appears to be happening only in the east of the country.

Speaker of the HoR, Ageela Saleh has asked that Serraj step down as head of the GNA and PC. Since no confidence was voted in the GNA by the HoR, Saleh claims that all his decisions are void and he should step down from his post in the GNA. Saleh did say that the new eight member cabinet should be chosen by an agreement among the nine member PC. He said that CVs of the members should be sent to the HoR within 10 to 15 days, allowing for a bit longer period than the original 10 days.

Saleh was also critical of UN envoy Martin Kobler claiming that he could no longer play a positive role in Libya and that he wants to be governor of Libya. He said he was interfering in oil sales and also in choosing the high commander of the army, which increased the divisions within the country. The function of commander in chief of the GNA armed forces is assigned to the PC until a new commander is chosen, according to the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement.

Given that less than half the PC are involved with choosing the new cabinet and the divisions within the HoR, it seems unlikely that a new vote of confidence can be passed or perhaps even held. There is no solution offered concerning the status of General Haftar and no mention of the crucial amendment to the Constitutional Declaration of 2011 that is necessary before the GNA can be legitimate

Libyan Presidency Council meets to select new cabinet

The Presidency Council (PC) of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is meeting today (August 28) to choose eight new ministers to present for a vote of confidence to the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR)

There had been earlier reports that the list of new members had already been presented to the HoR as discussed in a recent Digital Journal Article. The meeting today was discussed yesterday by the Libya Herald :

Tomorrow it will be back to the drawing board when Faiez Serraj and his fellow members of the Presidency Council sit down for the third time to produce a cabinet for the Government of National Accord acceptable to the House of Representatives. Their second attempt, drawn up way back in February, was finally thrown out this week by parliament. It has demanded that the PC come up with a smaller cabinet with no more than eight ministries.This report confirms the fact that the HoR has demanded a cabinet of just 8 ministers. Achieving such a reduced number may be difficult as there are 17 ministers now although 4 have resigned. The report notes that Omar Al-Aswad from Zintan had ended his boycott so he could take part in selecting the new reduced cabinet. The Libya Herald claimed the other boycotter Ali Gatrani, a close ally of General Haftar, commander of the HoR forces, was unlikely to rejoin even though he had been urged to do so by Martin Kobler the UN envoy to Libya.

There are conflicting reports about whether Gatrani will rejoin the PC. Koblerhimself tweeted: "long, positive meeting w/ PC member Ali Qatrani. happy that he intends to re-join the Presidency Council". On the other hand the Libya Heraldreports: "Boycotting member of the Presidency Council (PC) Ali Gatrani is refusing to rejoin it, ostensibly on the grounds that that it is meeting in Tripoli." Another tweet claims that he has rejoined conditionally: "Deputy PM Ali Gitrani announces his conditional return to #GNA PresidencyCouncil but says PC should leave Tripoli." The return of the two boycotters, especially Gitrani, will ensure that the demands of the HoR and Haftar have more weight in determining the makeup of the new cabinet. The present defense minister is unlikely to be on the list since he is an opponent of Haftar.

Even though the two boycotters have rejoined, they along with two others of the nine member PC are not present at today's meeting, according to a recent tweet: "4 members are absent from the meeting: Musa al-Koni, Ali al-Gitrani, Omar al-Aswad, & Abdessalam Kajman (the latter3 are out of the country)." it is surprising that the PC is meeting with just over half of the members present. If decisions are made today then the others will be angry. No doubt more meetings will be required. PM of the GNA, Faiez Serraj, said that the meeting was crucially important: “It is taking place at a fateful and difficult time as the country suffers serious crises. This imposes on us the duty to forget our differences and make the country’s wider interests a priority”.

No mention is made of any solution to the status of General Khalifa Haftar. He rejects the role of the PC as commander in chief of the GNA armed forces and wants himself to be in that role. The present Libya Political Agreement(LPA) requires that the PC not Haftar be commander in chief. Until this issue is solved a new cabinet will not unify the country. However, it is quite likely that there will be continual problems even getting a vote of confidence from the HoR in a new cabinet and one can expect divisions within the PC on the issue.

LAT

Way forward in Libya after lost confidence vote unclear

After the UN-backed Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) lost a vote of confidence in the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), the Presidency Council agreed to present a new list of ministers within ten days.

France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US have all called upon the HoR to endorse the new cabinet line-up within the time limit. A report on the issue continues:

Libyan authorities sent a new list of the team of the unity government to the House of Representatives for approval. In a joint statement, NATO allies praised the move, saying “members of the House of Representatives are responsible for taking the next vital step in implementing the Libya Political Agreement, which provides the only means to restore peace and stability in Libya.”If this is correct then the Presidential Council (PC) was able to reduce the number of ministries from 17 to eight as demanded by the HoR within less than a week. No information is given as to who the new choices are or as to when the PC met or the mechanisms they used to make decisions or even if the PC as a group even decided the issue.

The GNA needs a vote of confidence so that it can then unify the country under one government with the HoR serving as the GNA legislature. As it is now, the HoR does not recognize the GNA and has its own rival government headed by PM Abdullah Al-Thinni. It also has its own Libyan National Army headed by General Khalfa Haftar who does not recognize the GNA or its armed forces. Haftar demands that he be commander in chief of any new GNA armed forces. At the very least he would want a commander approved by him. At present, the PC serves the function of commander in chief. The present defense minister will probably not be on the new list as he is not approved by Haftar. The name Haftar is not even mentioned in recent statements on Libya by six western nations or by the UN,.

So far major media outlets are not confirming that the list has already been presented to the HoR but an Egyptian report provides its own version of what is happening:The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it welcomed the Libya Presidential Council’s proposal to appoint new ministers in the Government of National Accord (GNA). The proposal has been presented to the Libyan House of Representatives and is pending approval.Although the wording is a bit vague presumably the proposal is the new list of ministers. There again is no mention of the number but it appears that the list is "pending approval" by the HoR. Neither report suggests when the vote will take place. If the list is already submitted it could be as early as this Monday. No announcement of receipt of the list or as to any upcoming meeting has been issued as yet by the HoR.

Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) has arrived in Cairo for a two-day visit and is expected to meet with a group of officials in order to discuss the latest developments in Libya. No doubt Kobler wants Egypt to use its influence with the HoR and Haftar to convince them to sign on to the newly proposed cabinet. Most everyone applauds the proposal to present a new set of ministers for a vote of confidence by the HoR including the US as a recent tweet puts it: "US & others welcome #Libya PC decision to submit revised cabinet to HoR, chance to broaden inclusive GNA." As usual, no numbers are associated with the proposal.

The UN and many others constantly cite the importance of implementing the requirements of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Yet the UN and GNA have not received a formal vote of confidence from the HoR as required by the LPA. They have gone ahead and activated GNA ministries anyway which are now clearly illegal after the recent vote of confidence failed. Most everyone will ignore this fact.

The GNA has acted against the LPA in other ways as well. For example the LPA, according to section 8-f, mandates the PC to: "f. Conclude international agreements and conventions provided that they are endorsed by the House of Representatives. " The GNA has an agreement with the US for bombing missions but surely made no attempt to have HoR agree to this. There are no doubt plenty of other international agreements the GNA has made without the slightest attempt to have the HoR agree. Since the GNA has no legislature it has simply ignored this requirement. The HoR is also to approve the appointment of the Head of the General Intelligence Service according to section 8-b, but this has never happened. Stay tuned for the next scheme to avoid implementing the exact terms of the LPA.