Former Libyan PM released after more than a week in detention

(Tripoli August 23)After being detained for more than a week, former Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan has been released. Zeidan was being held by a group headed by Haytem TaJouri, supposedly loyal to the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA).

Zeidan was reported released earlier but this turned out to be false. This time the release is widely confirmed including by several tweets. A UN tweet says: "SRSG @GhassanSalame spoke to former PM #AliZeidan in #Tripoli, expressed relief at his release & was pleased to find him in good health"

"SRSG" stands for Special Representative of the Secretary General Salame's title. A member of the eastern-based House of Representatives also confirmed the release: "Former Prime Minister Ali #Zidane is released after being abducted by a local militia in #Tripoli, #HoR member Ali Saedi confirms. #Libya" A news agency Alwasattweeted: "Source: Fmr PM Ali Zeidan to appear before Attorney General in #Tripoli (Volunteered to do so, no cases against him)…" It may be that Tajouri insisted that he appear before the attorney general as a justification for his alleged arrest as Tajouri is reported to have called it on Facebook: "Commander of the TRB, Tajouri, also says on his Facebook account: 'The arrest was done in a legal way through a well-known force operating under the Ministry of Interior.'" However, head of the PC Faiez Serraj said later that there was no arrest warrant for Zeidan issued by the attorney general. Serraj claimed he was working for Zeidan's release and this finally has happened.

Neither the UN's envoy Salame nor Serraj head of the Presidential Council(PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA) had made any statement during the long period Zeidan was held. It appears that the PC has little power over Tajouri's Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade and neither the UN nor the GNA have the intestinal fortitude to even criticize the group for its actions which appear to be illegal. There is no statement from the UN that those who seized Zeidan should be punished.

The Libya Observer still speaks of Zeidan's being arrested on August 14th at the Victoria Hotel in Tripoli "on the basis of an old arrest warrant issued by the Office of the Attorney General" How this narrative can be true alongside Faiez's denial that Zeidan was seized on the order of the attorney general is hard to fathom. Perhaps the warrant is years old going back to the time in March of 2014 when he was ousted as Prime Minister. Perhaps someone can seize General Haftar on the basis of an arrest warrant issued in May of 2014 after he attempted a coup. Zeidan's family told the Observer that he was safe and well

A delegation from the south may have helped pressure Serraj to obtain Zeidan's release. Zeidan comes from Hun in the Jufra area. A member of Zeidan's family said that originally Zeidan intended to stay at another hotel but that Serraj had insisted that there was better security at the Victoria hotel. Serraj refused at first to meet with the southern delegation but the public reaction to this changed his mind according to the relative. Serraj claims this is not true that he met with the group as soon as he learned they were in Tripoli. Zeidan was reported to have been held at the Winzik hotel said to be under the control of Tajouri. Before the GNA government can impose law and order, the various militias in Tripoli and elsewhere need to be disbanded.

Paris meeting between two Libyan leaders results in an agreement

(July 26) In a joint press conference in the suburbs of Paris, Faiez Serraj, head of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA) and Khalifa Haftar, commander of the armed forces of the rival eastern-based government announced an agreement on ten points.

The meeting was held under the auspices of French President Emmanuel Macron. The agreement includes a ceasefire across Libya. At present there are no ongoing clashes between troops loyal to the GNA and those loyal to Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). There were clashes earlier but the GNA forces ended up giving up territory in the Al Jufra area to forces loyal to the LNA. Perhaps, the ceasefire will ensure that Haftar does not advance into Sirte or Tripoli but he will no doubt continue with an attack on Derna as he classifies those in control of the city as terrorists. If there is any strong opposition to Haftar among militia loyal to the GNA, Haftar could also clash with them on the grounds they are terrorists.

The two also agreed that there should be elections next Spring. There is no mention of a new constitution or of the work being done already on the constitution. After a tripartite meeting with Serraj, Haftar, and Macron, the new UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame joined the talks. The statement also said that there were no military solutions to Libya's problems but political solutions through national reconciliation that includes all parties. Military power is not to be used by any party except to fight terrorism. This is a large exception as Haftar typically classifies any group that is strongly opposed to him as terrorist.

The statement also calls for releasing fighters of militia and withdrawing weapons and that both parties should allow fighters who wish to join the official forces of the Libyan state to do so. But what forces are those? There is at present no unified government or armed forces as envisioned under the Libyan Political Agreement signed in Skhirat in December of 2015. How are militia to be disarmed and disbanded? The statement refers to the LPA but the LPA assumes that there will be one unified army. The statement says: "We are working on a strategy for security in Libya that will see all current security and military units joined under one body to combat illegal immigration, human trafficking and other violations via Libya's borders." Just how are the military units to be joined under one body? No mention of how that is to be done. No mention of Haftar's role in all this.

The statement ends by calling on the UN Security Council to support the agreements and have the new UN envoy Ghassam Salame organize the talks needed to rally the parties around the new process. For some reason, the statement was not signed by either Serraj or Haftar. The Libya Herald has an extensive report on the meeting along with the text of the final statement.

The agreement also said that the two would put the LPA into full operation. No mention that Haftar rejects the LPA as it is since it makes the PC act as commander in chief of the armed forces. Haftar has constantly tried to block the progress of the LPA and the GNA government. The HoR has twice rejected the GNA. Haftar has also said a number of times that he believes there is a military solution to the crisis. Indeed Haftar has been successful militarily in taking total control of Benghazi. He has also taken over oil ports in the oil crescent and as well has made recent advances in the Al Jufra area. He is well placed to insist on his demands. While the statement says that the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High State Council(HSC) of the GNA would play a role in the political dialogue there was no deadline set for suggested amendments to the LPA to be presented and no mention of the HoR voting on the amended LPA and GNA as required under the present terms of the GNA.

The Herald notes: "So far, despite the unlikelihood of it appealing to certain members of the HoR such as the National Sovereignty Bloc or HoR president Ageela Saleh, the meeting and agreement have drawn initial tentative approval from a number of HoR member and those of the State Council." There has been no official statement from either the HoR or the PC or HSC. However, the Justice and Construction Party associated with the Muslim Brotherhood rejected the agreement saying: “Holding meetings under the auspices of individual states is a deviation from the political track of the political agreement and a mix-up of it. Such meetings open the way for the agendas of those states to favor one side over the other and to deepen the division and crisis”

Al Jazeera also reports on the meeting. The Al Jazeera correspondent noted: "There are no guarantees of success. Serraj and Haftar still have to sell the deal to the various political factions that have not been directly involved in the talks here, which is going to be a tall order."

The meeting appears to be a way around problems associated with the LPA. The UN together with France are attempting to find another way to satisfy Hafar and create a unified government. One would think that the HoR government, its PM Al Thanni, and speaker Ageelah Saleh would be incensed that they were not the ones to negotiate with Serraj who represents the GNA but a military commander Khalifa Haftar. It simply shows who the international community thinks is boss. Apparently this is supposed to be a legitimate match-up. Anything is legitimate that the powerful think is so. The UN and foreign powers are once again settings things up with the hope that Libya will develop in the way that they wish. Libyans may not go along with these plans and conflicts may break out anew.

French confirm meeting between Serraj and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Paris on July 25

                                                          Emmanuel Macron French President
                                                       
Faiez Serraj the head of the Presidential Council(PC) of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA) is set to meet Haftar who is the head of the armed forces, the Libyan National Army (LNA) associated with the House of Representatives (HoR) based in the east. The meeting is to be in Paris tomorrow at the invitation of the French President Emmanuel Macron.

It is also expected that the incoming UN envoy Ghassan Salame will attend. He did not attend a meeting two weeks ago of a team from the HoR and the  GNA's High State Council. The group is working on amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement. However, there has been no announcement as to when or even if the HoR is to meet to approve the changes or what the changes are.

Even at this late date, the evening before the expected meeting, Serraj's office has refused to confirm or deny that he is even going to Paris. This is incredible and surely is an indication that there are unsolved problems about the meeting. There has not been any official comment from Haftar either although reportedly sources close to him say he is going.

As with other countries, France has maintained links with both rival government that of  the GNA and the rival HoR government. Macron has appointed Jean-Yves Le Drian as foreign minister. Le Drian favors stronger backing for  Haftar.

Haftar and Serraj met earlier in May in Abu Dhabi. The meeting was hailed at the time as a breakthrough. However, in spite of all the reports of agreements, no joint communique was ever issued and no actual agreements were ever signed off. They were said to have agreed on parliamentary elections, a truce, the need to fight terrorism, the development of a united army, and an end to the UN arms embargo. Perhaps the same issues will come up as Serraj recently suggested holding presidential and parliamentary elections next March. The head of the HoR Ageela Saleh rejected Serraj's suggestions and said that Serraj had no right to call for anything. Saleh does  not recognize the PC or GNA.

A Reuters report cites diplomats as saying that the talks will simply try to reach agreement on key principles, namely that the Libya Political Agreement is the basis for progress, that there was no military solution, and the Libyan military should be under civilian control. It is far from clear that Haftar would agree to these principles. After bringing the two into agreement the UN would implement the deal and set up elections.

The Italians were angry that they had not been informed of nor been involved in setting up the meeting. The Libya Herald reported just recently that Faiez Serraj and his foreign minister Mohamed Siala had arrived in Paris for talks. The Herald noted: " The French authorities have kept a tight control over the news about the meeting. Even this morning the Elysée Palace media office said that it still did not have full details about the encounter." This meeting has obviously not been at all well planned. One wonders how it can possibly turn out well.

However, in a statement, the Elysee said that president Macron would meet the two for consultations on getting Libya out of its crisis. Apparently, the French hope to have an agreement for when the new UN envoy Salame takes up his post. The statement said: “The challenge is to build a state capable of meeting the basic needs of Libyans and endowed with a regular and unified army under the authority of the civil power. It is a necessity for the control of Libya’s territory and its borders to fight terrorist groups, and arms and migrant traffickers.” The talks are supposed to take place at the chateau La Celle Saint-Cloud that is owned by the foreign ministry.

The Italians worry that the France is trying to propel Haftar to power and not support the PC which Italy has strongly backed. Yet French Foreign Minister Le Drian who is a strong supporter of Haftar told his Italian counterpart Angelino Alfano: “In this matter [Libya], we can do nothing, one without the other. It’s an issue we share.” However, it appears that France hopes that it can arrange something that Haftar will sign on to and that will involve the PC being in effect sidelined.

Mixed reactions in Libya for Presidency Council's head Faiez Serraj's call for elections next March

                                                       Faiez Serraj head of Presidential Council
  
Recently as part of his road map for peace,  head of the Presidential Council (PC) of the Government of  National Accord,  Faiez Serraj, said that there should be parliamentary and presidential elections next March. I discuss the entire road map in a recent article. While there has been strong support from some of the members of the High State Council of the GNA for Serraj's proposal, the House of Representatives members have been largely negative.

The speaker of the HoR Ageela Saleh dismissed the proposal in spite of the fact that he himself had called for elections next year. Saleh objects that Serraj has no legal powers to make such a call as he has not been appointed to such a role by the HoR. The HoR has not yet recognized the GNA in any event so naturally Serraj will be regarded as not having the status to call an election.

Ziyad Daghim, a member of the HoR from Benghazi said that Serraj's call for elections was fanciful and contradictory. He pointed out that for such an election to take place a two-thirds vote in favor of such action by the HoR would be required. In the present circumstances Daghim thought this impossible. Another member from Benghazi Essam al-Jahanni claimed the elections were a "sugar-coated bomb" that was aimed at Haftar's Libyan National Army that would lead the company to disaster.

Another HoR member, Abu Bakr Buera claimed that the proposal was unworkable. He said the proposal would soon be forgotten. He said that proposal showed that earlier efforts at conciliation by the UAE and others to mediate between Serraj and Haftar had failed. Buera claimed that to resolve the crisis joint efforts by the HoR, PC, and armed forces were required. Presumably he means Haftar's Libyan National Army by the "armed forces". Other HoR members claimed that security conditions made elections impossible for now. Some saw the proposal as coming from the Muslim Brotherhood, a group reviled by those loyal to Haftar. One of the few HoR members who praised the plan was Mohamed Raied from Misrata who called the plan excellent.

The elections would have repercussions for the HoR as there would be legislative elections but the members of  State HIgh Council would remain safe in their seats. This might explain why most members supported Serraj's plan. However, some members such as Nuri Elabbar who was former head of the High National Elections Committee did have concerns about the security situation making free elections difficult if not impossible. He noted that security would need to be guaranteed and well funded. Local organizations would have to cooperate in facilitating the elections. As with members of the HoR, Elabbar had concerns about the legitimacy of  holding the vote asking: Would it come from a vote to amend the Constitutional Declaration by the HoR? Was it based on the authority of the Libyan Political Agreement? And would the State Council have to be involved in the decision? He had no answer for his own questions.

Aref Nayed, of the Libyan Institute for Advanced Studies, and former Libyan ambassador to the UAE welcomed the call for elections but said they should occur in five months time on the 17th of December. In a letter to the new Libyan special envoy, Ghassan Salame, Nayed said that fresh elections would renew the legitimacy of  Libya's legislative and executive institutions. However, he claimed, some of the proposals in the Serraj's road map would prevent polls from actually taking place.

Nayad proposes that the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, along with the Arab League and the African Union, help organize parliamentary and presidential election by the 17th of December. He  sets this date because this is the deadline Haftar set for a political solution and is the date upon which he claims the Libya Political Agreement expires. The elections avoid a political vacuum. Others do not think the time period for the agreement begins until the HoR accepts the political agreement. It is not clear that either the HoR or the PC and GNA would accept these arrangements. Many would see the elections as being organized by outsiders to satisfy their interests. After all the talk of the LPA being the basis for any agreement this plan appears to be a substitution for an LPA that expires!

Commander of eastern-based Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar threatens to attack Tripoli

(May 18)The international community applauded the move by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar to join the political process after he met with the head of the Presidential Council (PC), Faiez Serraj, of the UN-back Government of National Accord in Abu Dhabi recently.

In spite of the fact that an agreement was said to be reached, and was to be confirmed in talks last week, no agreement has been reached. Doubts were raised about the agreement. Some of Haftar's remarks to a crowd celebrating the third anniversary of Operation Dignity show that Haftar is determined to carry on with that military activity designed to rid Libya of Islamists whom he considers terrorists. Haftar includes among such groups militias supporting the GNA. To a considerable extent Haftar's Operation Dignity represented the start of a continuing conflict between many militia groups that continues to this day. Haftar's Operation Dignity or Karama started in May of 2014 by attacks upon rival Islamist militia groups in Benghazi. It also included attacking and burning the parliament buildings in Tripoli.

At the third anniversary celebration Haftar threatened to drive the forces some of which protect the GNA out of Tripoli: “We will not leave Tripoli, our capital, a safe haven for terrorists; our people will only be at rest when the capital returns to the homeland." This is entirely inconsistent with the pursuit of a political settlement based upon an amended Libyan Political Agreemetn( LPA). In fact it represents a military solution that supporters of the GNA and the UN envoy claim is impossible. They claim that everyone agrees that a solution must be based upon the LPA.

Haftar also criticized the international community for not lifting the ban on arms sales to his Libyan National Army even though the House of Representatives government (HoR) that appointed him is not the recognized government of Libya by the UN but rather the rival GNA. He also describes the LPA a conspiracy: “The army will not sell the blood of our martyrs, we will not submit to the international conspiracy, we will not be part of it.” Yet he is said to be negotiating an agreement on the basis of this conspiracy.

The above account is based on reports from the Libya Observer that is anti-Haftar and still refers to him as a "renegade general" but the Libya Herald, which is not in general anti-Haftar, also reports on the anniversary speech by Haftar. The report speaks of Haftar claiming that he would not leave Tripoli to the "rogue criminals and abusers" running rampant in the city a description that fits in with the Observer claim he threatened to drive them out and return the city to the "homeland". The Herald describes the celebration as a well-organized impressive display of parades, heavily armed vehicles and an air show. It involved 12,000 members of the LNA. Although PM of the HoR was present early in the celebration he was not present at the main event where Haftar made his speech. The UN special envoy Martin Kobler was not there nor were any foreign officials.

It should be clear that Haftar was more or less forced into his political activity and meetings with Faiez Serraj head of the Presidential Council of the rival GNA. He is using it as a means to build up his support. He no doubt knows that Serraj will never be able to convince most members of the PC and State High Council that he should remain head of the LIbyan Armed Forces or a member of the PC as his side has demanded. The failure of negotiations he hopes will gain support for his own solution and "fight against terrorism". A key part of the agreement with Serraj is a ceasefire but there are still clashes in the south between troops loyal to the rival governments.

Libyan strong man Haftar combines force and now politics

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar commander in chief of the Libyan National Army associated with the House of Representatives(HoR) government appears to have given in to pressure to join in a political process to form a unified government.

The HoR government based in Tobruk is a rival to the UN-backed Government of National Accord ( GNA). Serraj Faiez is the head of the nine member Presidential Council(PC) of the GNA. According to the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat Morocco in 2015, the HoR must vote confidence in the GNA before its term starts as well as amend the Constitutional Declaration of 2011 to include the GNA. The HoR has twice voted a lack of confidence in the GNA, most recently on August 22nd, 2016.

On the second of May, Serraj held a meeting with Haftar in Abu Dhabi. There was no joint statement issued after the meeting and there was no deal signed. Nevertheless, many commentators were optimistic the meetings represented a breakthrough toward solving the political impasse of having two separate governments. I expressed skepticism about the meetings in two Digital Journal articles here and here.

Mattia Toaldo Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations has a long interesting article on recent developments following the meeting, in the Middle East Eye. Toaldo says of the meeting:Unsurprisingly, optimism soared among diplomats and policymakers when news came out of an Emirati-brokered meeting on 2 May held in Abu Dhabi between Fayez Serraj, head of the UN-backed and Tripoli-based Presidency Council, and Khalifa Haftar, the “field-marshall” who heads a rival administration in the country’s east.This is somewhat of an amazing description of Haftar. As a matter of fact it is Ageela Saleh who is head of the HoR administration not Haftar. Haftar was appointed commander in chief of the HoR armed forces as depicted in the appended photo. No doubt Haftar has control over the HoR and that is why you have the anomaly of one head of government not negotiating with another head but the commander of its armed forces. Toaldo notes that just hours after the meeting contents of a supposed deal that he claims included some of the following elements were posted on some pro-Haftar Arab media sites:A new, smaller Presidency Council of three (down from the current nine members) including Serraj, Haftar and his political arm, the speaker of the House of Representatives, Aghila Saleh. Haftar’s acceptance of civilian oversight by this body in exchange for him remaining as head of the army. A quick path towards new presidential and parliamentary elections to be held early in 2018.

Supposedly Serraj and Hafter agreed to finalize the deal last week with the blessing of Egyptian president el-Sisi. This did not happen. The elements of the deal quoted by Toaldo were simply the negotiating position of the Haftar side. Serraj`s statement issued some while after the conference mentions only an agreement to a ceasefire in the south and a peaceful transfer of power.

However, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the GNA, Mohammed Siyala, issued a statement in which he said that Khalifa Haftar was the commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces under the new government but that he accepted civilian oversight --apparently including himself as part of the new PC. There were protests with the ministry building being surrounded and demands made that he resign.

The key parts of the agreement as seen by the Haftar group which includes Haftar being kept as commander in chief and as part of the PC are non-starters. Most of the PC and the State High Council would absolutely reject any such government. Nevertheless Toaldo suggest:In most Western and regional capitals, there was talk of a “breakthrough” and of the need to accelerate the political process to include Haftar in the LPA and hold elections in a few months. A new emerging consensus focuses on accelerating the political process through a meeting of delegations from the House of Representative and the Tripoli-based High Council of State and a roadmap for parliamentary and presidential elections. The plan could then be endorsed by the UN at its highest levels.If the demands of Haftar being met are preconditions to an agreement then there is almost no chance of any actual agreement. However, if they are not met then the meetings will have been in vain.

Toaldo notes that Serraj really does not have the power to make a deal that Haftar would accept. Most Tripoli and Misrata militia have distanced themselves from the deal. As he notes there could be further tensions and even clashes between militia supporting Serraj and those opposed. Toalda notes that militia associated with the former Salvation Government may also gain power as they oppose Serraj. Haftar may actually have seen that his political actions would cause divisions among his opponents.

Toaldo notes that the meeting does appear to signal a change of strategy for Haftar since before the meeting he claimed that it was pointless to negotiate with Serraj since he sees his support as coming from militia and radicals his Operation Dignity intends to defeat. No doubt Haftar has been under considerable pressure from his backers in Egypt, the UAE and Russia to engage in political dialogue. Haftar could not afford to alienate his key backers. Toaldo describes his new strategy:Haftar’s new strategy is to abide by a reformed LPA with solid guarantees on his role as both military and civilian leader while pushing to have presidential elections early in 2018. The anti-Islamist former general would run in those elections as his moves to recruit campaigners throughout the country indicateToaldo thinks that he would win elections and then ask for help crushing his opponents and entering Tripoli.

However, Toaldo notes the numerous difficulties in carrying out this plan. Perhaps, it is not his plan at all. Haftar has always taken the view that their is a military solution the crisis. He may be going along with a plan pushed by his supporters and other in the international community which he knows will never be implemented because it will be rejected by his opponents inside and outside the GNA. When it fails because the other side will not negotiate an acceptable role for him in government he can ask the international community for military support to complete his Dignity Operation.

Toaldo himself notes:Ultimately, Haftar’s plan is not to abandon war to enter politics, but rather to use politics to strengthen his hand in a military battle that he knows he can’t win under current circumstances. For him, war is not the continuation of politics by other means, but rather the other way around: politics is a way to expand his support base and continue fighting.Toaldo warns that Europeans and Americans should think twice before supporting these negotiations that could lead to more war and help empower Haftar to take on well-armed militias in western Libya. Toaldo suggests that a better plan would be to concentrate on stabilizing the GNA government and making it more functional. This sounds sensible but seems unlikely to happen as most in the international community seem bound and determined to continue trying to give Haftar a prominent role in any unity government. It should have been evident some time ago this is not possible because so many are opposed to it.

Haftar has cleverly through his political move taken advantage of this opposition to create conflict among his opponents. A recent article reports that on the 8th and 9th of May militias opposed to the GNA mobilized south of Tripoli and deployed forces in the area in preparation for what they call `Libya Honor`. The group is led by Salah Badi a prominent Misrata militia commander and prominent in the Libya Dawn operation of 2014. The stage is being set for clashes among Haftar;s opponents. Haftar can wait until they are sufficiently weakened by internal fighting to carry out his vow in this tweet:

Khalifa Haftar: We will not leave our capital #Tripoli to become a haven for terrorists. #Libya

Head of Libyan Unity government Faiez Serraj meets with opponents

(May 14)Faiez Serraj, head of the Presidential Council of the UN-brokered Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), along with Fathi Majbri the deputy president, had talks in Tunis with a group of House of Representatives (HoR) members mainly from the east.

The Tunis talks focused on possible developments from the meeting Serraj had earlier with the commander of the forces associated with the HoR, the Libyan National Army (LNA), Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The talks were held over a week ago in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). The meetings were described by many as positive and a breakthrough although there was no joint statement after the meetings. Separate statements were made by each side emphasizing quite different aspects of a proposed agreement. Nothing has been signed. There were to follow up talks this week. An interesting article analysing the situation can be found here. It emphasizes that there is no deal yet.

Issa-Al-Araibi a member of the group who is from Benghazi said the members told Serraj to hold more meetings with Haftar. Up until now, Al-Araibi has been an opponent of the Presidency Council (PC) and GNA that Serraj heads. The talks followed upon those two days ago at which Serraj head briefed about 50 members of the HoR on his meeting with Haftar. One member of the HoR said he was disappointed that Serraj had flown to Tunis rather than Cairo to meet Serraj. He wanted Haftar to meet Serraj in Cairo. He blamed hard-liners in Tripoli and Misrata for the cancellation of further second round talks scheduled to be held this week in Cairo.

While the details of any agreement still appear unclear, it seems certain that Haftar must be offered a significant role in any new unified government before the HoR will implement the terms of the LPA and vote confidence in the GNA government. There must also be agreement on amending the LPA by at least deleting section 8 that deprives Haftar of leadership of the armed forces of the unified GNA. This is a non-starter with many in the PC and certainly within the State High Council as well. There has been considerable reaction opposed to any such agreement. An important militia group demanded the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs:A powerful brigade from Tripoli demanded Tuesday Foreign Minister-designate of UN-installed government, Mohamed Sayala, to resign for his recognition of Khalifa Haftar as “the General Commander of the Libyan Army.” Haitem Tajouri-led Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, which protects HQ of the ministry, said work will be suspended inside the ministry in protest against Sayala’s recognition.

Nevertheless UN Special Envoy, Martin Kobler, expressed his optimism with his usual type of tweet with almost no substance or detailed information: "Very positive mtg w/ PM Serraj in #Tripoli. Discussed recent developments & way fwd. Strong international support for the political process." Another tweet indicates that Haftar is meeting again with Egyptian president Sisi: "Sisi meets Haftar in Cairo today. Egyptian president's office says he 'stressed the need to lift the arms embargo'." Sisi has been a strong supporter of Haftar. Perhaps next week an actual agreement will be signed although any agreement that gives Haftar a significant role in a unified GNA could very well cause an outright war against Haftar.

Results of meeting between key rival officials in Libya are unclear

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army(LNA) associated with the eastern-based government of the House of Representatives (HoR) was to a meeting in United Arab Emirates (UAE) just three weeks ago.

The last meeting was at the invitation of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. He is said to have met secretly with a US official at that time. The present meeting too is at the invitation of Sheikh Mohammed who is not just the crown prince of Abu Dhabi but deputy commander of the UAE armed forces. The UAE organized a meeting of Haftar with the head of the Presidential Council(PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Faiez Serraj. There has been pressure from many quarters to have Serraj meet with Haftar, including Egypt, Russia, and the US.

In February, Haftar had refused to meet with Serraj in Cairo after the Egyptian government had one planned. Apparently, he refused because the head of the HoR, Ageela Saleh was in Cairo at the time and Haftar felt he should attend as well. Egypt was apparently angered at Haftar's action and relations seem to have cooled somewhat. Egyptian president Abdel el-Sisi has been a staunch supporter of Haftar. The UAE has also been a prime supporter of Haftar, providing him with equipment and probably bombing Tripoli several times on his behalf back in 2014.

A BBC post notes that Western governments have recently appeared to take on a more serious mediation role in order to end the political and military impasse in the country. As the article notes Haftar refuses to recognize the authority of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord accepted by the UN and most countries as the legitimate government. A UN resolution states that countries should not meet with officials of parallel Libyan institutions that do no recognize the GNA. However, countries do so all the time. Last April a UN Security Council Statement said:The members of the Security Council renewed their call in resolution 2259 (2015) on Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions that claim to be the legitimate authority, but are outside of the Libyan Political Agreement as specified by it.Numerous countries have had meetings with Haftar who heads the parallel LNA and with Ageela Saleh who heads the HoR parallel government and is actually sanctioned. The article notes that one of the prime reasons that Haftar does not accept the GNA is because under the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) that sets up the GNA section 8 gives the function of commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces to the PC rather than him. He wants to remain commander in chief.

The HoR last rejected the required motion of confidence in the GNA required by the LPA last August 22. Virtually nothing has been accomplished since then. There was supposed to be a new cabinet presented within ten days. There is still no new cabinet nor any amendment to the LPA. One of the conditions that the HoR has set for even participating in a dialogue is the deletion of section 8. It is highly likely that many members of the PC, GNA, and the High State Council, will reject the deletion of section 8 and refuse to accept Haftar as commander in chief of a united Libyan armed forces within a unified GNA. The BBC article concludes:Today there are signs that both sides may be willing to give an inch over the matter to reach a workable compromise. How long that will take in Libya’s snail-paced ‘progress’ is anyone’s guess.

The latest article from Al Jazeera says nothing about what the meeting accomplished:Both men were expected to discuss army-related amendments to an agreement signed by the Libyan factions in Morocco in December 2015, according to Abu Bakr Baeira, a member of the eastern parliament. Libyan television broadcaster 218 reported that the two held talks "in private" after posing for a photograph together. Emirati officials did not immediately comment.

However there is lots of activity on Twitter that remains to be confirmed. Several tweets claim that an agreement was reached between the two. One says: Under deal, "presidential and parliamentary elections to be held within 6 months of agreement coming into effect." (al-Arabiya). Another says: 3-person presidency council including Serraj & speakers of Tripoli & Tobruq parliaments will serve as "supreme commander of armed forces". An article in Arabiya however notes that there was no official statement at the end of the meetings. In other words, there is no official confirmation of any agreement. The news about agreements comes from interested parties. Al Arabiya speaks of sources close to Haftar as saying that the talks were positive. Libya 218 channel, a pro-Haftar TV outlet said that he and Serraj had agreed to canceling the clause and to form a restructured unity government. A source in Abu Dhabi said: “It was agreed to open permanent channels of communication and to form two working groups to complete an agreement on the details of the formation of a government and the military arrangements between officers from all regions." The source also said that they had an agreement to hold parliamentary elections no later than March 2018. The paper notes that there was no comment from the GNA.

Until there is further confirmation it is not clear what is happening. It would seem unlikely that the PC or the High Council would agree to deleting Section 8. While replacing it with a clause that makes Serraj plus the speakers of the Tobruq and Tripoli parliament's function as supreme commander might be acceptable to the PC and Council, it is somewhat surprising that Haftar would accept it. However, perhaps he thinks he can run for president and become Abdel el_Sisi the second. There now may be another unlikely scheme by international forces to involve Libya in possibly even more chaos. As of now, there is no speaker of the Tripoli parliament since until the GNA is approved by the HoR there is no GNA parliament. Or perhaps the HIgh State Council is parliament for now as it declared last September! Is Sewehli the planned third member of the PC!

UPDATE: A new article has just appeared in the Libya Herald about the Serraj Haftar meeting. It shows how unreliable reports about what happened are. The Herald sources are "unconfirmed reports". The reports differ wildly from others. For example, the narrative about the Presidential Council changes: The formation of a new presidency council to comprise a president plus the head of the House of Representatives and the general commander of the Libyan armed forces". The report also claims section 8 of the LPA will be deleted. So the third member of the PC would be Haftar. This might suit Haftar but it is non-starter with most members of the PC and the High State Council. Apparently Egyptian President el-Sisi is to join Haftar and Serraj in Cairo next week for further discussions. The official plan by the UAE and Egypt to help Haftar take over Libya may be unveiled then.

Cairo meeting fails to come up with solution to Libya crisis

Egyptian government attempts to mediate a peace deal between Presidency Council (PC) leader of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA) Faiez Serraj and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) failed.

(February 15) The LNA is the armed forces associated with the rival government to the GNA the Al-Thinni House of Representatives (HoR) government. Haftar refused to meet with Serraj and Serraj flew back to Tripoli from Cairo. Mohamed Samir spokesperson for the Egyptian Army said that the two did agree that there should be parliamentary elections and a presidential election in February of 2018. However, the Libya Herald claims it was told by a source that although Serraj agreed to the proposal, Haftar did not. Ageela Saleh, said only that he would study the idea. Apparently the Egyptian spokesperson was manufacturing fake news!

Serraj and Haftar were supposed to join in a meeting Tuesday that would have been chaired by Egyptian president Abdel el-Sisi. Serraj waited patiently all day in his hotel while Egyptian intelligence officials pressured Haftar to accept a compromise. Obviously they did not succeed. Haftar refused to accept Serraj's plan for a three-man PC rather than the present nine. He also rejected the proposal to have the position of commander-in-chief to be held jointly by the head of the PC, the HoR, and the State Council plus a supreme military council that would include Haftar. Haftar wants to remain head of the armed forces of any new GNA.

Both sides agreed to set up a committee of 15 members each from the HoR and the State Council of the GNA to consider changes to the Libya Political Agreement(LPA). There is no mention of a meeting for the HoR to vote confidence in the GNA as is required by the LPA. Some time ago the UN envoy Martin Kobler insisted that the LPA can be amended only after the HoR accepts it as it is and votes confidence in the GNA. The Herald suggests that the failure could strain relations between Haftar and Egyptian authorities. I doubt that there will be any significant changes in Egypt's support for Haftar as Egypt sees it as in its interest to continue support for him. He also has Russia and the UAE behind him. Haftar has been consistent in his demands and his attitude towards the peace process. He thinks there is a military solution and has been constantly trying to strengthen his power as the GNA appears to weaken and even faces an attempted coup by the PM of the former Salvation Government that so far the GNA has failed to put down.

In an interview with Arabic newspaper, Serraj explained that there was no meeting between himself and Haftar in Cairo because Haftar insisted that Ageela Saleh take part in the talks, but Saleh had refused to meet Serraj. Saleh said: "The intransigence of each party has resulted in the stagnation of a political solution and has increased the suffering of the Libyan people." Saleh is already sanctioned by the US and EU for allegedly blocking a settlement of the Libyan crisis. In my opinion, Saleh simply follows whatever Haftar wants. Nevertheless, Serraj thought that dialogue would eventually find a way out and that he would announce a new way forward in the next few days. At the same time, Serraj said he doubted that any government formed in the present circumstances could gain HoR approval or public confidence. Given this assessment, it is hard to see how there can be any successful way forward.

Haftar and Saleh remain in Cairo in talks with Egyptian authorities. The former ambassador to the UAE and several boycotting members of the HoR have also been involved in talks. Tarek al-Jaroushi a member of the HoR who attended the talks said: "Seraj must return to the legitimacy of (the eastern) parliament if he really is looking for a Government of National Accord that secures the rights of all Libyans." The GNA does recognize the legitimacy of the HoR but it becomes the legislature of the GNA only once it approves the GNA.

The HoR last rejected the GNA on August 22 last year. Almost six months later there seems little progress in having the HoR and its armed forces join with the GNA. It remains to be seen if US president Trump will involve the US in this crisis.

Eastern commander Haftar vows to seize power in Libya

(February 4) According to the London-Based Alhayat newspaper, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar told the French Ambassador, Brigitte Curmi that he is intending to take power in Libya and is not ready to engage in a dialogue with his rivals.

Khalifa Haftar is commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) the armed forces of the House of Representatives (HoR) government. Neither Haftar nor the HoR government recognize the UN-brokered Government of National Accord(GNA). The HoR has yet to vote confidence in the GNA as required by the LIbyan Political Agreement (LPA). Last August 22 it voted against approving the GNA. Ever since, Martin Kobler the UN envoy the Libya and Fayez Serraj head of the Presidency Council have been attempting to find some way to accommodate Haftar and have him join the GNA. However, Haftar wants to remain head of any new Libyan National Army whereas the present LPA gives that power to the Presidency Council(PC). Many of the members of the GNA will not agree to Haftar keeping his role and some demand that he have no role at all. None of the many attempts at getting the HoR and Haftar to accept the GNA have solved this problem so far.

Curmi advised Haftar to sit down with his rivals and not use weapons but he refused. Curmi is said to have told Haftar: "If you use weapons, you will differ with France and the EU and you will fail."

The Observer also reports French sources claim that Egypt wants a solution that favors Haftar and is trying to reach a compromise with Serraj head of the PC. The Libya Observer is very much anti-Haftar. As the Observer mentions Haftar has in effect been trying to seize power from as far back as February 2014 when he appeared on TV to announce what was in effect a coup but it did not work. On the 16th of May 2014, Haftar began his Operation Dignity to rid Libya of Islamic terrorists or at least those who opposed him. These included many of the militias that support the GNA. A few days later his allies attacked and burned the parliament buildings as shown on the appended video. Haftar's operations have received support from the UAE and Egypt and he is now receiving some support from Russia although Russia is also keeping open connections with Serraj and the GNA.

The article in Arabic at Alhayat can be found here. Other sources such as the Libya Herald have yet to report on the interview. A tweet says: #Haftar said to the French Ambassador that he intends to take power in #Libya & he refused to engage in a dialogue with his rivals. According to a twitter exchange a French article gives a differing report. While the Observer is anti-Haftar his remarks conform to his actions. He has recently refused to talk with Serraj according to an article in early January in the Libya Prospect:

The source added that “they were supposed to discuss the possibility of forming a national unity government, ” but Haftar said that talks began with Al-Sarraj two and a half years ago with no concert(sic) results, and the current state of war requires fighting not policy.Haftar refused to meet with Martin Kobler as long ago as May last year. From the very beginning Haftar constantly tried to sabotage the Dialogue process. He was even threatened with sanctions by the EU at one time. He believes there is a military solution to the political crisis but the right time has not come yet. He has threatened to liberate Tripoli. Perhaps he can convince Trump that he, an American and former CIA asset who now is courting Russia, needs a green light to take over control in Libya.

The Observer report just confirms what previous facts have already indicated. However, key characters supporting the GNA such as Kobler and Serraj do not like to talk about the issue. They do not want to make it more difficult for them to accommodate Haftar They fail to realize that their task is not difficult. It is probably impossible.

Interview with UN Envoy Martin Kobler on situation in Libya

The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) was signed on the 17th of December nearly a year ago. In an interview for the Libya Herald, Martin Kobler, head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) assesses the progress in implementing the LPA.

In an earlier interview, GNA Prime Minister and head, Faiez Serraj, had admitted that the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and its Presidency Council (PC) had failed to make progress since it had arrived in Tripoli at the end of March. Kobler defended the LPA and the GNA noting that the GNA had wide international support and forces loyal to it had successfully fought the Islamic State(IS). While Kobler is correct about the international support it has not translated into resources for the GNA to tackle its many problems. While the Al-Banyan Al-Marsous (Solid Structure or BAM) forces have virtually eliminated IS from its last stronghold in Sirte, it has mostly been achieved through brigades linked to the city of Misrata. The GNA has yet to have its own army and has failed to convince rival commander in the east Khalifa Haftar to serve under the command of the GNA. Haftar contributed nothing to liberating Sirte even though he had promised to do so.

Kobler admitted that the LPA had "implementation problems" a main problem being that the House of Representatives has failed to pass the constitutional amendment that is required to incorporate the LPA in the Transitional Constitutional Declaration of 2011. There seems to be a new emphasis on this step whereas before the emphasis was on the acceptance of the GNA through a vote of confidence. The HoR has twice voted down confidence motions in the GNA the last time being August 22. At the time a new GNA with a much smaller cabinet was to be presented within ten days. Kobler says nothing about the GNA presenting this new cabinet and here it is now December 4. He simply notes that the "HoR has accepted the LPA in principle and as a framework, and recognizes the Presidency Council". I am not sure what he means by the HoR recognizing the Presidency Council. It considers the Al-Thinni government of the HoR based in Tobruk to be the legitimate government of Libya not the GNA. Perhaps he means as part of the LPA. However, the HoR government does not believe the GNA is legally in existence until the HoR amends the constitutional declaration and votes confidence in it.

Kobler fails to mention that the HoR specifically wants section eight of the LPA deleted. The section makes the PC rather than Khalifa Haftar head of the armed forces. This is a key sticking point. As a way around the situation Kobler says: ‘‘There is a consensus by the major international stakeholders that the LPA should remain the framework of development. This does not mean that it is set in stone and it is very important that there is a process to discuss the deficiencies of the LPA." Kobler has changed his position in that he has constantly claimed that the LPA cannot be amended at least until it has been passed as it is.

Kobler said the Libya Dialogue members requested the HoR to pass the constitutional amendment. Apparently this is thought to be necessary to make the mainly advisory High State Council functional. Perhaps it is more a concern that the group have some semblance of legality. The process of their formation was highly suspect. A controversial decision by them supposedly made them the legislature of the GNA until the HoR voted confidence in the GNA.

The Libya Herald notes that the HoR is quite clearly refusing to pass the constitutional amendment. A two-thirds majority would be required to pass it. Kobler says:‘‘The political problems have to be solved. And I request the Libyan stakeholders to sit together, including members of the HoR, to pass the constitutional amendment. Or at least to say what should be done to make the LPA work.‘The problems have to be put on the table and then people can discuss it. The State Council is not functioning, the HoR is not functioning. All the institutions are not fulfilling their duties, including also the HoR.

It took the HoR six months and eight days to decide that they reject the list of the GNA members: it could have been done in a few days. Now, the HoR has, as per the LPA, the duty to fulfill. To pass the constitutional amendment and to endorse the GNA’’.Events should have been telling the UN for a long time now that the the LPA is not working out. Kobler cannot even bring himself to mention Khalifa Haftar and the problem of section eight. Kobler wants the parties to say what changes they have in mind to the LPA. He has been told many times about removing section eight and has been told many times that the GNA cabinet is too large among other problems. Now the parties are to get together to tell the UN what they want done since of course: "We the international community are not imposing anything. It is up to the Libyans what to do." This has never been true and is unlikely ever to be true. External players have too much to win or lose, particularly with respect to Libya's oil resources, not to attempt to influence the form the Libyan government takes.

Kobler suggests that the constitutional amendment needs to be signed so that the LPA and the GNA with the PC and State High Council become part of the "constitutional setup of the country" and Libyans become owners of the LPA. But before the HoR could abolish the LPA it would be accepting it with section eight, which is not acceptable to the HoR. Why would the HoR pass an amendment that accepts an LPA they reject? There is no sign of any meeting to do so.

Kobler complains that at present there is no real owner of the LPA. Amazing, all along Kobler has justified the setting up of the GNA, the PC, moving to Tripoli etc. by reference to the LPA even though the LPA is apparently not owned, whatever that means. If the HoR passes the constitutional amendment it would become owner of the agreement. Perhaps what Kobler has in mind is that if the HoR passed the amendment it would then be the legislature of the GNA. It could then amend the LPA. However, one can imagine what would happen at the level of the PC and the High State Council if the HoR decided to make Haftar head of the GNA armed forces.

Kobler agrees that the GNA cannot continue to be protected by militia but needs a Libyan national army. The Herald pointedly asks Kobler, given that he seems to have no positive dynamic between Ageela, Haftar and the HoR, if he is part of the problem and should perhaps step aside. No doubt this is a question many would ask! Koblerreplies: ”No. I feel overwhelmed by the degree of sympathy wherever I am. In the markets, everywhere. People personally tell me you and the UN have to do more. Please stay with us. We need your support as the international community. You have to be better. Stay with us. Accompany us on this way to peace and security. And I feel this very strongly’’. He admits that some people in Tobruk might not like him. He was unable to leave Tobruk airport recently because of protests.

Kobler notes that the GNA is recruiting a Presidential Guard to help protect it. He does not mention that the previous Presidential Guard defected and is now supporting members of the former Salvation Government who are occupying the Rixos hotel facilities as part of an attempted coup. He notes that an army has to be built up and a police force as well. At the same time some way must be found to either disband militias or incorporate them into a national army or police. However, almost nothing seems to be happening along these lines. Rival militias clashed in Tripoli for several days recently as shown on the appended video.

Interview with Libyan unity government Prime Minister Faiez Serraj

On the sidelines of the recent London meetings on Libya, the Libya Herald interviewed the head of the Presidency Council of the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) who is also prime minister. The interview covers a number of important topics.

For a politician the answers are surprisingly frank and are often quite critical of important political players. Many of the answers explain why the GNA is not showing progress.

An obvious problem with the GNA is the lack of adequate security arrangements and control over militia. Serraj admitted that the arrangements had been slow in taking place and that the situation on the ground had made the time line set out in the Libyan Political Agreement(LPA) outdated. According to the LPA, the security arrangements involved removing any militias from urban centers. However, urban centers are still dominated by militia including the capital Tripoli. Serraj said: "... despite all our good intentions and plans… we need resources. We thought that the Presidential Guard would be deployed and armed quickly. Unfortunately, there has been a delay, even by the international community’’. When the Presidential Guard was finally set up members defected to support the coup plotters of the Salvation Government who took over the headquarters of the GNA's High State Council at the Rixos hotel in Tripoli.

Serraj noted that the international community always seem to give priority to fighting terrorism and illegal immigration while Libyans worry more about being able to get money out of the bank and having electricity 24 hours a day. Serraj said:‘‘I keep telling them that there are other issues that concern Libyan citizens more than these. The Libyan citizen sees how the international community is concentrating on its priorities and not concerned that the Libyan citizen queues for three days to get LD 100 from the bank. And how you are not concerned that the electricity is cut for up to 14 hours. You are not concerned that hospitals have no vaccinations. You are not concerned that there are schools in which people are living rather than being used for schooling. These all represent the priorities of Libyan citizens. This is the problem: is the international community supporting us with statements or are they supporting us in improving services and the standard of living for the Libyan citizen. If this does not happen effectively, which I repeated today in my meetings, there will be no progress’’.Serraj said that even the humanitarian support that Libya was receiving from the international community was relatively minor.

Serraj noted that some militia were relatively benign in that they are part of state institutions who are cooperating with the GNA. There are other militia that are simply criminal groups to be fought. Others still are politically associated that the GNA needed to attract and win over to support the GNA. Faiez said that to integrate militia into state forces money was needed which has not been made available. The defection of the Presidential Guard may in part have been caused by a failure to pay their salaries. Serraj pointed out that militia members needed training to be assimilated into the police or regular forces. He claimed that many militia members wanted to return to civilian life but in the ongoing instability and lack of an integration program they cannot do so.

Serraj notes that the GNA has ended up in a political battle with the House of Representatives (HoR) and Haftar. He said that PC members met with Haftar but were unable to convince him to join the GNA and come under political control. Although he expected a positive response from Haftar, it never came. He concludes:‘‘We tried with him on more than one occasion. We told him that not all the PC was as he had described it. That it contained civilian political streams as well as nationalists and that he should cooperate with us and that we would continue his army-building programmes in the east. We invited him to join us in our battle against terrorism in Sirte. We sent him these messages clearly but sadly there was no positive response. There was inflexibility and there is still inflexibility and a different vision to the vision I drew’’.

Serraj expressed exasperation at the lack of money and the strings attached to spending even money that is available. Serraj asks how he is expected to build a state with no army, no weapons, no money. He complained that the process of trying to get permission to import arms was long and complicated and did not treat the GNA as a sovereign government that was internationally recognized. He contrasted this process with the way other parties, presumably including Haftar, get their weapons:‘‘On the other hand, the other parties, they pick up the phone, they order 200 vehicles 300 RPGs, a third party pays the invoice and a [fourth party] ships for them the goods. As simple as that. This is what is happening. How do you expect me to play my positive part and do this and that etc and you have not provided me with support – support that the other party has in a blank cheque?

Of the attempted coup, Serraj claims that it is all being done with money by Khalifa Ghwell in an attempt to promote instability in Tripoli. Serraj does not say where the money is coming from but notes that the Central Bank of Libya(CBL) claims that it has no money to pay for the expenses of the GNA. Yet it spends money elsewhere without the permission of the GNA. There is obviously some serious infighting going on.

Serraj admits that bad relations with the CBL was a serious problem for the GNA. When the Ministry of the Interior for example is asked to clear the coastal road. He can do so but only if the Ministry receives the funds necessary to do it. However, the GNA may not be able to get the funds. The GNA even has problems obtaining funds to provide salaries for militia that support it. At the same time, Serraj claims other parties are providing alternative offers. Before, the GNA could begin to solve its problems the CBL had to take steps to carry out GNA policies.

Faiez is critical of NOC head Sanalla and his role during the seizure of the oil ports by Haftar: ‘’We had reached an agreement by the way with the PFG prior to the entry of Hafter’s troops. I had asked the NOC to lift the force majeure so that production and exports could resume. But NOC Chairman Sanalla kept delaying until Hafter’s forces entered. And they took the credit. But this is the truth. Sanalla, when I told him that he was delaying by purpose he claimed that he had received threats to strike oil tankers’’. The PFG are the Petroleum Facilities Guard.

Although most sources claim that the PC are trying to come up with a new reduced cabinet to present for a vote of confidence to the HoR, Serraj claims that the HoR does not even want to consider such a proposal: "Now the HoR does not even want us to propose a third GNA. Mr Ageela Salah has taken a prior decision to reject any proposed GNA. How can you work with this as a legislative partner?’’ Serraj says that he will not propose a new GNA before the HoR approves a constitutional amendment. If this is not done then the HoR has not carried out its responsibilities under the LPA. Serraj claims the HoR had been hijacked by Ageela Saleh and a minority within the HoR.

Serraj points out that the objections of the HoR to the LPA are about section 8 which makes the PC rather than Haftar commander in chief of the armed forces at least on an interim basis. Serraj said that it was not his job to amend the LPA but just to implement it. Serraj is obviously distraught by all the obstacles that he has to overcome to move the political process forward and even raised the possibility that he might resign.

Serraj singled out four main spoilers in the present situation: Haftar, Ageela Saleh, CBL head Saddik Elkaber and Sheik Ghariani. Ghariani is the Grand Mufti who supports fighting against Haftar and opposes the GNA. That the head of the Central Bank should be regarded as one of the main spoilers is symptomatic of the internal division that helps prevent effective action by the GNA. In conclusion Serraj emphasizes the negative role of the CBL: ‘‘We noted from our entry into Tripoli that the public’s expectations were high. I feel the pain of Libyans and failure to meet their expectations. But without financial resources we cannot implement’’.