Libya Dialogue members meet in Tunisia but without eastern members

(January 22) The UN-brokered Libya Dialogue met in the town of Mammamet in Tunisia to assess the progress of the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and discuss changing parts of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA).

However, the delegation from the eastern-based rival government the House of Representatives (HoR) was absent from the meeting. According to HoR spokesperson Abdullah Bulaihak, the parliamentary deputy president Emhemed Shouaib and others were ordered not to attend by Ageela Saleh head of the HoR. Apparently Shouaib and the other members of the HoR delegation are no longer representatives of the HoR. There are unconfirmed reports that Shouaib was to fly back to Tobruk, the site of the HoR government, for consultations. Bulahaik said a new team had to be chosen and this would not happen until tomorrow at the earliest.

The members who met anyway to start deliberations decided only to ask the HoR who will be their new representatives. The discussions are about proposals that reduce the size of the Presidency Council from nine members to three as in an earlier draft of the LPA. The Presidency Council head would not also be Prime Minister but there would be a separate Prime Minister in charge of the cabinet. Apparently this structure is supported by Ageela Saleh and many members of the the HoR. It is unlikely any decision taken without HoR delegates present would be accepted by the HoR.

The members of the Libyan Dialogue must be acceptable to the UN special envoy Martin Kobler. He is unlikely to accept members whom he thinks are likely to vote for changes that he thinks may cause further divisions or other changes not acceptable to him. The HoR does not have the power to force its own choice of delegates on Kobler as membership of the Dialogue is a decision of Kobler. Names may not be the most pressing problem. Saleh wants a five-person HoR team rather than the present four. This would give the HoR more power. Another problem is that the HoR itself is not united about who should be on their team. Although Kobler did not attend today's meeting, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) organized the meeting site, bought Dialogue members plane tickets and arranged their accommodation.

The meeting has already been postponed twice. Originally the meeting was supposed to take place in Ghadames last week. It was then set to meet in Tunis on Wednesday but was then postponed until Sunday. The proposal from the HoR for a three person Presidency Council would see a representative from each of the three regions of Libya. However, the HoR is apparently finding it difficult to decide who they should name as their representative.

According to the Libya Herald, Saleh is willing to have the present head of the PC Faiez Serraj as head of the PC which is reduced in power as well as numbers, but only so long as Khalifa Haftar remains as military chief of the Libyan National Army, elections take place for the State Council and he remains as HoR president. Some of these demands sound impossible to satisfy. According to the present LPA, the PC has the function of commander in chief. Section 8 of the present LPA demands this. There is no way many members of the GNA and the High State Council would stand for any change to the LPA that would allow Haftar to remain as commander in chief of the armed forces. In fact, some will not countenance him having any role in the GNA. In the past, Kobler has refused to allow amendments to the LPA and has claimed it could not be amended but now he claims that the LPA is not written in stone.

It is not clear why the existing members of the HoR delegation are being replaced. What is clear is that if Saleh is demanding that Haftar remain as commander of the armed forces there will likely be no agreement with other members of the Dialogue. If there is then the GNA will simply implode. The Tunisia Dialogue meetings if they ever even start are unlikely to reach any solution to the present impasse between the GNA, the HoR and Haftar.

The HoR rejected the LPA for the second time on August 22 last year. There is no sign that there has been any progress towards holding another meeting at which the HoR would amend the constitutional declaration of 2011 as required and approve a new GNA government that is presented to them.

UN General Secretary on Libyan situation after one year of the Libyan Political Agreement

(December 17) A year ago on the 17th of December, selected members of the Libya Dialogue signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat Morroco. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon today commended all the Libyans who took part in the process.

A spokesperson for the UN General-Secretary issued a statement that said in part:

The Secretary-General commends all Libyans who engaged in the process, in the spirit of reconciliation, inclusion and human rights. The road to peace is long and requires hard work and commitment. Much has been achieved in the past year. The Presidency Council was formed and operates from Tripoli. Oil production has increased and significant advances have been made against terrorism across the country.

As is common, in UN statements much that is significant is left out. The LPA was not signed by either of the two separate legislatures as was originally intended. There was the Salvation Government of the General National Council(GNC) based in Tripoli and the House of Representatives government based in Tobruk. Neither parliament has ever ratified the LPA. Although there were members of both parliaments who signed, none were authorized by their respective parties to do so. The agreement was in effect manufactured by the UN as a means of getting around the fact that neither parliament would agree to the LPA. The text of the entire agreement can be found here. Some dates indicating when certain things are to be accomplished are long in the past.

In a masterful understatement Ban Ki-Moon notes that the slow pace at which the LPA is being implemented has not brought the stability and security to Libya that Moon says all Libyans deserve. In the parts of Libya run by the UN-brokered Government of National Accord, there have been cash shortages, power outages, some water shortages and many clashes among rival militia groups. There have been many kidnappings as well. There is no sign of the rival House of Representatives signing on to the LPA. The eastern area is being increasingly militarized by the commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar. He rejects the LPA and the GNA and even threatens to attack Tripoli.

Ban urges those not involved in the LPA process to join in. It is not clear why Haftar and his supporters should do so. He has seized the main oil ports of the oil crescent in the east and allies have control of the main pipeline system in the west carrying oil from two fields to the coast. He appears to have worked out some type of agreement with the National Oil Company but no detail has every been released. His Zintan allies in the west also must have reached some agreement but no mention is ever made of what this involves in reports.

Moon expressed his support for his Special Representative, Martin Kobler, and the staff of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). He also praised the Africa Union, EU, League of Arab States for their strong support of the political process. All seem to have simply been cheerleaders for whatever the UN and GNA did.

The statement today follows on an earlier statement on December 6 to the UN Security Council. In it he noted that the LPA was moving slower than it should in implementation, and associated institutions were operating below expectations. In that statement he mentioned the plan to form a Presidential Guard which would protect the government and institutions. He pointed out the difficulties of relying on militia.

There are no specific plans or even ideas as to how the HoR and Haftar are to be incorporated within the GNA or even how the LPA might be changed. It is still regarded as the basis for a way forward. Haftar is not even mentioned by name. The crucial specific problem of his continuing as commander of the armed forces is not mentioned. The statement gives little information about what has happened and even less about what the UN specifically intends to do in the future.

Interview with UN Envoy Martin Kobler on situation in Libya

The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) was signed on the 17th of December nearly a year ago. In an interview for the Libya Herald, Martin Kobler, head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) assesses the progress in implementing the LPA.

In an earlier interview, GNA Prime Minister and head, Faiez Serraj, had admitted that the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and its Presidency Council (PC) had failed to make progress since it had arrived in Tripoli at the end of March. Kobler defended the LPA and the GNA noting that the GNA had wide international support and forces loyal to it had successfully fought the Islamic State(IS). While Kobler is correct about the international support it has not translated into resources for the GNA to tackle its many problems. While the Al-Banyan Al-Marsous (Solid Structure or BAM) forces have virtually eliminated IS from its last stronghold in Sirte, it has mostly been achieved through brigades linked to the city of Misrata. The GNA has yet to have its own army and has failed to convince rival commander in the east Khalifa Haftar to serve under the command of the GNA. Haftar contributed nothing to liberating Sirte even though he had promised to do so.

Kobler admitted that the LPA had "implementation problems" a main problem being that the House of Representatives has failed to pass the constitutional amendment that is required to incorporate the LPA in the Transitional Constitutional Declaration of 2011. There seems to be a new emphasis on this step whereas before the emphasis was on the acceptance of the GNA through a vote of confidence. The HoR has twice voted down confidence motions in the GNA the last time being August 22. At the time a new GNA with a much smaller cabinet was to be presented within ten days. Kobler says nothing about the GNA presenting this new cabinet and here it is now December 4. He simply notes that the "HoR has accepted the LPA in principle and as a framework, and recognizes the Presidency Council". I am not sure what he means by the HoR recognizing the Presidency Council. It considers the Al-Thinni government of the HoR based in Tobruk to be the legitimate government of Libya not the GNA. Perhaps he means as part of the LPA. However, the HoR government does not believe the GNA is legally in existence until the HoR amends the constitutional declaration and votes confidence in it.

Kobler fails to mention that the HoR specifically wants section eight of the LPA deleted. The section makes the PC rather than Khalifa Haftar head of the armed forces. This is a key sticking point. As a way around the situation Kobler says: ‘‘There is a consensus by the major international stakeholders that the LPA should remain the framework of development. This does not mean that it is set in stone and it is very important that there is a process to discuss the deficiencies of the LPA." Kobler has changed his position in that he has constantly claimed that the LPA cannot be amended at least until it has been passed as it is.

Kobler said the Libya Dialogue members requested the HoR to pass the constitutional amendment. Apparently this is thought to be necessary to make the mainly advisory High State Council functional. Perhaps it is more a concern that the group have some semblance of legality. The process of their formation was highly suspect. A controversial decision by them supposedly made them the legislature of the GNA until the HoR voted confidence in the GNA.

The Libya Herald notes that the HoR is quite clearly refusing to pass the constitutional amendment. A two-thirds majority would be required to pass it. Kobler says:‘‘The political problems have to be solved. And I request the Libyan stakeholders to sit together, including members of the HoR, to pass the constitutional amendment. Or at least to say what should be done to make the LPA work.‘The problems have to be put on the table and then people can discuss it. The State Council is not functioning, the HoR is not functioning. All the institutions are not fulfilling their duties, including also the HoR.

It took the HoR six months and eight days to decide that they reject the list of the GNA members: it could have been done in a few days. Now, the HoR has, as per the LPA, the duty to fulfill. To pass the constitutional amendment and to endorse the GNA’’.Events should have been telling the UN for a long time now that the the LPA is not working out. Kobler cannot even bring himself to mention Khalifa Haftar and the problem of section eight. Kobler wants the parties to say what changes they have in mind to the LPA. He has been told many times about removing section eight and has been told many times that the GNA cabinet is too large among other problems. Now the parties are to get together to tell the UN what they want done since of course: "We the international community are not imposing anything. It is up to the Libyans what to do." This has never been true and is unlikely ever to be true. External players have too much to win or lose, particularly with respect to Libya's oil resources, not to attempt to influence the form the Libyan government takes.

Kobler suggests that the constitutional amendment needs to be signed so that the LPA and the GNA with the PC and State High Council become part of the "constitutional setup of the country" and Libyans become owners of the LPA. But before the HoR could abolish the LPA it would be accepting it with section eight, which is not acceptable to the HoR. Why would the HoR pass an amendment that accepts an LPA they reject? There is no sign of any meeting to do so.

Kobler complains that at present there is no real owner of the LPA. Amazing, all along Kobler has justified the setting up of the GNA, the PC, moving to Tripoli etc. by reference to the LPA even though the LPA is apparently not owned, whatever that means. If the HoR passes the constitutional amendment it would become owner of the agreement. Perhaps what Kobler has in mind is that if the HoR passed the amendment it would then be the legislature of the GNA. It could then amend the LPA. However, one can imagine what would happen at the level of the PC and the High State Council if the HoR decided to make Haftar head of the GNA armed forces.

Kobler agrees that the GNA cannot continue to be protected by militia but needs a Libyan national army. The Herald pointedly asks Kobler, given that he seems to have no positive dynamic between Ageela, Haftar and the HoR, if he is part of the problem and should perhaps step aside. No doubt this is a question many would ask! Koblerreplies: ”No. I feel overwhelmed by the degree of sympathy wherever I am. In the markets, everywhere. People personally tell me you and the UN have to do more. Please stay with us. We need your support as the international community. You have to be better. Stay with us. Accompany us on this way to peace and security. And I feel this very strongly’’. He admits that some people in Tobruk might not like him. He was unable to leave Tobruk airport recently because of protests.

Kobler notes that the GNA is recruiting a Presidential Guard to help protect it. He does not mention that the previous Presidential Guard defected and is now supporting members of the former Salvation Government who are occupying the Rixos hotel facilities as part of an attempted coup. He notes that an army has to be built up and a police force as well. At the same time some way must be found to either disband militias or incorporate them into a national army or police. However, almost nothing seems to be happening along these lines. Rival militias clashed in Tripoli for several days recently as shown on the appended video.

Libya Dialogue group meets in Malta on Libya crisis

(November 10) Valetta--Today members of the Libyan Political Dialogue begin a two-day meeting whose aim is to end the political impasse in Libya and agree to the steps needed to advance the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA)

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The Libya Political Dialogue was a group of Libyan stakeholders assembled by former UN envoy to Libya, Bernardino Leon. Working with the dialogue members he produced several drafts of the Liberal Political Agreement. No draft was ever agreed to by both the Salvation government parliament, the General National Congress or the rival House of Representatives (HoR) government based in Tobruk. When Martin Kobler took over as UN envoy he tried to pass the final draft through both parliaments but failed.

Kobler got around this problem by convening members of the Dialogue who supported the LPA in the Moroccan resort town of Skhirat in December of 2015. Those members signed what is known as the Skhiirat Agreement or Libyan Political Agreement. Although there were members of both parliaments present none of them had authority from their parliaments to sign. Presumably the members of the Political Dialogue referred to in the notice of meeting are some or all of those members who signed the Skhirat agreement.

The LPA requires that the HoR vote confidence in the LPA before the GNA term began. However, the GNA was actually rejected although a hundred members signed a letter supporting the GNA albeit with reservations. This led to an earlier meeting of the Political Dialogue members. In March this year they met in Tunis to discuss the GNA decision to activate itself and move to Tripoli from Tunis. Although there was some dissension the meeting was interpreted as supporting the GNA decision and the GNA moved to the naval base at Tripoli.

However, the GNA still needed the HoR to vote confidence in it before the HoR could become the legislature of the GNA under the terms of the LPA. This has never happened. In fact the HoR voted on August 22 to reject the GNA. The GNA was supposed to present a new smaller cabinet of eight members within ten days but more than two months later there is as yet no sign of a list of such members. It is not even clear that the HoR will even receive such a list and vote on it. Nothing is scheduled and no deadline has been set. The HoR wants not just a new list of cabinet members but also the deletion of a section of the LPA which makes the Presidency Council of the GNA the commander of GNA forces. The HoR and Field Marshal Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army Forces associated with the HoR, want Haftar to remain in his position. This is one of what the UNSMIL statement calls a key obstacle to the implementation of the Political Agreement. Kobler insists that only with a unified government, "the people of Libya will live with security, and basic services can be restored".

There was a second meeting of Dialogue members in July in Tunis at which the group expressed disappointment in the work of the GNA and warned that if its performance did not improve they might vote a lack of confidence in it.

Other bodies are also meeting on the Libya crisis and there is a new initiative by the African Union. A spokesperson for Khalifa Haftar, Colonel Ahmed Mesmary, said that an alternative to the Skhirat agreement was being worked out by tribal leaders in the city of Ajdabiya.

The dialogue members may be asked to amend the LPA. Kobler has constantly insisted that the LPA cannot be amended until it is passed by the HoR as it is. Perhaps, he has now changed his mind. Without amendment of the LPA, it appears quite unlikely that the HoR will vote confidence in the GNA.

Libyan unity government and political agreement under fire

For ages now there has been a constant refrain from supporters of the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) and the UN envoy Martin Kobler that the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) is the only way forward in Libya.

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All of a sudden, the narrative is changing. Even though at a recent conference in London there were moves made to bolster the GNA and help it out with some of its many problems, there appears to be a concerted attempt to wean international support away from reliance on the LPA and the process of having the GNA present a new cabinet before the House of Representatives for a vote of confidence as required by the LPA. The HoR voted against approving the GNA last August 22nd. There is still no sign of a new cabinet being chosen nor any new deadline for when the HoR will vote. Faiez Serraj, the PM of the GNA claims in a recent interview that the HoR is not even asking that a new cabinet be submitted for approval:

Now the HoR does not even want us to propose a third GNA. Mr Ageela Saleh has taken a prior decision to reject any proposed GNA. How can you work with this as a legislative partner? ‘I will not propose a new GNA for HoR approval prior to the HoR passing a constitutional amendment. If the HoR does not pass a constitutional amendment it abrogates its responsibilities in the LPA.If Serraj's claim is correct it is not surprising that the PC is in no hurry to create a new cabinet.

What should be clear is that the HoR and the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Field Marshall Haftar, will not accept the LPA as it stands because it has a section that sidelines Haftar and makes the Presidency Council(PC) commander of the GNA armed forces, at least temporarily. There have been numerous attempts at negotiation to get around this but none so far have been successful. There now appears to be a growing body of opinion that is suggesting that the LPA is part of the problem and must at the very least be changed and renegotiated. The Libya Herald reports: "The International Crisis Group says the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat last December has to be changed. In a hard-hitting and lengthy report published today, it says that as it stands it cannot be implemented."

The International Crisis Group is described here.Crisis Group raises funds from mainly western governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. In 2011/2012, 49 percent of its funding came from governments, 20 percent from philanthropic organisations, and 31 percent from individuals and private foundations...Crisis Group has an Advisory Council composed of three groups named the President's Council, the International Advisory Council, and the Ambassador Council, which includes corporations like Chevron and Shell, as well as some members listed on its website as 'Anonymous'.[6] Crisis Group has been criticised for serving the interests of its corporate and government funders.It has at times been criticized as serving western interests. That the group should come out with such an extensive hard-hitting critical account of the LPA and the GNA as well indicates that there could be a shift towards a new policy that tries to accommodate Haftar by moving away from or negotiating the LPA.

The country needs the following:To save the country, the calls for new negotiations to create a united government “involving especially key security actors not at Skhirat” – a reference to Khalifa Hafter and the Libyan National Army. Not only has the agreement altered the conflict, the conflict has altered the circumstances. Hafter’s successes in Benghazi and in the oil fields have upset the international community’s calculations and changed the situation on the ground. As a result, the international community’s instance in implementing the LPA as its stands is wrong. The peace process has to be “reset”.

Note that this position not only accepts the seizure of the oil fields and ports by Haftar but warns against any attempt to take them back by other forces as the Crisis Group report says: "The Presidency Council and allies should not take over the Gulf of Sirte facilities; the HoR and its forces should not move further west; the sides’ foreign backers should push hard to avoid an escalation." This in effect freezes the situation with Haftar having the upper hand and the greater leverage in any negotiations. Haftar already moved further west after he captured the ports taking towns further west on the way to Sirte.

The report suggests that the UN and other states supporting diplomacy should promote a forum for Haftar and major armed groups from the west to discuss de-escalation in the Gulf of Sirte, Benghazi and elsewhere. Presumably this would include Derna. Such a proposal makes little sense. Haftar's Operation Dignity is not about to make peace with western militia it considers its enemy or with the jihadists in Benghazi and Derna. What evidence is there that Haftar wants to take part in such a forum or that his supporters are willing to put enough pressure on him to do so?

The report notes that countries such as Egypt, the UAE, an Russia are giving Haftar overt and covert political and military support. While publicly subscribing to the peace process they at the same time undermine it but offer no concrete alternative. Why should they as long as they see their interests being served by supporting Haftar? The report notes the danger that the forces that liberated Sirte could begin to clash with Haftar's forces and that there needs to be a reset to the peace process to avoid new clashes over oil and gas.

The Crisis Group claims that the PC should negotiate with the HoR a new unity government. The report sums up some of its recommendations in the light of the crisis situation:“The prospect of Libya in free fall should give all pause, especially the vulnerable neighbours. Regional and global actors involved in the diplomatic process over Libya should converge on common goals, push for a renegotiation of the accord, use their influence to restrain the belligerents and nudge them toward a political solution and participation in a security track.”Among the common goals the international community are supposed to have are a unified army command and a reunified security structure. However, Haftar does not want to be within the chain of a political GNA command and it is not clear how the necessary security track of unifying the security structure is to be achieved.

As this report comes out, other articles critical of the GNA and western policy are also multiplying. There is one in the Middle East Eye and another as well. There is an Alarabiya article on the Crisis Group report. The Crisis report is well worth reading in its entirety.

Interview with Libyan unity government Prime Minister Faiez Serraj

On the sidelines of the recent London meetings on Libya, the Libya Herald interviewed the head of the Presidency Council of the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) who is also prime minister. The interview covers a number of important topics.

For a politician the answers are surprisingly frank and are often quite critical of important political players. Many of the answers explain why the GNA is not showing progress.

An obvious problem with the GNA is the lack of adequate security arrangements and control over militia. Serraj admitted that the arrangements had been slow in taking place and that the situation on the ground had made the time line set out in the Libyan Political Agreement(LPA) outdated. According to the LPA, the security arrangements involved removing any militias from urban centers. However, urban centers are still dominated by militia including the capital Tripoli. Serraj said: "... despite all our good intentions and plans… we need resources. We thought that the Presidential Guard would be deployed and armed quickly. Unfortunately, there has been a delay, even by the international community’’. When the Presidential Guard was finally set up members defected to support the coup plotters of the Salvation Government who took over the headquarters of the GNA's High State Council at the Rixos hotel in Tripoli.

Serraj noted that the international community always seem to give priority to fighting terrorism and illegal immigration while Libyans worry more about being able to get money out of the bank and having electricity 24 hours a day. Serraj said:‘‘I keep telling them that there are other issues that concern Libyan citizens more than these. The Libyan citizen sees how the international community is concentrating on its priorities and not concerned that the Libyan citizen queues for three days to get LD 100 from the bank. And how you are not concerned that the electricity is cut for up to 14 hours. You are not concerned that hospitals have no vaccinations. You are not concerned that there are schools in which people are living rather than being used for schooling. These all represent the priorities of Libyan citizens. This is the problem: is the international community supporting us with statements or are they supporting us in improving services and the standard of living for the Libyan citizen. If this does not happen effectively, which I repeated today in my meetings, there will be no progress’’.Serraj said that even the humanitarian support that Libya was receiving from the international community was relatively minor.

Serraj noted that some militia were relatively benign in that they are part of state institutions who are cooperating with the GNA. There are other militia that are simply criminal groups to be fought. Others still are politically associated that the GNA needed to attract and win over to support the GNA. Faiez said that to integrate militia into state forces money was needed which has not been made available. The defection of the Presidential Guard may in part have been caused by a failure to pay their salaries. Serraj pointed out that militia members needed training to be assimilated into the police or regular forces. He claimed that many militia members wanted to return to civilian life but in the ongoing instability and lack of an integration program they cannot do so.

Serraj notes that the GNA has ended up in a political battle with the House of Representatives (HoR) and Haftar. He said that PC members met with Haftar but were unable to convince him to join the GNA and come under political control. Although he expected a positive response from Haftar, it never came. He concludes:‘‘We tried with him on more than one occasion. We told him that not all the PC was as he had described it. That it contained civilian political streams as well as nationalists and that he should cooperate with us and that we would continue his army-building programmes in the east. We invited him to join us in our battle against terrorism in Sirte. We sent him these messages clearly but sadly there was no positive response. There was inflexibility and there is still inflexibility and a different vision to the vision I drew’’.

Serraj expressed exasperation at the lack of money and the strings attached to spending even money that is available. Serraj asks how he is expected to build a state with no army, no weapons, no money. He complained that the process of trying to get permission to import arms was long and complicated and did not treat the GNA as a sovereign government that was internationally recognized. He contrasted this process with the way other parties, presumably including Haftar, get their weapons:‘‘On the other hand, the other parties, they pick up the phone, they order 200 vehicles 300 RPGs, a third party pays the invoice and a [fourth party] ships for them the goods. As simple as that. This is what is happening. How do you expect me to play my positive part and do this and that etc and you have not provided me with support – support that the other party has in a blank cheque?

Of the attempted coup, Serraj claims that it is all being done with money by Khalifa Ghwell in an attempt to promote instability in Tripoli. Serraj does not say where the money is coming from but notes that the Central Bank of Libya(CBL) claims that it has no money to pay for the expenses of the GNA. Yet it spends money elsewhere without the permission of the GNA. There is obviously some serious infighting going on.

Serraj admits that bad relations with the CBL was a serious problem for the GNA. When the Ministry of the Interior for example is asked to clear the coastal road. He can do so but only if the Ministry receives the funds necessary to do it. However, the GNA may not be able to get the funds. The GNA even has problems obtaining funds to provide salaries for militia that support it. At the same time, Serraj claims other parties are providing alternative offers. Before, the GNA could begin to solve its problems the CBL had to take steps to carry out GNA policies.

Faiez is critical of NOC head Sanalla and his role during the seizure of the oil ports by Haftar: ‘’We had reached an agreement by the way with the PFG prior to the entry of Hafter’s troops. I had asked the NOC to lift the force majeure so that production and exports could resume. But NOC Chairman Sanalla kept delaying until Hafter’s forces entered. And they took the credit. But this is the truth. Sanalla, when I told him that he was delaying by purpose he claimed that he had received threats to strike oil tankers’’. The PFG are the Petroleum Facilities Guard.

Although most sources claim that the PC are trying to come up with a new reduced cabinet to present for a vote of confidence to the HoR, Serraj claims that the HoR does not even want to consider such a proposal: "Now the HoR does not even want us to propose a third GNA. Mr Ageela Salah has taken a prior decision to reject any proposed GNA. How can you work with this as a legislative partner?’’ Serraj says that he will not propose a new GNA before the HoR approves a constitutional amendment. If this is not done then the HoR has not carried out its responsibilities under the LPA. Serraj claims the HoR had been hijacked by Ageela Saleh and a minority within the HoR.

Serraj points out that the objections of the HoR to the LPA are about section 8 which makes the PC rather than Haftar commander in chief of the armed forces at least on an interim basis. Serraj said that it was not his job to amend the LPA but just to implement it. Serraj is obviously distraught by all the obstacles that he has to overcome to move the political process forward and even raised the possibility that he might resign.

Serraj singled out four main spoilers in the present situation: Haftar, Ageela Saleh, CBL head Saddik Elkaber and Sheik Ghariani. Ghariani is the Grand Mufti who supports fighting against Haftar and opposes the GNA. That the head of the Central Bank should be regarded as one of the main spoilers is symptomatic of the internal division that helps prevent effective action by the GNA. In conclusion Serraj emphasizes the negative role of the CBL: ‘‘We noted from our entry into Tripoli that the public’s expectations were high. I feel the pain of Libyans and failure to meet their expectations. But without financial resources we cannot implement’’.

Libyan unity government loses vote of confidence

After many meetings which either lacked a quorum or were disrupted, today the House of Representatives (HoR) met in Tobruk and held a vote of confidence in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA).

Spokesperson for the HoR, Abdallah Bilhaq, claimed 101 deputies attended with 61 voting against the GNA, 39 abstaining, and only one voting in favor. A tweet also confirmed the numbers present: " ‏@Eljarh #Confirmed HoR Rapporteur has just confirmed live that 101 members were present and a majority of 61 voted to reject the GNA. #Libya." However another tweet describes the vote as fake and gives different numbers: " 12 abstention +1 refused +61 agrees to topple the government = 74 = Where's the quorum ? !@UNSMILibya @KoblerSRSG " Western media including Bloomberg take the vote as legitimate.

The vote is a crushing blow to PM of the GNA, Faiez Serraj, and to Martin Kobler, UN envoy who have both been trying to get the endorsement of the HoR required by the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat Morocco last December. The vote would make the HoR the legislature of the GNA. It was supposed to begin the term of the GNA as well, but the GNA moved to Tripoli some time ago and began operation. At a February meeting of the HoR 100 members are supposed to have signed a letter supporting the GNA. This and a meeting of some Dialogue members who had signed the LPA were used to justify moving the GNA from Tunis to Tripoli at the end of March. Obviously that majority was nowhere to be seen at today's meeting as only one person voted in favor of the GNA. Kobler has claimed all along that a majority approved the GNA but today's events show him wrong at best and a liar at worst. While a majority may approve the GNA in principle it has always been with a number of provisos including having Haftar remain as commander of the Libyan National Army. As it is under the LPA, the Presidential Council of the GNA serves that function. This is not acceptable to Haftar and his backers in the HoR who obviously have a majority.

Kobler may try to find some way around the situation. Back in May, a meeting of members of the HoR who supported the GNA was planned for the western city of Ghadames. However, it never took place.

The GNA faces increasing difficulties. Electrical workers are protesting not being paid, kidnappings in Tripoli are increasing and a militia group is occupying the military intelligence headquarters just to mention a few issues. The GNA is also having problems exporting oil. Haftar's troops are threatening to take over oil ports held by the Petroleum Facilities Guard who support the GNA and the Tripoli-based National Oil Company (NOC). Haftar supports the HoR and the rival NOC in the east demanding that exporters have permits from the eastern NOC.

Alleged majority of HoR meet and issue a statement supporting the GNA but with conditions

The Libya Herald reports that a majority of the members of the HoR met in a hotel separately from the regular HoR meeting rooms. In a statement the group said it supports the UN-brokered Government of National Accord.

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However, it also said it wants Article 8 deleted. Actually as I have pointed out there are two articles numbered 8. One is in the main text of the Libyan Political Agreement signed in Skhirat, Morocco, on December 17. The other is in the additional provisions. The text of the Skhirat agreement is available in Engllsh here. I have talked about the two sections many times including here. The Libya Herald reports the HoR members as wanting section 8 in the additional provisions deleted:

 However, they also said they wanted the controversial Article No. 8 of the LPA’s additional provisions to be deleted. Under it, the Presidency Council is supposed to appoint or reappoint heads of major military, security and civilian posts within 20 days of the LPA being signed. Many see the article as an anti-Hafter move.

While what the Herald article says is true, it leaves out what is even more significant — namely that Haftar was supposed to lose his job as of the signing of the agreement. This is from page 20 of the text: All powers of the senior military, civil and security posts stipulated in the Libyan legislations and laws in force shall be transferred to the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers immediately upon signing this Agreement. :In other words, Haftar lost his job back on December 17 but everyone ignores this including the press. The other section 8 is in the main text and would see Haftar lose his job as soon as the GNA becomes operative. This is supposed to be after a vote of confidence in the HoR. However, the GNA declared itself up and running and moved to Tripoli some time back on the basis of a statement from a majority of the HoR that it supported the GNA and a supposed green light from Libyan Dialogue members. So Haftar should have been removed by now according to that provision as well. The Presidency Council remains mum on this even though it contains some members who are opposed to Haftar. The State Council has said nothing either.

The Herald report said that there were some 100 members who declared their support at the meeting. However a tweet with a photo shows many less: "32 memb of HOR hide scary in hotel restaurant amendment #skhirat agreement." The group condemned their colleagues for not allowing a formal meeting and said that the GNA remained the only way out of the crisis.

The Herald reports that the day had started out with effort to hammer out a compromise by members from the two groups. This may be the committee of six from each side that had been struck the day before. Apparently the meeting became chaotic with both sides engaging in a shouting match. First and second deputy Emhemed Shouaib and Ahmaid Huma, both supporters of the GNA then left. They then reassembled at another hotel where they released their statement. They did not take a formal vote to approve the LPA or GNA: Instead, the supporters called for the HoR to endorse the LPA, adding that the latter should take its oath of office before parliament no later than the end of next week. This should at a venue to be determined by the office of the HoR presidency, they said.Presumably, they meant the HoR should take an oath of office as members of the GNA legislative assembly.

An HoR official told the Herald that 102 members had declared their support for the GNA while those opposed were between 55 and 60. Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) issued a press release critical of those who prevented the vote. He regretted that what he called a clear majority were unable to exercise their intrinsic democratic right to vote and his release concludes:Taking note of the GNA supporters’ declaration, he paid tribute “to the spirit and courage of parliamentarians who gathered in Tobruk over the past few days”. He urged them to “remain faithful to their constituents” and to carry out their responsibilities “without obstruction, threat or intimidation”.Notice that he makes no mention of the fact that the majority statement also demands that section 8 be deleted. Kobler never notices things like that. Of course, he also fails to mention that the spoilers might have some connections with General Khalifa Haftar.

Ageela Salah, the speaker of the HoR, gave his opinion of the situation to the Libya Observer.. He said that a meeting could be held only with the attendance of the Speaker.

Much of present chaos in Libya can be traced to UN sidelining HoR and GNC in signing Skhirat LPA

Much of the responsibility for the present chaos in Libya can be traced back to the actions of the UN, the UN Security Council and the many countries who strongly support the UN-brokered Libya Political Agreement (LPA).

The hubris, arrogance, and bad faith of the actions of the former Special Envoy to Libya, Bernardino Leon and his successor, Special Representative to the Secretary-General Martin Kobler, are astonishing but everyone applauds them and their efforts.

The Libya Dialogue was a UN-brokered attempt to have the two main rival governments, the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and the rival General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli along with other stakeholders come to a political agreement which would result in peace and a unity government that both parliaments would accept. The two rival governments would voluntarily hand over power to the unity government. The aim was to have a government that will request foreign military intervention to fight against the Islamic State. The intervention could also deal with the huge flow of immigrants from Libya to Europe.

Bernardino Leon tried for over a year to come up with a draft agreement that both parliaments were expected to sign. Leon himself was discovered to have accepted a high-paying job in the UAE. He also communicated with officials in the UAE, in effect taking orders from them. He was attempting to weaken the GNC and empower the HoR. The UN said there was no conflict of interest involved even though the conflict was perfectly clear. Leon's final draft of a Libya Political Agreement (LPA) was accepted by Leon's successor Martin Kobler who claimed it could not be amended. He then tried, without success, to have the LPA adopted by the two parliaments.

Instead of reviving the Dialogue, Kobler gathered together members of the Dialogue who approved the LPA and its associated Government of National Accord (GNA) in Skhirat, Morocco. There were members from both parliaments present but none had signing authority. The Skhirat LPA was signed on December 17. There was no Libyan Political Agreement as intended by the original dialogue but a scheme for forced regime change imposed upon the two rival governments. This is obvious, but the media ignore this background. Even this LPA has been violated numerous times. The LPA has also been amended, for example by changing the number of deputy ministers from three to nine. Yet the Skihirat agreement is praised by numerous governments and is supported by a resolution in the UN Security Council which threatens those who block its implementation with sanctions.

The UN still faced the unfortunate fact that even the Skhirat LPA required the HoR to vote confidence in the GNA. A formal vote has never happened. Instead a statement by an alleged majority of the HoR that supports the GNA was used as an equivalent. There still has to be an amendment by the HoR to the constitutional declaration of 2011 to incorporate the GNA into the constitution. As with so much else, this is mostly ignored. The last four meetings of the HoR have not had a quorum. The GNA went ahead and declared itself up and running and the UN and associated international cheerleaders urged it to move to Tripoli. Not the slightest hint that the UN or GNA has done anything wrong even though they have been violating their own rules,

It should come as no surprise that since neither government agreed to the LPA or GNA that they have not ceded power, in spite of threats from the UN and the promise of good jobs in the new government. The HoR is actually the legislature of the GNA and the State Council is composed of GNC members. As Mohamed Eljarh of the Atlantic Council in Washington put it: "The birth of this government in this way has done nothing but worsen the political crisis... create new conflicts and further destabilise."

The GNC has not given Kobler permission to land at the Mitiga airport in Tripoli. Kobler tweeted: "Again had to cancel flight to Tripoli... UN must have the right to fly (to) Tripoli," Kobler has the force of a UN Security Council resolution behind him, the same resolution that has been used to threaten sanctions against two officials of the UN. The result seems to have been to harden positions.

The same has happened in the HoR with the parliament refusing to hand over power and objecting to the move to Tripoli before a formal vote is held. The international community and the UN refuse to recognize that any of this is due to them. It is all a result of a handful of "spoilers". Among the spoilers, is Khalifa Haftar whose Operation Dignity was in large part responsible for the present civil war. He was once to be sanctioned but that is ancient history and his name no longer comes up just Ageela Salah, head of the HoR.

Michael Nayebi-Oskui, a Middle East and North Africa analyst said: "Unless the international community can give the GNA control over Libyan finances, a powerful national army, and somehow make it legitimate in the eyes of the Libyan people, the GNA is poised to become the weakest of Libya's three competing national authorities." There do seem to be attempts to cause financial difficulties for the GNC government to turn people against it. The most powerful army is no doubt that of the HoR, the Libyan National Army(LNA) mostly composed of former militia of the commander in chief Khalifa Haftar. The UN will not take him on and sideline him since he has the support of Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and the Arab League. If he remains head of the LNA then the GNA is doomed for all the Islamists in the GNA will revolt.

While the divisions within Libya itself are an important factor creating problems and conflict within Libya, even those divisions are exacerbated by foreign intervention in support of one group or another. However, UN intervention with the support of numerous foreign governments, often former colonial powers, has exacerbated the situation through gross violation of its own rules in order to achieve a compliant government to legitimize foreign intervention.

Violations of the Libyan Political Agreement

In order to try and get the Government of National Accord up and running the United Nations has accepted numerous violations of the Libya Political Agreement as signed on December 17 in Skhirat, Morocco.

The original aim of the political dialogue was to have agreement on a Government of National Accord (GNA) and a peace settlement between the internationally recognized House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and the rival General National Congress in Tripoli. After more than a year, a final draft of the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) failed to gain approval in either parliament. The UN decided to simply ignore the understanding that both parliaments had to agree to a deal. Martin Kobler, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), simply gathered together members of the dialogue who supported the GNA to sign the agreement in Skhirat, Morocco, on December 17. No one bothers to point out this is a total rejection of the whole idea of the dialogue to have an agreement between the two parliaments. For the international community and the UN it was a great leap forward. So even though not authorized to sign by the respective parliaments, this was hailed a a positive step and an agreement between the two rival parties.Since the Skhirat agreement, the UN has continually violated the rules of the LPA. This article recalls just a few.

There are two articles 8. One is in the main text of the Skhirat agreement:Article (8) 2. Terms of Reference of the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers:

a. Assume the functions of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan army b. Appointment and removal of the Head of the General Intelligence Service upon the approval of the House of Representatives.The provision comes into force immediately upon the vote of confidence in the GNA by the HoR. There was no vote but the Political Dialogue supported by the UN claims that a letter signed by an alleged majority of the HoR approving the GNA was in effect equivalent to a vote of confidence. As yet there is no sign that the incumbent leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalfia Haftar, has been removed from this position. The HoR earlier demanded that section 8 be deleted as well as the GNA cabinet be reduced from 32. The LPA cannot be amended until after it is given a confidence vote. Fortunately, for the UN, the mainstream press seems to suffer severe short term memory loss and the issue has been deleted from their memory banks. This memory loss also applies to the other section 8 in the additional provisions on page 20 of the Shkirat agreement:Article (8) All powers of the senior military, civil and security posts stipulated in the Libyan legislations and laws in force shall be transferred to the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers immediately upon signing this Agreement. The Presidency Council must take a decision on the occupants of such posts within a period that does not exceed twenty (20) days. In case a decision is not reached during this period, the Presidency Council shall take decisions on new appointments within a period that

does not exceed thirty (30) days, while taking into account the Libyan legislations in force.This was to happen back on December 17. Yet nothing happened and almost no one noticed.

Another example of egregious violations of the LPA is evident in the setting up of the State Council, an advisory body to the GNA, a sop to the GNC who have no legislative power in the GNA. The HoR is the legislature in the GNA. The LPA says: Annex 3 Basic Rules for the Functioning of State Council Article 1 The State Council shall comprise one hundred and forty five (145) members who were elected during the General National Congress elections on 7 July 2012 as per the following: 1. One hundred and thirty four (134) male and female members of the General National Congress who enjoy sound membership at the signing this Agreement. The Presidency of the General National Congress shall submit a list containing the names of those members.Since the GNC rejects the GNA it has not presented any names for the State Council. Instead, Makhzoum who left the negotiating team of the GNC in August, but nevertheless signed the LPA in December, obediently drew up a list which was eagerly accepted by the UN. Makhzoum along with some other members of the State Council have been expelled from the GNC.

The UN has also decided to violate the basic provision of the LPA regarding a vote of confidence by the HoR in the GNA and its program. The HoR also needs to pass an amendment to the 2011 Constitutional Declaration to incorporate the GNA in it: 4.The term of the Government of National Accord shall be one year as of the date of granting it a vote of confidence by the House of Representatives. ....Article (3)

The Prime Minister, within a period that does not exceed one month of the adoption of this Agreement, shall submit a full agreed list of the members of the Government of National Accord and its programme to the House of Representatives to fully endorse it, grant it a vote of confidence and adopt its program in accordance with the legally stated procedures within a period that does not exceed ten (10) days of its submission to the House of Representatives.The deadline was exceeded and no formal vote was taken but a letter supporting the GNA on which three signatures at least were not authorized was accepted as the vote of confidence. There was no incorporation of the GNA into the Constitutional Declaration.

The HoR is now apparently the legislature of the GNA. As such it has to approve all sorts of things under the LPA and also pass new laws. It remains to be seen if they accept such a role after being bypassed by the UN.

Libyan GNA to move to Tripoli without a vote of confidence from the HoR

Before the GNA begins its term it must receive a vote of confidence from Tobruk's internationally recognized House of Representatives (HOR). Even though it has not received the vote, the GNA is intending to move to Tripoli and begin operations there.

The HoR met several times to have a vote on the GNA. Each time there was either no quorum or the session was disrupted with no votes. In response, the UN appears to be planning to avoid a vote in the HoR. The first time the UN did this resulted in the present Skhirat agreement.

The Libyan Dialogue was originally intended to reach a political agreement on a unity government between the two rival governments, the HoR and the General National Congress (GNC) located in Tripoli in the west. After a year, there was a draft of a Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) reached by then-Special Envoy to Libya, Bernardino Leon. Leon was unable to get this draft passed through either parliament. When Martin Kobler took over as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Libya, he said the dialogue was over and insisted the two parliaments pass the LPA as it was. He claimed it could not be amended, though he later changed it himself to add members to the Presidency Council.

When Kobler also failed to have the LPA passed by either parliament, he decided to avoid altogether having the two parliaments' approval, even though all along this was the stated aim. Instead, he called together members of the Libya Dialogue who supported the LPA and had them sign it on December 17th in Skhirat, Morocco. The international community wants one government which they approve so that they can then get the GNA to ask them to intervene military in Libya. The Skhirat LPA was applauded by most everyone, even though it had nothing to do with the original aim of the Dialogue. It was what important powers wanted. However, there was a huge stumbling block. The LPA requires that the HoR give a vote of confidence in the GNA. This never happened. The solution to this is to again avoid a vote in the HoR if that is necessary and simply continue on as if the GNA had been approved and up and running. There is no reconsideration of a policy that ignores the original intent of the dialogue and the conditions of even the Skhirat agreement. There is no dialogue. The Political Dialogue has become an instrument for helping the UN fulfill its plans. The statement says: Members of the Libyan Political Dialogue concluded today the first day of deliberations in the Tunisian capital with a reaffirmation of their commitment to uphold the Libyan Political Agreement signed in Skhirat on 17 December 2015 as the only and legitimate framework for bringing an end to the political crisis and military conflict in Libya.

The statement gives lip service to the requirement that the HoR give a vote of confidence in the GNA but does not say explicitly that it is required and even suggest that a letter signed by what they claim is a majority of the HoR supporting the GNA convinces them that the GNA is in effect approved. Originally, the letter was supposedly signed by 100 members but at least three have come forth who denied they signed. The statement conveniently ignores this by not citing a number at all: While the members of the Political Dialogue stress that granting a vote of confidence to the Government of National Accord is an inherent competence of the House of Representatives, and with all due respect to opinions of Parliament members about the Government of National Accord, they valued the statement of 23 February by the majority of members of the House of Representatives in which they expressed approval of the formation of the Government of National Accord.

Members of the Political Dialogue called on the House of Representatives concerning the importance of complete(sic) these steps and to continue upholding its responsibilities with respect to the implementation of all relevant provisions of the Libyan Political Agreement.In spite of all this verbal maneuvering the fact is that the GNA's term has not yet begun. Nevertheless, the next sections say that the Presidency Council of the GNA should take whatever steps are necessary to have the GNA start working out of Tripoli.

One might wonder why on earth the UN would want the GNA to work out of Tripoli, given the precarious security situation. Some militia groups have threatened the security personnel who are to make arrangements in Tripoli. Three UN personnel were already arrested as Kobler has complained. He thought this important enough to issue a news release about it. The statement reveals why this is so important: All public bodies, including official financial institutions, should put in place the necessary arrangements for an immediate and orderly and peaceful handover of power in accordance with the provisions of the Libyan Political Agreement.

The UN wants the GNA to control the Central Bank and the National Oil Company in order to starve the rival governments of revenue and have funds to finance itself. It will also no doubt ask a UK court to release to it the billions in frozen Libyan funds. These can be used to buy off opposition. The statement also stresses the need to safeguard the institutions emanating from the LPA including the State Council and the HoR.

The HoR is not even safe apparently in its own territory of Tobruk. What makes the UN think that a UN resolution will make the HoR any safer in Tripoli? The State Council is an advisory body composed of members from the GNC. The GNC did not approve the agreement and does not recognize the State Council. Makhzoum who suggested the names for the council has been turfed out of the GNC and some of the members of the Council as well. The GNC is supposed to appoint them. It does not matter, since this does not help advance UN plans.

The UN may again consider using threats of sanctions as way of forcing parties to agree to the GNA. France is already using this threat:France wants EU sanctions imposed on Agilah Saleh of the HoR, Nuri Abusahmain of the GNC & #Tripoli Gov PM al-Ghwell. #Libya

The UN has tried using the threat before only to have sanctions vetoed in the UN Security Council. However, the EU could perhaps pass sanctions. However, the EU already listed Khalifa Haftar commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces to be sanctioned. Nothing happened and Haftar claimed the threat was meaningless. Sometimes, Haftar is right. Haftar's name has not come up yet this time. Isn't a bit strange to sanction Saleh who will be the head of the GNA's legislative assembly the HoR.