Libya Political Dialogue claims to have amended the Libyan Political Agreement

(January 26) According to a report from the Libya Observer, the Libyan Political Dialogue committee agreed to six proposals amending the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) that had been agreed to by an earlier Dialogue group at Skhirat Morocco back on December 17, 2015.

The Skhirat agreement has already been twice rejected by House of Representatives (HoR) which by the LPA is required to vote confidence in the UN-brokered Government of National Accord( GNA) set out in the LPA. The HoR government and the head of its armed forces the Libyan National Army (LNA), Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, refuse to recognize the GNA and its Presidency Council (PC).

The Dialogue members are at the invitation of the UN envoy to Libya Martin Kobler. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya UNSMIL arranges accommodations and air transportation, Kobler usually calls for a Dialogue meeting when he wants to push through something not strictly in the LPA. He called the group together when he wanted the GNA to move from Tunis to Tripoli even though strictly speaking the GNA did not yet exist as an operating government, since it had not received a vote of confidence by the HoR. It still has not had such a vote and there is yet no sign of it being held although it was supposed to be ready to be held within ten days after the August 22 rejection last year.

The present meeting was twice postponed but even when it last met it was reported that representatives from the HoR were not present. The HoR was to send a new delegation. According to the Libya Observer, the HoR did not send any representatives to the meeting today at which the amendments were made.

The High Council of State (HCS) a part of the GNA composed of former members of the General National Congress and a mostly advisory body is claimed to have rejected any discussions of the reshuffling of the government members by the dialogue members. The group claims that it will only agree to discuss the issue with HoR representatives. An HCS delegate to the meeting was reported to have said: “The only legal mechanism to discuss amending the political agreement the bodies working under its authority is via an agreement between the HoR and the HCS as included in the Skhirat-signed agreement.”

Apparently, the Dialogue group agreed to include only three members in the Presidential Council rather than the present nine. Each member would be from a different part of the three main areas of Libya. In its final statement the Dialogue members said: “The Head of the Government of National Accord will be picked from outside the Presidential Council and he will be responsible for the executive authority along with the ministers.” A new council has been added that will be appointed as the Chief Commander of the Libyan Army:“The council will consist of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Head of the High Council of State, and a member from the three members of the Presidential Council,” Decisions would be made by consensus. It seems highly unlikely that Khalifa Haftar, will agree to any such Council. He wants to remain head of the armed forces of any new government. The membership of the HCS would also be expanded. The Constitution Drafting Assembly was required to finish its work within a period of one month from the day the amendments get signed. However, the amendments are not yet signed.

The dialogue committee said that the HoR should approve the Government of National Accord before the signing takes place to ensure that the amendments will be included and dealt with seriously. Whatever makes the committee think that the HoR will vote confidence before the amendments were signed even if they accepted the amendments? What makes the committee think that the HoR will accept amendments that they had not been involved in creating? It is possible that perhaps the HoR did send a delegation at the last minute but the Libya Observer report suggests this was not the case. One would expect that if the HoR had been there, the amendment about a new council being commander of the Libyan Army would have been rejected. According to the Observer, the Presidential Council spokesperson has said that the Dialogue Committed is not entitled to amend the LPA. Perhaps that is in effect recognized by the group as they suggested that the HoR should first vote confidence in the GNA before the amendments were signed. This just appears to be another scheme dreamed up with the help of Martin Kobler, Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), to try and have the HoR vote confidence in the GNA. It seems it is being attacked already by the existing GNA and is quite unlikely to be accepted by the HoR or Haftar.

An earlier report by the Libya Herald, said that the dialogue team, meeting in the Tunisian resort town of Hammamet had been unable to make any decisions because of divisions in the HoR. The members could not agree on the number of members to be nominated by the HoR to the committee. Some HoR members insisted that any changes had to first be agreed to by a committee of five HoR members and five from the High State Council of the GNA as is set forth in the LPA. They argued that the Dialogue meeting in Tunis should be ignored since they could not amend the LPA. The meeting had to be suspended until Tuesday after a row. The Herald account concludes:It is due to reconvene tomorrow, Tuesday, but there is no guarantee that HoR members will agree on a new dialogue committee, let along that some of the committee (if not all of them) will go to Hammamet and join the Libya Dialogue.The Herald claims that without the HoR new representatives turning up nothing can be done. It seems that something was done but it seems highly unlikely that HoR representatives were involved.

The Libya Express also covered the Dialogue committee meeting. The account follows closely that given by the Libya Observer but does not say that there were no HoR representatives present. Neither does it mention any criticism by the Presidency Council nor the High State Council but has a separate article on the HSC criticism.

Much of present chaos in Libya can be traced to UN sidelining HoR and GNC in signing Skhirat LPA

Much of the responsibility for the present chaos in Libya can be traced back to the actions of the UN, the UN Security Council and the many countries who strongly support the UN-brokered Libya Political Agreement (LPA).

The hubris, arrogance, and bad faith of the actions of the former Special Envoy to Libya, Bernardino Leon and his successor, Special Representative to the Secretary-General Martin Kobler, are astonishing but everyone applauds them and their efforts.

The Libya Dialogue was a UN-brokered attempt to have the two main rival governments, the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and the rival General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli along with other stakeholders come to a political agreement which would result in peace and a unity government that both parliaments would accept. The two rival governments would voluntarily hand over power to the unity government. The aim was to have a government that will request foreign military intervention to fight against the Islamic State. The intervention could also deal with the huge flow of immigrants from Libya to Europe.

Bernardino Leon tried for over a year to come up with a draft agreement that both parliaments were expected to sign. Leon himself was discovered to have accepted a high-paying job in the UAE. He also communicated with officials in the UAE, in effect taking orders from them. He was attempting to weaken the GNC and empower the HoR. The UN said there was no conflict of interest involved even though the conflict was perfectly clear. Leon's final draft of a Libya Political Agreement (LPA) was accepted by Leon's successor Martin Kobler who claimed it could not be amended. He then tried, without success, to have the LPA adopted by the two parliaments.

Instead of reviving the Dialogue, Kobler gathered together members of the Dialogue who approved the LPA and its associated Government of National Accord (GNA) in Skhirat, Morocco. There were members from both parliaments present but none had signing authority. The Skhirat LPA was signed on December 17. There was no Libyan Political Agreement as intended by the original dialogue but a scheme for forced regime change imposed upon the two rival governments. This is obvious, but the media ignore this background. Even this LPA has been violated numerous times. The LPA has also been amended, for example by changing the number of deputy ministers from three to nine. Yet the Skihirat agreement is praised by numerous governments and is supported by a resolution in the UN Security Council which threatens those who block its implementation with sanctions.

The UN still faced the unfortunate fact that even the Skhirat LPA required the HoR to vote confidence in the GNA. A formal vote has never happened. Instead a statement by an alleged majority of the HoR that supports the GNA was used as an equivalent. There still has to be an amendment by the HoR to the constitutional declaration of 2011 to incorporate the GNA into the constitution. As with so much else, this is mostly ignored. The last four meetings of the HoR have not had a quorum. The GNA went ahead and declared itself up and running and the UN and associated international cheerleaders urged it to move to Tripoli. Not the slightest hint that the UN or GNA has done anything wrong even though they have been violating their own rules,

It should come as no surprise that since neither government agreed to the LPA or GNA that they have not ceded power, in spite of threats from the UN and the promise of good jobs in the new government. The HoR is actually the legislature of the GNA and the State Council is composed of GNC members. As Mohamed Eljarh of the Atlantic Council in Washington put it: "The birth of this government in this way has done nothing but worsen the political crisis... create new conflicts and further destabilise."

The GNC has not given Kobler permission to land at the Mitiga airport in Tripoli. Kobler tweeted: "Again had to cancel flight to Tripoli... UN must have the right to fly (to) Tripoli," Kobler has the force of a UN Security Council resolution behind him, the same resolution that has been used to threaten sanctions against two officials of the UN. The result seems to have been to harden positions.

The same has happened in the HoR with the parliament refusing to hand over power and objecting to the move to Tripoli before a formal vote is held. The international community and the UN refuse to recognize that any of this is due to them. It is all a result of a handful of "spoilers". Among the spoilers, is Khalifa Haftar whose Operation Dignity was in large part responsible for the present civil war. He was once to be sanctioned but that is ancient history and his name no longer comes up just Ageela Salah, head of the HoR.

Michael Nayebi-Oskui, a Middle East and North Africa analyst said: "Unless the international community can give the GNA control over Libyan finances, a powerful national army, and somehow make it legitimate in the eyes of the Libyan people, the GNA is poised to become the weakest of Libya's three competing national authorities." There do seem to be attempts to cause financial difficulties for the GNC government to turn people against it. The most powerful army is no doubt that of the HoR, the Libyan National Army(LNA) mostly composed of former militia of the commander in chief Khalifa Haftar. The UN will not take him on and sideline him since he has the support of Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and the Arab League. If he remains head of the LNA then the GNA is doomed for all the Islamists in the GNA will revolt.

While the divisions within Libya itself are an important factor creating problems and conflict within Libya, even those divisions are exacerbated by foreign intervention in support of one group or another. However, UN intervention with the support of numerous foreign governments, often former colonial powers, has exacerbated the situation through gross violation of its own rules in order to achieve a compliant government to legitimize foreign intervention.

UN Security Council gives its blessing to questionable self-empowerment of GNA

The UN Security Council has now issued a press release that gives its blessing to decisions of the GNA applauded by the UN which now recognize the GNA as the sole legitimate government of Libya.

The release on the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) website starts out:

The members of the Security Council welcomed the meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue on 10 March 2016, which reaffirmed its commitment to uphold the Libyan Political AgreementWhat commitment? There have already been numerous violations of the LPA. The UN takes no notice.

Next comes the fig leaf to cover the fact that the GNA suddenly becomes a functioning government without a vote of confidence by the HoR, as required in the LPA:The members of the Security Council noted that the Political Dialogue valued the declaration signed by a majority of the members of the House of Representatives on 23 February announcing their support for the Government of National Accord.

Of course it is not quite politically correct to say that they consider this actually equivalent to HoR approval and are acting as if it gave legitimacy to claim the GNA is now the actual government of Libya, as far as the UN and international community are concerned. Even the crassest power politics must pretend to observe the rules. The UN "notes" that the Political Dialogue "valued the declaration." In reality the letter is used as a substitute for the HoR vote of confidence. Nothing in the statement notes that at least three of the signatories denied they signed. However, one must keep up the proper appearances.

The next section goes through the motions of carrying on as if the HoR will see the light and vote confidence in the GNA:The members of the Security Council echoed the call made by the Political Dialogue for the House of Representatives to uphold its responsibilities in implementing all relevant provisions of the Libyan Political Agreement and for the Presidency Council to take steps to rapidly start working from the capital, Tripoli, in accordance with the security arrangements in the Agreement.

The UN cannot bring itself to simply say that the HoR must hold a vote of confidence in the GNA for this would make it too clear what must be done. Instead there is a resort to a vague general phrase "to uphold its responsibilities in in implementing all relevant provisions of the Libyan Political Accord." These include not just the vote of confidence but also an amendment to the Constitutional Declaration of 2011 to incorporate the GNA and give it a legal basis in the constitution. That has not happened even if the letter is regarded as an equivalent of the HoR vote of confidence. The UN will not mention key items such as that.

In calling for the Presidential Council to start working from the capital, the UN is in effect sanctioning the view that the GNA is now operating and should be in the capital as envisaged by the LPA. It can then take charge of the Cenral Bank, National Oil Company and Investment Authority and ask for the billions in frozen Libyan funds. It may then buy off opposition and starve rival governments of funds. All of this, assumes that the GNA term has started before the vote of confidence in the HoR as required by the LPA. So much for paying any attention to the requirements of the LPA.

The UN again pledges their support to the LPA as signed in Skhirat on December 17th. One wonders how they can do that since that agreement had three members of the presidency council whereas now there are nine. This is because somehow the agreement which Martin Kobler, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) claimed numerous times could not be amended nevertheless was.

The Security Council next notes that their resolution 2259 of 2015 calls for " Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions that claim to be the legitimate authority but are outside of the Libyan Political Agreement as specified by it." But surely this applies only after the term of the GNA has started and this requires a vote of confidence in the HoR, along with an amendment to the Constitutional Declaration. The Security Council is violating the very LPA it has just vowed to uphold.

The Security Council calls on the GNA "to finalise interim security arrangements necessary for stabilising Libya, and in the regard called upon Member States to respond urgently to requests from it for assistance." The whole urgency of getting the GNA up and running is so it can request military assistance from the international community. There are various schemes planned with the U.S. turning Libya into a new front against the Islamic State, but other countries plan to be part of the mission. Most of them are among the huge chorus of cheerleaders already giving support to the illegal moves of the GNA no doubt with the urging of Martin Kobler. Even without being invited by the GNA to intervene many countries' special forces are already operating in Libya and there have been air strikes as well.

A key moral justification for military intervention and formation of a unity government is to fight terrorism. As the Council puts it:The members of the Security Council reiterated their concern about the growing terrorist threat in Libya, in particular from groups proclaiming allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and groups affiliated with Al Qaeda, and called on the Government of National Accord to urgently focus on combating this threat.Note that not only the Islamic State is regarded as terrorist but groups affiliated with Al Qaeda which would include Ansar Al-Sharia. This group belongs in some Shura Councils which the GNC supports. The statement does not rule out other groups being considered terrorist as well. Khalifa Haftar considers all the militia associated with the GNC as terrorists and his Operation Dignity is designed to defeat them militarily. This is another fact typically ignored in most reports on Libya.

Within the next few days we should have the reaction of the HoR and the GNC to these announcements. The withdrawal of international recognition will be most devastating to the HoR. The GNC is not recognized in any event. Perhaps, the international community will actually wait and see if the GNA can actually move to Tripoli. It does not seem that acceptable security arrangements are yet in place. Perhaps the GNA will ask for help in arranging this. France might answer the call:

Considerable resistance to attempts to empower the Government of National Accord

The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat, Morocco, on December 17 last year has a provision that requires the internationally recognized House of Representatives (HoR) give a vote of confidence in the GNA before its term of office begins.

The UN has been unable to hold a vote in the HoR on the issue. An earlier session when there was a vote rejected the GNA because it had too many ministers and also demanded the Section 8 — that would take away Khalifa Haftar's commander-in-chief job and give it to the Presidency Council — be deleted. No vote has been held on the new GNA. Meetings have been either without a quorum or ended when they were disrupted. In response, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Martin Kobler called together the Political Dialogue members who had signed the Skhirat agreement to agree on a way forward. The group first issued a statement that among other items urged that the GNA move to Tripoli as soon as possible. In spite of the lack of a vote from the HoR, the group also spoke of the GNA as the only way forward. Subsequently, the UN issued a new release which spoke not only of moving to Tripoli but describes the GNA as the only legitimate Libyan government. The move to Tripoli is obviously part of the plan to gain control of the Libyan Central Bank and the National Oil Company. This would deprive the two rival governments of funds and enable the GNA to buy off opposition. The release also speaks of the necessity to hand over financial institutions to the GNA.

The GNA Presidential Council has conveniently ignored the formal requirement of a vote of confidence in the HoR before the term of the GNA begins. As the Libya Herald notes:The Presidency Council has claimed that its proposed 13-ministry government has effectively been given the go-ahead by the endorsement signed by some hundred members of the House of Representatives (HoR) last month and by the Libya Dialogue in its statement on Thursday.Several of the hundred members have claimed that they did not sign the statement.

The announcement has angered some of the Skhirat agreement signatories, including three different political parties. The Libya Observer reports:A joint statement by the National Forces Alliance, the National Front Party and Alwattan Party, in addition to some MPs and politicians said the statement of the Presidency Council is an attempt to jump on the political agreement, warning that any violation to Skhirat agreement would strip the Presidential Council of its credibility."Giving the government a vote of confidence lies within the powers of the House of the Representatives," the statement explains.The group also noted that the constitutional declaration of 2011 must be amended before the Skhirat agreement goes into effect. This key feature of the situation is often ignored. Also ignored is that if the GNA is approved by the HoR, then section 8 of the LPA comes into play and General Haftar loses his job to the Presidency Council. The signatories also asked that the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) remain neutral and keep to the provisions of the LPA. It is much too late for that since the LPA provisions have already been violated numerous times.

A few other news outlets, including the BBC, have noted that the Libya Dialogue was actually calling for a speedy vote of approval of the GNA by the HoR:

However, on Thursday, a statement by Libya's Political Dialogue Team - composed of members of political figures in Libya and some MPs representing the country's two rival parliaments - did not appear to pave the way for this move. It called for a speedy parliamentary vote on the proposed government, the BBC's Rana Jawad in Tunis notes.

Some individual analysts also see difficulties in the GNA and UN actions including Jason Pack of Libya Analysis. Pack notes several parties and individuals who signed the Skhirat agreement condemned the move as an attempt to skirt HoR endorsement. Pack claims the move further discredits the UN mediation in the Eastern Region who regard certain Libyan actors as manipulating the process to prop-up their own partners and interests.

Pack claims that the French threat to impose EU sanctions on Ageela Saleh only bolsters the legitimacy of actors rejecting the LPA. The same may happen through the threats against GNC officials. Pack points out that many Libyan and foreign actors are ignoring the ban on weapons imports for the two rival governments. As Pack rightly put it: Reports of these flagrant violations of the Libyan arms embargo paint a cynical picture of international and regional support for the UN mediated solution for Libya.I doubt that we will hear of any sanctions being imposed on those responsible for the violations.

According to Pack, some eastern Libyan fighters have switched allegiance from Ibrahim Jadhran, who heads the Petroleum Forces Guard (PFG), to commander of the Libyan National Army, Khalifa Haftar. This would give more power to pro-Haftar groups. Pack concludes: Increased pressure by the international community to salvage the UN process without amending its flawed approach is likely to enflame leaderless separatist sentiment as a fracturing of all Libyan political movements other than the LNA is underway. In fact, the HoR may splint into two camps — an anti-GNA Tubruq camp and a pro-GNA camp meeting elsewhere in Libya.

There is also strong resistance to the GNA in the west with the GNC rejecting it. It is not clear that the GNA is viable anywhere in Libya. The west is very much split. There is not even unity within the Presidency Council as according to reports, three of the nine members have suspended membership.
None of this opposition seems to matter to the UN and its huge chorus of international cheerleaders. This is representative the chants of the cheerleaders:The ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy welcome the statement of the members of the Libyan Political Dialogue, gathered in Tunis on the 10th and on the 11th of March 2016. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union express full support to the Government of National Accord as proposed by the Presidency Council, and acknowledge the statement of 23 February signed by a majority of members of the House of Representatives in which they announced their support for the Government of National Accord.

No one talks of Section 8 of the LPA. If the GNA is now in operation then the Presidency Council has the function of commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army not Khalifa Haftar. There is no sign that this is happening even though some supporters of Haftar claim that the Presidency Council is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. It seems a bit odd that the Council does not talk immediately act and turf Haftar from his job. Actually, another section 8 transferred powers of the commander in chief to the Council back on December 17.