Libyan UN-brokered government's head outlines a road map to peace

                                           Troops loyal to GNA

Fayez al-Serraj, head of the Presidential Council of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA)  noted that he and his government had tried to bridge the gap between it and the rival House of Representatives (HoR) government, and had always tried to achieve reconciliation but without success. Serraj said that representatives of the HoR and the GNA's High Council of State had been unable to live up to their privileges regarding their sovereign positions. One might equally claim that the GNA was not able to do so either in that it was unable to present a government to the HoR that could gain the confidence of the HoR as is required by the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). It lost the vote twice, the last time on August 22, 2016.

There have been earlier so-called road maps to peace one near the end of May suggested by Martin Kobler and an earlier one in the middle of February. Neither was a success. Serraj claimed that there was security in the capital Tripoli. While there may be peace temporarily it is not clear that the various militia are under control of the GNA and there are militia threatening the city from outside. The eastern commander Haftar also has said several times he intends to liberate the  city.

Serraj urged uniting military institutions and placing them under civilian authority. He also suggested declaring an amnesty. No doubt at least some military groups and militia in western Libya would be unwilling to accept a united army if that army were commanded by Haftar.

Serraj also urged that there be presidential and parliamentary elections in March of 2018. Serraj said on TV: "Ceasefire in all cities across Libya except places where fighting terror is ongoing, forming a High Council of National Reconciliation with 100 members and forming dialogue committees under the sponsorship of the UN to discuss elections law and constitution amendment." Serraj also suggested that committees should be formed with the HoR to join divided institutions. Yet, Ageela Saleh, the speaker of the HoR rejected Serraj's road map. Saleh also said that there would be no elections until a constitution was ready.

It is not clear that Serraj developed his road map in consultation with the other 8 members of the PC or if he talked it over with members of the High State Council or any members of the House of Representatives.

The Libya Herald also reported on Serraj's speech mentioning aspects left out by the Observer.  Serraj advocated a national program to gather up weapons, and to demobilize militias. It is not clear how this could be done. There is no central force that Serraj controls at present that could do this. The security problem and building up a national army with disarming of militia is something that simply has not transpired. Serraj also said there should be a crackdown on corruption, smuggling and human trafficking.

Serraj noted that there had to be respect for all the different cultural components of Libya including the Amazigh, Tebu, and Tuareg communities.The proposed National Reconciliation Council would have branches in all towns and areas, and would prepare a national conference to end the current divisions and enmities. The HoR, backed by Field Marshal Haftar,  might not agree to any such process and could keep areas under its control from sending representatives. Alternatively, they could simply vet any representatives to be sent to assure they would support the HoR and Haftar.

Serraj would bypass the efforts of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly and he presents a series of proposals that would see the head of the state directly elected, who would then nominate a new government. He also proposed that meanwhile the HoR and State Council set up a joint committee that would agree on amendments to the Constitutional Declaration that would set out the powers of the head of state. The HoR and State Council already has members taking part in a dialogue to come up with amendments to the Libya Political Agreement.

Serraj managed not to mention Khalifa Haftar in his entire speech, nor of others who do not accept the GNA such as Khalifa Ghwell's followers loyal to the former Salvation Government and who recently clashed with forces loyal to the GNA east of  Tripoli. It is doubtful that Serraj has the power to follow through with much of what he outlines in his road map. Opposition to his road map may be sufficient to prevent most of what he proposes from becoming reality.

More than 60 killed in attack by Third Force on Haftar-run air base in south-central Libya

At least 60 are dead, in what some media are describing as a massacre, in an attack by the Third Force Battalion along with members of the Benghazi Defense Brigades on the Brak-al-Shati airbase 650 km south of Tripoli.

Even though the Third Force is supposed to be under control of the GNA, the Presidential Council (PC) condemned the attack and said they had nothing to do with it and did not order the action. They have vowed to investigate and sanction those responsible. The GNA suspended its defence minister Mahdi al-Barghati and ordered an investigation into his role in the incident. Jamal al-Trelki commander of the Third Force was also suspended.

UK ambassador to Libya, Peter Millet, also condemned the assault tweeting:"Disgusted by attack on Brak al-Shati & reports of mass executions. Perpetrators must be brought to justice." The Ministry of Defense(MoD) of the GNA denied it had issued instructions to attack the Brak airbase. The Libya Observer claims that both Al Baraghati and Third Force commander Al-Treiki were dismissed rather than suspended. It also reports that a commission of inquiry has been formed into the attack that includes the Minister of Justice and of the Interior supervised by the PC as "Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army". This group will be anathema to Haftar who claims he is commander in chief of the Libyan National Army not the PC which he does not even recognize.

The attackers did not remain at the base. The base is now back under control of Haftar forces. There is a constant flow of photos of those killed on social media with some appearing to have been summarily executed. There has as yet been no independent verification of the number of casualties. The UN ambassador to Libya Martin Kobler, said he was outraged at reports of "significant" fatalities in the attack. He said that the dead included civilians, and noted there were reports that summary executions may have taken place.

The GNA Defense Ministry in spite of its condemnations of the attack claimed that the Dignity Operation of General Haftar was responsible for it, since his forces had been making frequent ground and air attacks on the Taminhint Airbase the headquarters of the Third Force. There were several casualties. The Third Force gave a similar reason for the attack:Meanwhile, the Media Office of the Third Force said the attack on Brak Airbase came in retaliation for the repeated Dignity Operation attacks and shelling on Taminhint Airbase. Head of the Media Office Mohammed Qaliwan told local media that their forces had disabled Brak Airbase to prevent future attacks on Taminhint. He also denied Dignity Operation media claims of field execution of militants.

In all probability there will be a rapid response by Haftar. The GNA calls on its forces to remain calm. This might be difficult if they are attacked. Haftar is unlikely to wait for the findings of the GNA commission of inquiry.

Ageela Saleh speaker of the HoR critical of PC call to halt attack on IS until unified command formed.

Ageelah Saleh, speaker of the House of Representatives, based in Tobruk, has criticized the recent statement of the Presidential Council of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA).

Ageelah Saleh, speaker of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) was critical of the demand by the Presidential Council (PC) of the GNA that all those in the process of launching an attack on the Islamic State should stop until the PC set up a unified command. The statement maintained that a violation of the order would violate military law. The Misrata militia which were advancing towards Sirte from the west obeyed the demand. However, it is not clear what response Khalifa Haftar will make. He is advancing towards Sirte with a large convoy and other units of the LNA are coming from the south-east as well.

Saleh claims that the PC statement aggravates the divisions within Libya as well as violating the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). it also casts aspersions on the patriotism of the Libyan National Army (LNA). The statement also makes it more difficult for the 6 plus 6 committee to come to an agreement on approving the GNA. The 6 plus 6 committee was set up after the last failure to vote on the GNA. It is composed of six opposed to passing the GNA and six in favor of passing it.

Saleh also objected to the PC claiming it was the commander in chief of the LNA as set out in section 8 of the Libyan Political Agreement. From Saleh's point of view, all of the decisions of the PC are illegitimate since the LPA has not yet been formally endorsed by the HoR, nor has there been a constitutional amendment to include the GNA in the constitution. According to theLibya Observer:Aqilah regarded the PC’s statement as an excuse against the pro-agreement HoR members as they agreed to remove article (08) from the appendix rules of the Skhirat agreement that strips HoR members of the title “Chief Commander” and gives it to he PC. However, despite the removal, the PC is working as unconstitutionally as before and is claiming the title based upon the statement issued by those HoR members.Ageela ignores the fact that the HoR does not have the power to remove article 8 from the LPA so it is not removed. The PC are correct to make their claim. What is surprising is that the section 8 in the additional provisions, not the "appendix rules," applied once the agreement was signed on December 17. Obviously the PC and the GNA and Kobler paid no attention to that fact until now. This perhaps shows the increasing power of those opposed to Haftar in the GNA.

Saleh also complained that Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Martin Kobler, went beyond his job as UN mediator to intervene in the domestic affairs of Libya. He has repeatedly taken sides with certain UN agreement parties over others. For some time, now Kobler has explicitly said that his job is to strengthen the GNA and garner support for it. He claims the time for talk and negotiations is over. He claims the GNA is the only way forward and does not pretend to be a mediator any more.

Preparations are under way to hold a meeting of those members of the HoR who support the GNA to meet in Ghadames in the extreme west of Libya in order to approve the GNA and amend the constitutional declaration of 2011. Even if this meeting votes confidence in the GNA, those in favor of the GNA also want Section 8 deleted. Haftar's status as commander in chief of the LNA is not likely to be solved simply by an acceptance in principle by members of the HoR. There could be immediate conflict within the GNA as to whether Haftar remains in his position.

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GNA more concerned with control of armed forces than attacking Islamic State

The Presidential Council of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Prime Minister Faiez Serraj has asked both the forces of General Khalifa Haftar and those from Misrata to stop their advance towards Sirte to fight the Islamic State.

The Council said the actions should be stopped "until a joint command for the offensive is nominated." It also claimed that any infringement of the rule would be considered a violation of military law. It said that the fight against terrorism should not be used for personal gains.

The announcement is surprising given that just two days ago the president of the State Council had asked the Presidential Council for an attack on the Islamic State. Just recently, General Haftar has received a large shipment of vehicles and ammunition.

Haftar along with other troops of the Libyan National Army (LNA) from the south-east are moving towards Sirte. The three main oil ports on the oil crescent are guarded by the Petroleum Frontier Guards (PFG) headed by Ibrahim Jodhran, who supports the GNA and its National Oil Company rather than the rival NOC in the east. There are reports that Jodhran has been replaced by the Al-Thinni HoR government. Haftar may try to secure the ports while on his way to Sirte. The HoR and Haftar support the eastern-based NOC which has been attempting to illegally sell oil and not through the Tripoli-based NOC.

The mayor of Ajdabia City on the way to Sirte, Salim Jodhran said:“This military action by those forces aims at controlling the oil facilities in order to use them in the political arena.” He said that he informed speaker of the HoR Ageelah Salah that the municipality did not trust Haftar and that the municipality only took orders from the PC of the proposed GNA government.

Stratfor, the global intelligence agency, claims the two rival militias and associated governments are in a race to take back Sirte from the Islamic State, which it has held for almost two years now. Stratfor claims:The victor will secure greater bargaining power in the ongoing high-stakes negotiations to assemble a U.N.-brokered unity government, the Government of National Accord. The negotiations over the new government have attempted to square the disparate interests of federalists, Islamists and secular nationalists, among others, to establish the defeat of their common enemy, the Islamic State, as the priority. This shared goal has enabled the various groups to overlook their severe ideological and tribal divisions — at least for now.

Stratfor notes that Misrata militias held Sirte before the Islamic State drove them out. Unless they retake the city, they fear that their role in the GNA government will be reduced. Haftar sees the liberation of Sirte as a means of gaining power in the unity government. He wants to remain commander in chief of the Libyan Army or minister of defence. I think that Haftar may also be open to causing a breakup of Libya with himself as head or an important figure in a government in Cyrenaica. Stratfor notes:Misratan militants and local militias loyal to Petroleum Facilities Guard leader Ibrahim Jadhran are positioned between Sirte and Ajdabiya. They fear that on the way to Sirte, Hifter's forces will take control of some of Libya's most important oil and natural gas infrastructure, further consolidating the general's negotiating position. As is the case between Misrata and Hifter, there is mutual distrust between Jadhran and Hifter.

Jodhran may already be dismissed so that Haftar need just ensure that the ports and the PFG are loyal to the Al-Thinni government. There is not a word from UN Support Mission In Libya (UNSMIL) head Martin Kobler on all that is happening. He has said nothing so far about when and where the next meeting of the HoR will be to vote confidence in the GNA.

Mohamed Eljarh on the Presidential Council in Tripoli Libya

A recent article by Mohamed Eljarh, non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, summarizes what has happened since most members of the Presidential Council (PC) of the UN-brokered Government of National Accord(GNA) arrived at a naval base in Tripoli.

Ejarh notes that the PC has managed to consolidate its position by getting support from key institutions such as the Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation. He points out that the PC will be expected to deal with problems such as the cash crisis. However, he notes control of these key institutions gives the PC huge advantages over its competitors. The advantages are that it can cut off funds and oil revenues from the GNC — and perhaps the HoR as well — if the head of the oil guards, Ibraihim Jahdran, who supports the GNA, is able to open the oil ports. The PC also gained the support of many municipal authorities. Eljarh says it is important that the international community delivers on its promises to help in order to strengthen the PC. Eljarh clearly favors the GNA and applauds efforts to help it succeed. He worries that a wrong move might lead to instability.

He notes that the PM of the Tripoli-based government still has not relinquished power and the president of the GNC Abusahmain also refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the GNC. Next Eljarh gives a very uncritical account of the meeting in Tripoli at which the new State Council was established:The pro-GNA bloc of the GNC (known as the Wefaq bloc) which is made up of around 73 members met in Tripoli on April 5 to announce the dissolution of the legislative body and the establishment of the new State Council—the highest consultative institution according to the LPA.He does note that "many legal arguments surround the circumstances of the State Council's meeting" but does not bother to tell us what they might be. His account of what the meeting did also omits much of what happened. As a bit of background I quote from the Libya Politlical Agreement (LPA) about the Council:The State Council shall comprise one hundred and forty five (145) members who were elected during the General National Congress elections on 7 July 2012 as per the following:1. One hundred and thirty four (134) male and female members of the General National Congress who enjoy sound membership at the signing this Agreement. The Presidency of the General National Congress shall submit a list containing the names of those members.

Note that there were actually half or less of the Council at the meeting. The members were supposed to be from a list submitted by the president of the GNC. Of course he does not recognize the GNA and so did not submit a list. The UN decided this was no problem they simply had Saleh Al-Makzhoum who was expelled from the GNC make up a list and then the UN and PC accepted it. Makzhoum presided at the Tripoli hotel meeting. As described in a recent article the meeting did several important things: The session, which was described also by the attendants as “the final session of the GNC, was put to effect by the second Deputy Speaker of the GNC, Saleh Al-Makhzoum, in which all of the attendants voted unanimously on amending the constitutional declaration and including the political agreement.Eljarh fails to mention that the GNC amended the constitutional declaration as well as approving the LPA and then dissolving itself.

Clearly one of those pesky legal problems is that the group was not the GNC and hence could not dissolve itself. Even worse, the GNC is not the internationally recognized legislature so it could not possibly amend the constitutional amendment. The only way this can make sense is if you accept the Libyan Supreme Constitutional Court decision of November 2014 that the the HoR was unconstitutional and should be dissolved, leaving the GNC as the sole legitimate government. It could the play the role of the HoR as in the LPA and do the amendment. I explain this in a recent article. An actual meeting of the GNC at their headquarters called the hotel meeting illegal and was to send the issue to the judiciary. However, the GNC needs militia not judges.

Eljarh notes that the question of the GNA's legitimacy is an obstacle to progress. However, this seems to be not so. The GNA declared itself up and running without a vote of confidence from the HoR. It used the letter signed by an alleged majority of the HoR supporting the GNA and a meeting with the political dialogue as a green light to go ahead and move to Tripoli. It is gathering support and gaining control without any HoR vote. The GNA needs to vote to placate Haftar and the HoR and bring them on board and also to serve as the legislature of the GNA.

Eljarh remarks: An important part of the debate within the Tobruk House of Representatives is the question of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its General Commander Khalifa Haftar; finding an acceptable settlement on this issue will prove difficult and all parties involved will have to make difficult compromises.

As his first point in a guide for policymakers as Libya continues with the implementation with the LPA, Eljarh says:Implementation of the LPA: any legally or constitutionally controversial moves must be avoided, as such moves would open the door for legal challenges in the future that would destabilize the political transition. Legally or constitutionally questionable moves must not be condoned or welcomed by any of the parties involved, either Libyan or international.However, all along when the UN or GNA have a difficulty they get around it only by violating the LPA. The meeting of the State Council is a recent example. Ignoring section 8 of the LPA is another example. But that is just the tip of the iceberg. I discuss a few examples of violations here There have been numerous violations but the GNA still has the support of the UN Security Council and the international community. If the UN cannot find a solution that does not violate the LPA it will certainly violate the LPA again.