The war as we saw it.

This commentary on the Iraq war makes a great deal of sense and is much more perceptive than commentary by many so-called experts on the conflict. Given their analysis it is surprising that they claim their morale is fine.


NY Times, August 19, 2007
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA,
EDWARD
SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY

Baghdad

VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the
political
debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by
definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for
the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans,
with
an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can
win
over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is
far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers
with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are
skeptical
of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly
manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and
social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal
views
and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in
Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered
framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are
offset
by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space”
remains the
same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who
do
not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists,
Shiite
militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more
complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi

police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United
States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American
soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal
armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint

and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American
investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the
triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their

own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the

incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would
have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports
that
a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be
considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion
commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the
thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of
command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi
armed
forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit
support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against

Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their
own
armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a
counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center

that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become
effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their
loyalties
would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at
cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful
that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and

questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground
remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this
fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army
Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a
“time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is
expected
to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United
States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this
context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground
require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use
of
lethal and brutal force.

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an
American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers
to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a
resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the

local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take
this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly
insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce
normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we
continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet
political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass
in
the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no
semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving
at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since

a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military
situation remains in constant flux.

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the
Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members.

The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its
people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling
against
the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they
believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The
qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the
invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us
something useful for the moment.

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they
believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best

to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation
risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct
the
three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling
of
the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of
government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have
committed to support.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence
or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when

the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political
sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party
the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we
have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every
party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are
hated by
all in the long run.

At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency,
improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we
have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in
bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced

and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity,
telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated
communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with

a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we

would consider normal.

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging

in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years
into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have
substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and

criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is
when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as
we
hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with
deep
resignation, “We need security, not free food.”

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released
Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of
their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain
dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and
force
our withdrawal.

Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let
Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced
policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve
their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be
defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies

to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see
this mission through.

Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant.

Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier

is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a

staff sergeant.