BOLIVIA
Bolivia: End of the new social pact?
Federico Fuentes, Caracas
25 August 2007
Having come out of an intense period of political confrontation,
including the biggest mobilisation in Bolivia's history, this
landlocked country situated in the heart of rebellious South America
seems on the verge of plunging into a new phase of open conflict. At
the centre of this is the country's Constituent Assembly — a central
plank of Bolivia's cultural and democratic revolution, led by the
country's first indigenous president, Evo Morales — which was
convened
over a year ago with the goal of achieving a new social pact between
Bolivia's conflicting sectors and drafting a new constitution that
would for the first time include the country's indigenous majority.
Both sides of politics now openly talk about the possibility of the
closure of the assembly, which has already passed its initial August 6
deadline to present a new draft constitution without a single article
having been approved. Outside the assembly, in the streets of Sucre,
the number of pickets and people on hunger strike continues to grow.
Protests by locals in Sucre continue to radicalise, angered by the
assembly's vote to leave out any debate over where the capital of
Bolivia should be.
On August 22, the ABI news service reported that "mobilisations in
Sucre, spilled over this Wednesday into acts of vandalism, persecution
of constituent delegates, attacks against houses, looting of union
headquarters, destruction of media installations and physical
aggressions against journalists". The assembly indefinitely suspended
its sessions due to the lack of any guarantees for the safety of
delegates. While Sucre is the historic capital of Bolivia, ever since
the 1899 civil war La Paz has been the country's political capital.
The cries for the return of the capital to Sucre, stoked by the
right-wing opposition to the Morales government, have raised tensions
across Bolivia and revived fears of another "civil war".
The previous day, brawling broke out in Bolivia's congress following
moves by Morales's party, the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), to
elect new members to the Constitutional Tribune and replace the
current judges — aligned with the neoliberal right — who had
suspended
four members of the Supreme Court legally appointed by Morales at the
end of last year. Shifting the vote to another area of the congress,
without the presence of the opposition, MAS pushed through its agenda
in the chamber of deputies. The vote now must go to the
opposition-controlled senate.
Responding to the increased threats to the process of change the
country is undergoing, Maximo Romero, a cocalero (coca-grower) leader
from the Chapare region, was quoted by ABI on August 20, warning that
"If some sectors, political parties and others, do not allow the
Constituent Assembly to advance, it will be necessary for the social
organisations to organise ourselves, and we will respond to the
provocations by surrounding Sucre" in order to "defend the continuity
of the assembly".
Romero's comments came as the Six Federations of the Tropics of
Cochabamba — Bolivia's chief cocalero organisation and where, in the
'80s, Morales began his political activity (he is still the elected
president of the federation) — began to mobilise 7000 cocaleros to
march on Sucre. Other campesino groups, including the Union
Confederation of Campesinos of Bolivia (CSCB), will join them. The ABI
article quoted CSCB relations secretary Rosendo Mita declaring that
"whether they [the opposition] want it or not, the assembly will
continue its work until December".
"They [the right-wing opposition] are calling for violence. If we
don't resolve this via consensus, it has to be resolved via violence",
said Bolivia's Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera. "Those that don't
want the assembly are proposing violence." Warning of the impact of
the impending mobilisations of the cocaleros and campesinos, first
vice-president of the Constituent Assembly Roberto Aguilar said "we
are searching for channels of dialogue to impede confrontation".
On August 22 Garcia Linera was quoted by ABI as saying: "To wear down
the old powers will cost a lot, it will be conflictive, the population
needs to be conscious of this, and the best way to defend the
continuity of the process of change is through democratic mobilisation
to back this transformation and to put an end to the history of these
old elites, of their old privileges, of their old shameful quotas, so
that they never return to the country."
Troubles in the Constituent Assembly
Since convening on August 6, 2005, the Constituent Assembly has been
plagued by confrontations as a re-emergent opposition — organised out
of the city of Santa Cruz in the east of Bolivia and which has at its
core the Santa Cruz elite, gas transnationals, large agribusiness, and
the US embassy — has attempted to derail the process of change.
Aiming to mobilise the white, middle-class sectors in opposition to
Morales's indigenous revolution and defend their economic power, these
elites have raised the banner of departmental (state) autonomy as a
way of shielding themselves from the measures taken by Morales's
government.
By blocking any steps forward by the national government, particularly
in the Constituent Assembly, they hope to sow disillusion in the
assembly and Morales and pave the way for their return to government.
These same interests, which never wanted the Constituent Assembly,
have been working from within it and from without to ensure it fails.
For the first eight months, the assembly was deadlocked over rules of
procedure and debate, with the opposition demanding a two-thirds
majority for all votes as a way to prevent the possibility of any
radical measures being introduced into the new constitution.
Once over this hurdle, a combination of factors soon acted to again
stall this process. Firstly, when voting began within the assembly's
21 commissions over what report to present to the assembly as a whole,
MAS manoeuvred in a few of the key commissions so that, in alliance
with some smaller parties, it could essentially present both the
majority and minority report and lock out the right.
Threatening to walk out of the assembly, the right wing retreated to
its trenches in Bolivia's east. On July 2, the anniversary of a
national referendum on departmental autonomy, the opposition in Santa
Cruz launched its proposed statutes for autonomy, warning that the
eastern half of the country would reject any constitution that did not
incorporate its proposals.
At the same time, almost out of nowhere, the demand for the return of
the capital to Sucre emerged. The protests, which began in Sucre, were
supported by the opposition so as to create a fake debate and heighten
tensions. It also saw it in its interest to have the capital closer to
the east and away from the combative social movements predominately
based in the country's west. In response, around 1.5 million people
mobilised in La Paz on July 20 to defend its position as the capital.
As the August 6 deadline continued to draw closer, a debate opened up
as to who had the power to extend the assembly's mandate. Given the
opposition's majority in the senate, allowing it to block any
extension, the ultra-right separatist wing of the Santa Cruz elite
began to raise fears of MAS imposing its own constitution against the
will of the "half moon" (Bolivia's four eastern states — Santa Cruz,
Beni, Pando and Tarija) and forcing the country into a "civil war".
The spectre of an indigenous-military parade scheduled to occur in
Santa Cruz the day after the assembly's deadline, with the legendary
"Red Ponchos" (militant Aymara people with a long history of armed
resistance) marching side by side with the military in heart of the
east, was used to conjure up the threat of "indigenous revenge"
against the east. Meanwhile, more and more evidence emerged of the
movement of illegal arms into the hands of right-wing militias in the
east.
>From one challenge to the next
Only at the last minute did the Bolivian congress vote to extend the
Constituent Assembly deadline until December 14. Then, on August 7,
rather than the prophesied "racial revenge" and threats of clashes,
thousands flocked to view the indigenous-military parade.
Venezuela's El Nacional reported the following day that during his
speech at the parade, Morales stated: "The presence of the armed
forces and indigenous peoples is in no way a provocation against
anyone, it is so that all of us can get to know each other. We are
united with the social movements to take forward the cultural
revolution and the process of change within democracy."
Sending a clear message to Santa Cruz's ultra-right separatists,
General Wilfredo Vargas, chief of the armed forces, was quoted as
saying, "Today the institutionality of the country is threatened by
abominable enemies who are not in agreement with our development and
independence". The general added that Bolivia's armed forces "are
always alert in order to confront the enemies of the homeland".
However, protests continued over the issue of the capital, and the
east continued to maintain the threat to boycott the assembly and
reject any constitution that does not enshrine the version of
departmental autonomy pushed by the elite.
The threat from the Santa Cruz elite is far from gone; the groundwork
for a future confrontation has already been laid.
At stake with the question of the extension of the assembly's deadline
was the possibility that, needing to produce a constitution in a few
days, the assembly would end up with a majority report from MAS and
supported by the indigenous and social movements and a minority report
from the opposition. The aim of the opposition would then have been to
get a majority for its draft in the east and demonstrate in practice
the "validity" of the concept of "two Bolivias", triggering a possible
disintegration of the country.
While that threat was averted, the pact agreed to by all the parties
—
including MAS and the opposition — in order to facilitate the
extension may have created a minefield for assembly delegates.
According to the agreement, once the deadline is over, the assembly
will first present those articles where a two-thirds majority could
not be reached in the assembly in a national referendum. Those that
are supported by voters in the referendum will then go back to the
assembly and be incorporated into the draft constitution, which would
then go to a national referendum.
This could create a number of future problems for MAS. Firstly, the
whole process could take up to the end of next year, increasing the
possibility of general discontent with the whole process. While the
polls still show a large majority support the assembly, the
opposition's campaign of stalling has had an impact.
Secondly, the opposition may be able to present its "alternative"
constitution, in the form of numerous key articles that will go to the
first referendum. It will undoubtedly be aiming to win a majority in
the east for these articles. In fact, the process may act as an
incentive for the right to not seek any consensus and instead to test
the strength of the two camps in the referendum.
Bolivia's future
Lastly, as MAS constituent delegate Raul Prada pointed out to Erbol
radio station on August 4, the law to extend the deadline means that
"the Constituent Assembly has been converted into an appendix of the
congress and lost all its originario character". This pact has
demonstrated in practice that the Constituent Assembly, irrespective
of all the discussion over its character and whether it was originario
— that is, above the current constituted state bodies — is for now
subordinated to the constituted powers. This is undoubtedly part of
the reason why MAS is intent on electing new judges to the
Constitutional Tribunal.
Bolivia's mainstream media, in its attempt to split the social
movements, has marked this decision as a decisive step by MAS towards
the center of politics and away from the radical left and indigenous
movements, playing on divisions that have begun to emerge.
However, faced with a growing polarisation, an emergent right with a
real base in the east, transnationals that continue to oppose
nationalisation of the country's significant gas reserves, the
presence of US troops over the border in Paraguay and the very real
threat of the disintegration of Bolivia, attempting to reach pacts in
order to buy time and build up forces for future confrontations may be
a sensible move by MAS.
Moreover, it is necessary for MAS to avoid unnecessary and premature
confrontation. Part of the political struggle is projecting a viable
and convincing course to defend the territorial integrity of Bolivia
and overall social stability. These issues weigh heavily on the minds
of middle-class elements and on important sections of the armed
forces. They add weight to the need to concentrate on widening the
scope of political struggle against the right.
The right, well aware of this, seeks to avoid political struggle
through provocations, street violence and threats to defy
constitutional authority wherever it senses it has the strength to do
so.
This is why the government has been quick to point out to the people
of Santa Cruz that those who are in favour of closing the assembly are
in favour of violence and are acting against the call for autonomy —
because departmental autonomy can only be agreed to within the
framework of the assembly.
Nevertheless, Argentine journalist Pablo Stefanoni, a former adviser
to Morales, warned in an article in Pulso of a current policy of
"unfocused pactism" being pushed by MAS — seeking pacts at all cost
—
which could send the Constituent Assembly to "the cemetery", or
produce a constitution that suits neither the social movements nor the
Santa Cruz elite.
For Prada, it seems that only two exits to the current situation
exist: conclude working in an honourable way within the rules of the
game, or definitively kick over the table and search for new
conditions, breaking with the constituted powers. Either way, MAS will
need to continue to mobilise Bolivia's poor majority, centred around
the country's powerful indigenous and campesino movements, behind a
firm defence of indigenous self-determination and national integrity
against imperialism, and against the separatist Santa Cruz oligarchy.
The actions of MAS and the social movements up until now, and the
renewed calls for mobilisation emanating from the heart of MAS — the
cocaleros — are, on the whole, signs for optimism in this dangerous
battle for Bolivia's future.
From: International News, Green Left Weekly issue #722 29 August 2007.
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