Apparently no one see this as any great sin. It is only when it is done by supposed socialists such as Chavez that there is any harm done. Arias is a good guy well liked by the U.S. and a supporter of neo-con economic policies.
This is from my post at Allvoices.
but with some alterations..
It is ironic that the mediator in the Honduran crisis Oscar Arias actually did what Zelaya was accused of plotting to change the country's constitution so as to be able to run again. If he had not been able to change the constitution by changing some members of the supreme court he would not be president now! Where are the press on this one.
This is from Wikipedia.
The Costa Rican constitution had been amended to include a clause which forbade former presidents seeking reelection. Arias challenged this in Sala IV, the Constitutional Court, which initially rejected his application. That ruling came down in September 2000. Arias then used his considerable political connections to alter the Court´s composition and, with a majority of members favorable to his cause, succeeded at the second attempt -- April 2003 -- to have the constitution changed.[3] Arias - to the surprise of no one - announced in 2004 that he intended to run again for president in the February 2006 general elections. .........
Showing posts with label Chavez. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chavez. Show all posts
Sunday, July 19, 2009
Saturday, May 17, 2008
Chavez swallows a charm pill..
It seems that Chavez has decided to cool down his combative posture for a while at least.
Chavez seems to draw the line at Uribe of Colombia.
With Chávez in Check, Talks in Peru Stay Calm
.nytimes.com/2008/05/17/world/americas/17latin.html
By SIMON ROMERO
Published: May 17, 2008
LIMA, Peru — To the relief of organizers of a summit meeting here of leaders from Latin America and Europe on Friday, the encounter was notable for being relatively free of insults being flung publicly.
No chancellor was accused of being a fascist. No president called another a lap dog of the United States. No king told a president to shut up. (Actually no kings were even in attendance.)
For achieving such an incident-free meeting, Peru’s hosts had primarily President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela to thank. Surprising many people here, he was on his best behavior, almost.
Mr. Chávez hugged a former enemy, President Alan García of Peru, whom he once called “a crook, a liar, a manipulator and an irresponsible man.” He sought to mend ties with Spain, speaking warmly with Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of Spain; relations soured last November when King Juan Carlos asked Mr. Chávez to shut up at a summit meeting in Chile.
Mr. Chávez even apologized to Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany. A few days ago he had accused her party, the conservative Christian Democratic Union, of sharing the ideas of Hitler.
“I apologize to you,” Mr. Chávez told Ms. Merkel, after cozying up to her and President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina during a break, according to news reports. “I’m doing this in front of Cristina because every time I behave badly, she’s the one who pulls my ears.”
Mrs. Merkel smiled widely after her chat with Mr. Chávez, reflecting the relief here after he had said he would be traveling to Lima with his “usual furor.”
An alternative meeting held by leftist groups at the campus of the National Engineering University was more colorful than the meeting of the heads of state. It featured guitar sing-alongs, plates of coca leaves (for chewing) and a soccer match with President Evo Morales of Bolivia, who called a ban on high-altitude competitions a form of “apartheid” against Bolivian teams.
At the official gathering, the heads of state culminated their meeting by drafting a document pointing to the importance of economic growth, and of combating climate change and rising food prices. On the edge of these talks, Mr. Chávez remained cordial — until reporters asked him about President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia, an ally of the United States with whom Venezuela has been feuding. “One of the great problems we have is the government of Colombia,” Mr. Chávez said, his smile melting away.
Mr. Uribe had his own harsh words for Mr. Chávez. “The only thing we ask is for no one to shelter terrorists,” he said, a reference to Colombia’s assertion that Venezuela had assisted the largest guerrilla group in Colombia.
Chavez seems to draw the line at Uribe of Colombia.
With Chávez in Check, Talks in Peru Stay Calm
.nytimes.com/2008/05/17/world/americas/17latin.html
By SIMON ROMERO
Published: May 17, 2008
LIMA, Peru — To the relief of organizers of a summit meeting here of leaders from Latin America and Europe on Friday, the encounter was notable for being relatively free of insults being flung publicly.
No chancellor was accused of being a fascist. No president called another a lap dog of the United States. No king told a president to shut up. (Actually no kings were even in attendance.)
For achieving such an incident-free meeting, Peru’s hosts had primarily President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela to thank. Surprising many people here, he was on his best behavior, almost.
Mr. Chávez hugged a former enemy, President Alan García of Peru, whom he once called “a crook, a liar, a manipulator and an irresponsible man.” He sought to mend ties with Spain, speaking warmly with Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of Spain; relations soured last November when King Juan Carlos asked Mr. Chávez to shut up at a summit meeting in Chile.
Mr. Chávez even apologized to Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany. A few days ago he had accused her party, the conservative Christian Democratic Union, of sharing the ideas of Hitler.
“I apologize to you,” Mr. Chávez told Ms. Merkel, after cozying up to her and President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina during a break, according to news reports. “I’m doing this in front of Cristina because every time I behave badly, she’s the one who pulls my ears.”
Mrs. Merkel smiled widely after her chat with Mr. Chávez, reflecting the relief here after he had said he would be traveling to Lima with his “usual furor.”
An alternative meeting held by leftist groups at the campus of the National Engineering University was more colorful than the meeting of the heads of state. It featured guitar sing-alongs, plates of coca leaves (for chewing) and a soccer match with President Evo Morales of Bolivia, who called a ban on high-altitude competitions a form of “apartheid” against Bolivian teams.
At the official gathering, the heads of state culminated their meeting by drafting a document pointing to the importance of economic growth, and of combating climate change and rising food prices. On the edge of these talks, Mr. Chávez remained cordial — until reporters asked him about President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia, an ally of the United States with whom Venezuela has been feuding. “One of the great problems we have is the government of Colombia,” Mr. Chávez said, his smile melting away.
Mr. Uribe had his own harsh words for Mr. Chávez. “The only thing we ask is for no one to shelter terrorists,” he said, a reference to Colombia’s assertion that Venezuela had assisted the largest guerrilla group in Colombia.
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
Chavez' constitutional reforms defeated
This is from a very useful site venezuelanalysis. While some of the "reforms" are quite progressive there are also some quite authoritarian proposals mixed in. Many who support Chavez overall did not support the entire package. The defeat of the "reforms" will ensure that Chavez will not be able to detour the Bolivarian revolution down a cult of personality path. Future leaders will need to be trained and there will be less emphasis upon one leader such as Chavez.
Venezuela’s Constitutional Reform: An Article-by-Article Summary
November 23rd 2007, by Gregory Wilpert – Venezuelanalysis.com
The following is an article-by-article summary of the changes being proposed to Venezuela's 1999 constitution. The summary is in no way official and should only be used as an aid in making sense of the proposed constitutional reform. The official reform text is quite long (31 pages), as it includes the full text of each to be changed article, even if only one sentence or word was changed in the article. Making out what, exactly, the changes are relative to the original 1999 constitution can thus be a sometimes time-consuming and difficult task.
Venezuelans will vote on the reform on December 2nd and will do so in two blocks. Block "A" includes President Chavez's original proposal, as amended by the National Assembly, which would change 33 articles out of the 350 articles in the constitution. Also included in block A are another 13 articles introduced by the National Assembly. Block "B" includes another 26 reform articles proposed by the National Assembly. Voters may vote "Yes" or "No" on each block.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reform Question: "Are you in agreement with the approval of the constitutional reform project, passed by the National Assembly, with the participation of the people, and based in the initiative of President Hugo Chavez, with its respective titles, chapters, and transitional, derogative, and final dispositions, distributed in the following blocks?"
[Articles in italics are those proposed by the National Assembly, non-italic articles were proposed by the President.]
Block A
Section II. Politico-Territorial Division of the Country: President may declare special military and development zones, citizens have a new "right to the city."
Art. 11 - Allows the President to decree special military regions for the defense of the nation. Also, it would allow him to name military authorities for these regions in a case of emergency.
Art. 16 - Allows the president to decree, with permission from the National Assembly, communal cities, maritime regions, federal territories, federal municipalities, island districts, federal provinces, federal cities, and functional districts. Also the president may name and remove national government authorities for these territorial divisions (these do not, however, supplant the existing elected authorities in these regions).
Art. 18 - Provides a new right, the right to the city, which says that all citizens have the right to equal access to the city's services or benefits. Also names Caracas, the capital as the "Cradle of Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, and Queen of the Warairarepano" [an indigenous name for the mountain range surrounding Caracas].
Section III. Citizen Rights and Duties: Voting age lowered to 16 years, gender parity in candidacies, creation of councils of popular power, social security fund for self-employed, reduction of workweek to 36 hours, recognition of Venezuelans of African descent, free university education, introduction of communal and social property.
Art. 64 - Lowers the minimum voting age from 18 to 16 years.
Art. 67 - Requires candidates for elected office to be set up in accordance with gender parity, reverses the prohibition against state financing of campaigns and parties, and prohibits foreign funding of political activity.
Art. 70 - Establishes that councils of popular power (of communities, workers, students, farmers, fishers, youth, women, etc.) are one of the main means for citizen participation in the government.
Art. 87 - Creates a social security fund for the self-employed, in order to guarantee them a pension, vacation pay, sick pay, etc.
Art. 90 - Reduction of the workweek from 44 hours to 36.
Art. 98 - Guarantees freedom for cultural creations, but without guaranteeing intellectual property.
Art. 100 - Recognition of Venezuelans of African descent, as part of Venezuelan culture to protect and promote (in addition to indigenous and European culture).
Art. 103 - Right to a free education expanded from high school to university.
Art. 112 - The state will promote a diversified and independent economic model, in which the interests of the community prevail over individual interests and that guarantee the social and material needs of the people. The state is no longer obliged to promote private enterprise.
Art. 113 - Monopolies are prohibited instead of merely being "not allowed." The state has the right to "reserve" the exploitation of natural resources or provision of services that are considered by the constitution or by a separate law to be strategic to the nation. Concessions granted to private parties must provide adequate benefits to the public.
Art. 115 - Introduces new forms of property, in addition to private property. The new forms are (1) public property, belonging to state bodies, (2) direct and indirect social property, belonging to the society in general, where indirect social property is administered by the state and direct is administered by particular communities, (3) collective property, which belongs to particular groups, (4) mixed property, which can be a combination of ownership of any of the previous five forms.
Section IV. Functions of the State: Creation of popular power based in direct democracy, recognition of missions for alleviating urgent needs, foreign policy to pursue a pluri-polar world, devolution of central, state, and municipal functions to the popular power, guaranteed revenues for the popular power.
Art. 136 - Creates the popular power, in addition to the municipal, state, and national powers. "The people are the depositories of sovereignty and exercise it directly via the popular power. This is not born of suffrage nor any election, but out of the condition of the human groups that are organized as the base of the population." The popular power is organized via communal councils, workers' councils, student councils, farmer councils, crafts councils, fisher councils, sports councils, youth councils, elderly councils, women's councils, disables persons' councils, and others indicated by law.
Art. 141 - The public administration is organized into traditional bureaucracies and missions, which have an ad-hoc character and are designed to address urgent needs of the population.
Art. 152 - Venezuela's foreign policy is directed towards creating a pluri-polar world, free of hegemonies of any imperialist, colonial, or neo-colonial power.
Art. 153 - Strengthening of the mandate to unify Latin America, so as to achieve what Simon Bolivar called, "A Nation of Republics."
Art. 156 - Specifies the powers of the national government, adding powers that are spelled out in earlier and in later articles in greater detail. New powers of the national government include the ordering of the territorial regime of states and municipalities, the creation and suspension of federal territories, the administration of branches of the national economy and their eventual transfer to social, collective, or mixed forms of property, and the promotion, organization, and registering of councils of the popular power.
Art. 157 - The national assembly may attribute to the bodies of the popular power, in addition to those of the federal district, the states, and the municipalities, issues that are of national government competency, so as to promote a participatory and active democracy (instead of promoting decentralization, as was originally stated here).
Art. 158 - The state will promote the active participation of the people, restoring power to the population (instead of decentralizing the state).
Art. 167 - States' incomes are increased from 20% to 25% of the national budget, where 5% is to be dedicated to the financing of each state's communal councils.
Art. 168 - Municipalities are obligated to include in their activities the participation of councils of popular power.
Art. 184 - Decentralization of power, by its transfer from state and municipal level to the communal level, will include the participation of communities in the management of public enterprises. Also, communal councils are defined as the executive arm of direct democratic citizen assemblies, which elect and at any time may revoke the mandates of the communal council members.
Art. 185 - The national government council is no longer presided over by the Vice-President, but by the President. Its members are the President, Vice-President(s), Ministers, and Governors. Participation of mayors and of civil society groups is optional now. Previously the federal governmental council (as it was called) was responsible for coordinating policies on all governmental levels. Now it is an advisory body for the formulation of the national development plan.
Section V. Organization of the State: President may name secondary vice-presidents as needed, presidential term extended and limit on reelection removed, may re-organize internal politico-territorial boundaries, and promotes all military officers.
Art. 225 - The president may designate the number of secondary vice-presidents he or she deems necessary. Previously there was only one Vice-President.
Art. 230 - Presidential term is extended from six to seven years. The two consecutive term limit on presidential reelection is removed.
Art. 236 - New presidential powers as specified in other sections of the reform are listed here, which include the ordering and management of the country's internal political boundaries, the creation and suspension of federal territories, setting the number and naming of secondary vice-presidents (in addition to the first vice-president), promote all officers of the armed forces, and administrate international reserves in coordination with the Central Bank.
Art. 251 - Adds detail to the functioning of the State Council, which advises the president on all matters.
Art. 252 - Composition of the State Council changed to include the heads of each branch of government: executive, judiciary, legislature, citizen power, and electoral power. The president may include representatives of the popular power and others as needed. Previously the council included five representatives designated by the president, one by the National Assembly, one by the judiciary, and one by the state governors.
Art. 272 - Removal of the requirement for the state to create an autonomous penitentiary system and places the entire system under the administration of a ministry instead of states and municipalities. Also, removes the option of privatizing the country's penitentiary system.
Section VI. Socio-Economic System: Weakening of the role of private enterprise in the economic system, possible better treatment of national businesses over foreign ones, no privatization any part of the national oil industry, taxation of idle agricultural land, removal of central bank autonomy.
Art. 299 - The socio-economic regimen of the country is based on socialist (among other) principles. Instead of stipulating that the state promotes development with the help of private initiative, it is to do so with community, social, and personal initiative.
Art. 300 - Rewording of how publicly owned enterprises should be created, to be regionalized and in favor of a "socialist economy", instead of "decentralized."
Art. 301 - Removal of the requirement that foreign businesses receive the same treatment as national businesses, stating that national businesses may receive better treatment.
Art. 302 - Strengthening of the state's right to exploit the country's mineral resources, especially all those related to oil and gas.
Art. 303 - Removal of the permission to privatize subsidiaries of the country's state oil industry that operate within the country.
Art. 305 - If necessary, the state may take over agricultural production in order to guarantee alimentary security and sovereignty.
Art. 307 - Strengthening of the prohibition against latifundios (large and idle landed estates) and creation of a tax on productive agricultural land that is idle. Landowners who engage in the ecological destruction of their land may be expropriated.
Art. 318 - Removal of the Central Bank's autonomy and foreign reserves to be administrated by the Central Bank together with the President.
Art. 320 - The state must defend the economic and monetary stability of the country. Removal of statements on the bank's autonomy.
Art. 321 - Removal of the requirement to set up a macro-economic stabilization fund. Instead, every year the President and the Central Bank establish the level of reserves necessary for the national economy and all "excess reserves" are assigned to a special development and investment fund.
Section VII. National Security: Armed forces to be anti-imperialist, reserves to become a militia.
Art. 328 - Armed forces of Venezuela renamed to "Bolivarian Armed Force." Specification that the military is "patriotic, popular, and anti-imperialist" at the service of the Venezuelan people and never at the service of an oligarchy or of a foreign imperial power, whose professionals are not activists in any political party (modified from the prohibition against all political activity by members of the military).
Art. 329 - Addition of the term "Bolivarian" to each of the branches of the military and renaming of the reserves to "National Bolivarian Militia."
Section VIII. Constitutional changes: Signature requirements increased for citizen-initiated referenda to modify the constitution.
Art. 341 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional amendments from 15% to 20% of registered voters.
Art. 342 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional reforms from 15% to 25% of registered voters.
Art. 348 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional assembly from 15% to 30% of registered voters.
Block "B"
Section III. Citizen Rights and Duties: Non-discrimination based on sexual orientation and health, increase in signature requirements for citizen-initiated referenda, primary home protected from expropriation.
Art. 21 - Inclusion of prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation and on health.
Art. 71 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated consultative referenda from 10% to 20% of registered voters.
Art. 72 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated recall referenda from 20% to 30% of registered voters. Also, voter participation set at minimum 40% (previously no minimum was set, other than that at least as many had to vote for the recall as originally voted for the elected official).
Art. 73 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated approbatory referenda from 15% to 30% of registered voters.
Art. 74 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated rescinding referenda from 10% to 30% of registered voters. In the case of law decrees, increased from 5% to 30% of registered voters.
Art. 82 - Protection of primary home from confiscation due to bankruptcy or other legal proceedings.
Art. 109 - Equal voting rights for professors, students, and employees in the election of university authorities.
Section IV. Functions of the State: State and local comptrollers appointed by national Comptroller General, political divisions determined on a national instead of state level.
Art. 163 - State comptrollers are to be appointed by the national Comptroller General, not the states, following a process in which organizations of popular power nominate candidates.
Art. 164 - State powers are specified in accordance with other articles of the reform. States can no longer organize the politico-territorial division of municipalities, but only coordinate these.
Art. 173 - Political divisions within municipalities are to be determined by a national law, instead of being in the power of the municipalities. The creation of such divisions is to attend to community initiative, with the objective being the de-concentration of municipal administration.
Art. 176 - The municipal comptroller is to be appointed by the national Comptroller General, not the municipalities, following the nomination of candidates by the organizations of popular power.
Section V. State organization: Councils of popular power participate in the nomination of members of the judiciary, citizen, and electoral powers, procedures for removing members of these branches specified more explicitly.
Art. 191 - National Assembly deputies who the president has called to serve in the executive may return to the National Assembly to finish their term in office once they stop working in the executive. Previously they lost their seat in the assembly.
Art. 264 - Specifies that Supreme Court judges are to be named by a majority of the National Assembly, instead of being left to a law. Also, in addition to civil society groups related to the law profession, representatives of the popular power are to participate in the nomination process.
Art. 265 - Supreme Court judges may be removed from office by a simple majority vote of the National Assembly, instead of a two-thirds majority and an accusation by the citizen power.
Art. 266 - Adds the ability of the Supreme Court to rule on the merits of court proceedings against members of the National Electoral Council, in addition to its ability to do so in the case of all other high-level government officials.
Art. 279 - Includes representatives of popular power councils for the nomination of Attorney General, Comptroller General, and Human Rights Defender. Also, specifies that each of these may be removed by a majority of the National Assembly, instead of leaving the issue to a separate law and a ruling from the Supreme Court.
Art. 289 - Adds to the Comptroller General's powers the ability to name state and municipal comptrollers.
Art. 293 - Removes the National Electoral Council's responsibility to preside over union elections.
Art. 295 - Inclusion of representatives from the Popular Power in the nomination process of members to the National Electoral Council. Specifies that members may be chosen by a majority of National Assembly members, instead of a two-thirds majority. Election of electoral council members is supposed to be staggered now, where three are elected and then halfway through their 7-year term, the other two are to be elected.
Art. 296 - Members of the National Electoral Council may be removed by a majority of National Assembly members, without the need of a prior ruling from the Supreme Court.
Section VIII. Constitutional exceptions: Right to information no longer guaranteed during state of emergency, emergencies to last as long as the conditions that caused it.
Art. 337 - Change in states of emergency, so that the right to information is no longer protected in such instances. Also, the right to due process is removed in favor of the right to defense, to no forced disappearance, to personal integrity, to be judged by one's natural judges, and not to be condemned to over 30 years imprisonment.
Art. 338 - States of alert, emergency, and of interior or exterior commotion are no longer limited to a maximum of 180 days, but are to last as long as conditions persist that motivated the state of exception.
Art. 339 - The Supreme Court's approval for states of exception is no longer necessary, only the approval of the National Assembly.
Full Spanish text of the constitutional reform proposal
English translation of Venezuela's 1999 constitution
Source URL: http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2889
Printed: December 3rd 2007
License: Published under a Creative Commons license (by-nc-nd). See creativecommons.org for more information.
Venezuela’s Constitutional Reform: An Article-by-Article Summary
November 23rd 2007, by Gregory Wilpert – Venezuelanalysis.com
The following is an article-by-article summary of the changes being proposed to Venezuela's 1999 constitution. The summary is in no way official and should only be used as an aid in making sense of the proposed constitutional reform. The official reform text is quite long (31 pages), as it includes the full text of each to be changed article, even if only one sentence or word was changed in the article. Making out what, exactly, the changes are relative to the original 1999 constitution can thus be a sometimes time-consuming and difficult task.
Venezuelans will vote on the reform on December 2nd and will do so in two blocks. Block "A" includes President Chavez's original proposal, as amended by the National Assembly, which would change 33 articles out of the 350 articles in the constitution. Also included in block A are another 13 articles introduced by the National Assembly. Block "B" includes another 26 reform articles proposed by the National Assembly. Voters may vote "Yes" or "No" on each block.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reform Question: "Are you in agreement with the approval of the constitutional reform project, passed by the National Assembly, with the participation of the people, and based in the initiative of President Hugo Chavez, with its respective titles, chapters, and transitional, derogative, and final dispositions, distributed in the following blocks?"
[Articles in italics are those proposed by the National Assembly, non-italic articles were proposed by the President.]
Block A
Section II. Politico-Territorial Division of the Country: President may declare special military and development zones, citizens have a new "right to the city."
Art. 11 - Allows the President to decree special military regions for the defense of the nation. Also, it would allow him to name military authorities for these regions in a case of emergency.
Art. 16 - Allows the president to decree, with permission from the National Assembly, communal cities, maritime regions, federal territories, federal municipalities, island districts, federal provinces, federal cities, and functional districts. Also the president may name and remove national government authorities for these territorial divisions (these do not, however, supplant the existing elected authorities in these regions).
Art. 18 - Provides a new right, the right to the city, which says that all citizens have the right to equal access to the city's services or benefits. Also names Caracas, the capital as the "Cradle of Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, and Queen of the Warairarepano" [an indigenous name for the mountain range surrounding Caracas].
Section III. Citizen Rights and Duties: Voting age lowered to 16 years, gender parity in candidacies, creation of councils of popular power, social security fund for self-employed, reduction of workweek to 36 hours, recognition of Venezuelans of African descent, free university education, introduction of communal and social property.
Art. 64 - Lowers the minimum voting age from 18 to 16 years.
Art. 67 - Requires candidates for elected office to be set up in accordance with gender parity, reverses the prohibition against state financing of campaigns and parties, and prohibits foreign funding of political activity.
Art. 70 - Establishes that councils of popular power (of communities, workers, students, farmers, fishers, youth, women, etc.) are one of the main means for citizen participation in the government.
Art. 87 - Creates a social security fund for the self-employed, in order to guarantee them a pension, vacation pay, sick pay, etc.
Art. 90 - Reduction of the workweek from 44 hours to 36.
Art. 98 - Guarantees freedom for cultural creations, but without guaranteeing intellectual property.
Art. 100 - Recognition of Venezuelans of African descent, as part of Venezuelan culture to protect and promote (in addition to indigenous and European culture).
Art. 103 - Right to a free education expanded from high school to university.
Art. 112 - The state will promote a diversified and independent economic model, in which the interests of the community prevail over individual interests and that guarantee the social and material needs of the people. The state is no longer obliged to promote private enterprise.
Art. 113 - Monopolies are prohibited instead of merely being "not allowed." The state has the right to "reserve" the exploitation of natural resources or provision of services that are considered by the constitution or by a separate law to be strategic to the nation. Concessions granted to private parties must provide adequate benefits to the public.
Art. 115 - Introduces new forms of property, in addition to private property. The new forms are (1) public property, belonging to state bodies, (2) direct and indirect social property, belonging to the society in general, where indirect social property is administered by the state and direct is administered by particular communities, (3) collective property, which belongs to particular groups, (4) mixed property, which can be a combination of ownership of any of the previous five forms.
Section IV. Functions of the State: Creation of popular power based in direct democracy, recognition of missions for alleviating urgent needs, foreign policy to pursue a pluri-polar world, devolution of central, state, and municipal functions to the popular power, guaranteed revenues for the popular power.
Art. 136 - Creates the popular power, in addition to the municipal, state, and national powers. "The people are the depositories of sovereignty and exercise it directly via the popular power. This is not born of suffrage nor any election, but out of the condition of the human groups that are organized as the base of the population." The popular power is organized via communal councils, workers' councils, student councils, farmer councils, crafts councils, fisher councils, sports councils, youth councils, elderly councils, women's councils, disables persons' councils, and others indicated by law.
Art. 141 - The public administration is organized into traditional bureaucracies and missions, which have an ad-hoc character and are designed to address urgent needs of the population.
Art. 152 - Venezuela's foreign policy is directed towards creating a pluri-polar world, free of hegemonies of any imperialist, colonial, or neo-colonial power.
Art. 153 - Strengthening of the mandate to unify Latin America, so as to achieve what Simon Bolivar called, "A Nation of Republics."
Art. 156 - Specifies the powers of the national government, adding powers that are spelled out in earlier and in later articles in greater detail. New powers of the national government include the ordering of the territorial regime of states and municipalities, the creation and suspension of federal territories, the administration of branches of the national economy and their eventual transfer to social, collective, or mixed forms of property, and the promotion, organization, and registering of councils of the popular power.
Art. 157 - The national assembly may attribute to the bodies of the popular power, in addition to those of the federal district, the states, and the municipalities, issues that are of national government competency, so as to promote a participatory and active democracy (instead of promoting decentralization, as was originally stated here).
Art. 158 - The state will promote the active participation of the people, restoring power to the population (instead of decentralizing the state).
Art. 167 - States' incomes are increased from 20% to 25% of the national budget, where 5% is to be dedicated to the financing of each state's communal councils.
Art. 168 - Municipalities are obligated to include in their activities the participation of councils of popular power.
Art. 184 - Decentralization of power, by its transfer from state and municipal level to the communal level, will include the participation of communities in the management of public enterprises. Also, communal councils are defined as the executive arm of direct democratic citizen assemblies, which elect and at any time may revoke the mandates of the communal council members.
Art. 185 - The national government council is no longer presided over by the Vice-President, but by the President. Its members are the President, Vice-President(s), Ministers, and Governors. Participation of mayors and of civil society groups is optional now. Previously the federal governmental council (as it was called) was responsible for coordinating policies on all governmental levels. Now it is an advisory body for the formulation of the national development plan.
Section V. Organization of the State: President may name secondary vice-presidents as needed, presidential term extended and limit on reelection removed, may re-organize internal politico-territorial boundaries, and promotes all military officers.
Art. 225 - The president may designate the number of secondary vice-presidents he or she deems necessary. Previously there was only one Vice-President.
Art. 230 - Presidential term is extended from six to seven years. The two consecutive term limit on presidential reelection is removed.
Art. 236 - New presidential powers as specified in other sections of the reform are listed here, which include the ordering and management of the country's internal political boundaries, the creation and suspension of federal territories, setting the number and naming of secondary vice-presidents (in addition to the first vice-president), promote all officers of the armed forces, and administrate international reserves in coordination with the Central Bank.
Art. 251 - Adds detail to the functioning of the State Council, which advises the president on all matters.
Art. 252 - Composition of the State Council changed to include the heads of each branch of government: executive, judiciary, legislature, citizen power, and electoral power. The president may include representatives of the popular power and others as needed. Previously the council included five representatives designated by the president, one by the National Assembly, one by the judiciary, and one by the state governors.
Art. 272 - Removal of the requirement for the state to create an autonomous penitentiary system and places the entire system under the administration of a ministry instead of states and municipalities. Also, removes the option of privatizing the country's penitentiary system.
Section VI. Socio-Economic System: Weakening of the role of private enterprise in the economic system, possible better treatment of national businesses over foreign ones, no privatization any part of the national oil industry, taxation of idle agricultural land, removal of central bank autonomy.
Art. 299 - The socio-economic regimen of the country is based on socialist (among other) principles. Instead of stipulating that the state promotes development with the help of private initiative, it is to do so with community, social, and personal initiative.
Art. 300 - Rewording of how publicly owned enterprises should be created, to be regionalized and in favor of a "socialist economy", instead of "decentralized."
Art. 301 - Removal of the requirement that foreign businesses receive the same treatment as national businesses, stating that national businesses may receive better treatment.
Art. 302 - Strengthening of the state's right to exploit the country's mineral resources, especially all those related to oil and gas.
Art. 303 - Removal of the permission to privatize subsidiaries of the country's state oil industry that operate within the country.
Art. 305 - If necessary, the state may take over agricultural production in order to guarantee alimentary security and sovereignty.
Art. 307 - Strengthening of the prohibition against latifundios (large and idle landed estates) and creation of a tax on productive agricultural land that is idle. Landowners who engage in the ecological destruction of their land may be expropriated.
Art. 318 - Removal of the Central Bank's autonomy and foreign reserves to be administrated by the Central Bank together with the President.
Art. 320 - The state must defend the economic and monetary stability of the country. Removal of statements on the bank's autonomy.
Art. 321 - Removal of the requirement to set up a macro-economic stabilization fund. Instead, every year the President and the Central Bank establish the level of reserves necessary for the national economy and all "excess reserves" are assigned to a special development and investment fund.
Section VII. National Security: Armed forces to be anti-imperialist, reserves to become a militia.
Art. 328 - Armed forces of Venezuela renamed to "Bolivarian Armed Force." Specification that the military is "patriotic, popular, and anti-imperialist" at the service of the Venezuelan people and never at the service of an oligarchy or of a foreign imperial power, whose professionals are not activists in any political party (modified from the prohibition against all political activity by members of the military).
Art. 329 - Addition of the term "Bolivarian" to each of the branches of the military and renaming of the reserves to "National Bolivarian Militia."
Section VIII. Constitutional changes: Signature requirements increased for citizen-initiated referenda to modify the constitution.
Art. 341 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional amendments from 15% to 20% of registered voters.
Art. 342 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional reforms from 15% to 25% of registered voters.
Art. 348 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated constitutional assembly from 15% to 30% of registered voters.
Block "B"
Section III. Citizen Rights and Duties: Non-discrimination based on sexual orientation and health, increase in signature requirements for citizen-initiated referenda, primary home protected from expropriation.
Art. 21 - Inclusion of prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation and on health.
Art. 71 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated consultative referenda from 10% to 20% of registered voters.
Art. 72 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated recall referenda from 20% to 30% of registered voters. Also, voter participation set at minimum 40% (previously no minimum was set, other than that at least as many had to vote for the recall as originally voted for the elected official).
Art. 73 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated approbatory referenda from 15% to 30% of registered voters.
Art. 74 - Increase in the signature requirement for citizen-initiated rescinding referenda from 10% to 30% of registered voters. In the case of law decrees, increased from 5% to 30% of registered voters.
Art. 82 - Protection of primary home from confiscation due to bankruptcy or other legal proceedings.
Art. 109 - Equal voting rights for professors, students, and employees in the election of university authorities.
Section IV. Functions of the State: State and local comptrollers appointed by national Comptroller General, political divisions determined on a national instead of state level.
Art. 163 - State comptrollers are to be appointed by the national Comptroller General, not the states, following a process in which organizations of popular power nominate candidates.
Art. 164 - State powers are specified in accordance with other articles of the reform. States can no longer organize the politico-territorial division of municipalities, but only coordinate these.
Art. 173 - Political divisions within municipalities are to be determined by a national law, instead of being in the power of the municipalities. The creation of such divisions is to attend to community initiative, with the objective being the de-concentration of municipal administration.
Art. 176 - The municipal comptroller is to be appointed by the national Comptroller General, not the municipalities, following the nomination of candidates by the organizations of popular power.
Section V. State organization: Councils of popular power participate in the nomination of members of the judiciary, citizen, and electoral powers, procedures for removing members of these branches specified more explicitly.
Art. 191 - National Assembly deputies who the president has called to serve in the executive may return to the National Assembly to finish their term in office once they stop working in the executive. Previously they lost their seat in the assembly.
Art. 264 - Specifies that Supreme Court judges are to be named by a majority of the National Assembly, instead of being left to a law. Also, in addition to civil society groups related to the law profession, representatives of the popular power are to participate in the nomination process.
Art. 265 - Supreme Court judges may be removed from office by a simple majority vote of the National Assembly, instead of a two-thirds majority and an accusation by the citizen power.
Art. 266 - Adds the ability of the Supreme Court to rule on the merits of court proceedings against members of the National Electoral Council, in addition to its ability to do so in the case of all other high-level government officials.
Art. 279 - Includes representatives of popular power councils for the nomination of Attorney General, Comptroller General, and Human Rights Defender. Also, specifies that each of these may be removed by a majority of the National Assembly, instead of leaving the issue to a separate law and a ruling from the Supreme Court.
Art. 289 - Adds to the Comptroller General's powers the ability to name state and municipal comptrollers.
Art. 293 - Removes the National Electoral Council's responsibility to preside over union elections.
Art. 295 - Inclusion of representatives from the Popular Power in the nomination process of members to the National Electoral Council. Specifies that members may be chosen by a majority of National Assembly members, instead of a two-thirds majority. Election of electoral council members is supposed to be staggered now, where three are elected and then halfway through their 7-year term, the other two are to be elected.
Art. 296 - Members of the National Electoral Council may be removed by a majority of National Assembly members, without the need of a prior ruling from the Supreme Court.
Section VIII. Constitutional exceptions: Right to information no longer guaranteed during state of emergency, emergencies to last as long as the conditions that caused it.
Art. 337 - Change in states of emergency, so that the right to information is no longer protected in such instances. Also, the right to due process is removed in favor of the right to defense, to no forced disappearance, to personal integrity, to be judged by one's natural judges, and not to be condemned to over 30 years imprisonment.
Art. 338 - States of alert, emergency, and of interior or exterior commotion are no longer limited to a maximum of 180 days, but are to last as long as conditions persist that motivated the state of exception.
Art. 339 - The Supreme Court's approval for states of exception is no longer necessary, only the approval of the National Assembly.
Full Spanish text of the constitutional reform proposal
English translation of Venezuela's 1999 constitution
Source URL: http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2889
Printed: December 3rd 2007
License: Published under a Creative Commons license (by-nc-nd). See creativecommons.org for more information.
Thursday, September 6, 2007
Analysis of developments in Venezuela and other parts of South America
It is certainly generous of the Monthly Review to make important articles such as this available for free on its website. The whole article is available on the website. Lebowitz concentrates on Venezuela but also touches on other countries in South America as well.
Venezuela:
A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin America
by Michael A. Lebowitz
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes From
the Editors
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael A. Lebowitz is author of Beyond Capital: Marx's Political Economy of the Working Class (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Build It Now: Socialism for the Twenty-First Century (Monthly Review Press, 2006), and The Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development (Monthly Review Press, forthcoming in 2008). Portions of this essay were presented as “Going Beyond Survival: Making the Social Economy a Real Alternative” at the Fourth International Meeting of the Solidarity Economy, July 21–23, 2006, at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Fair wages, a fair day’s work! Through their struggles within capitalism, it has often been possible for workers and citizens to secure themselves some share of the benefits of social labor. Capitalist globalization and the offensive of neoliberal state policies, however, have encroached upon all those gains from past struggles; and the answer to those who were surprised to find those victories ephemeral was the mantra of TINA—there is no alternative.
Yet, as the devastation of the capitalist offensive has become obvious, opposition has emerged especially in Latin America. We warned you this would happen, say the hucksters and self-promoters; instead of the good times ahead promised from the neoliberal medicine prescribed from the 1980s on, Latin America experienced (in the words of Jorge G. Castañeda) “the persistence of dismal poverty, inequality, high unemployment, a lack of competitiveness, and poor infrastructure” (“Latin America’s Left Turn,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006). The left (“rightly foretold” by the prophets) has returned.
This means that hope has returned. Working people around the world look to Latin America these days for the demonstration that there is an alternative, that a better world is possible. But, are they right to look to Latin America? Is a real alternative emerging or is it merely a negotiation of better terms in the implicit contract with capitalist globalization? Is Latin America breaking with capitalism or is it struggling for fairness?
The Good Left and the Bad Left
Of course, we know that all lefts are not the same. And, indeed, that is a constant theme among commentators of all varieties. While few would divide Latin America in accordance with dietary practices as did Alvaro Vargas Llosa (Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez, and Evo Morales being designated as “carnivores”—Washington Post, August 6, 2006), for many there is simply the Good Left and the Bad Left. What they have in common, according to Castañeda, is that they stress “social improvements,” “egalitarian distribution of wealth,” “sovereignty,” and “democracy” (over the presumed opposite package of macroeconomic orthodoxy, wealth creation, international cooperation, and governmental effectiveness). What makes the Bad Left bad, though, is essentially described by one word—“populism.”
When they hear the term populism, Latin American intellectuals reach for their incense. Partly that is because the term conveys people, masses, the unwashed in motion. When Castañeda declares populism to be “nationalist, strident, and close-minded,” it is hard not to think of this as his description of the masses themselves. But, there is more to it (or, rather, there is another aspect of this). When he describes as among the characteristics of populists in power that they “nationalized large sectors of their countries’ economies, extending well beyond the so-called commanding heights” and captured “natural resource or monopoly rents, which allowed them to spend money on the descamisados, the ‘shirtless,’ without raising taxes on the middle class,” you know that what makes the Bad Left really bad is its attack on capital.
Small wonder, then, that the Good Left is said to include the governments of Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil (and maybe even Nestor Kirchner’s Argentina), while the Bad Left invariably revolves around Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales. Given that the distance from Chávez appears to be the true measure of all things, one might conclude that Ecuador’s Rafael Correa will also fall into the category of the Bad.
Yet, here is where this classification system breaks down. How do we distinguish between an attack on capitalism as such and an attack on the current policies and practices of capitalism? Between a struggle for a new economic system, on the one hand, and a struggle for fairness on the part of international creditors, in trade relations, and in the distribution of resource rents, on the other? Distinguishing between these may be harder than it appears at first sight.
After all, even a process of despotic inroads upon capital (of a long march which wrests, “by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie,” in the words of Marx and Engels) is certain to be described as mere reformism by those for whom anything less than storming the heights immediately—nationalizing everything with workers’ control now—is simply acquiescence to international capital. Abstract idealists for whom the correlation of forces (internal and external) and the concept of process mean less than the pamphlets they have underlined always sing the same tune of betrayal (changing only the names of those who have spurned their overtures). But, it does not mean that they are wrong in particular cases.
How can we identify an attack on capitalism as such? Is an alternative to capitalism being built in the new left governments of Latin America?
Identifying an Alternative to Capitalism
What constitutes a real alternative to capitalism? I suggest that it is a society in which the explicit goal is not the growth of capital or of the material means of production but, rather, human development itself—the growth of human capacities. We can see this perspective embodied in the Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela—in Article 299’s emphasis upon “ensuring overall human development,” in the declaration of Article 20 that “everyone has the right to the free development of his or her own personality,” and in the focus of Article 102 upon “developing the creative potential of every human being and the full exercise of his or her personality in a democratic society.”
In these passages (which are by no means the whole of that constitution), there is the conception of a real alternative—an economy whose logic is not the logic of capital. “The social economy,” President Hugo Chávez said in September 2003, “bases its logic on the human being, on work, that is to say, on the worker and the worker’s family, that is to say, in the human being.” That social economy, he continued, does not focus on economic gain, on exchange values; rather, “the social economy generates mainly use-value.” Its purpose is “the construction of the new man, of the new woman, of the new society.”
These are beautiful ideas and beautiful words, but they are, of course, only ideas and words. The first set comes from a constitution and the second comes from the regular national educational seminar known as Aló Presidente. How can such ideas and words be made real? Let me suggest four preconditions for the realization of this alternative to capitalism.
(1) Any discussion of structural change must begin from an understanding of the existing structure—in short, from an understanding of capitalism. We need to grasp that the logic of capital, the logic in which profit rather than satisfaction of the needs of human beings is the goal, dominates both where it fosters the comparative advantage of repression and also where it accepts an increase in slave rations.
(2) It is essential to attack the logic of capital ideologically. In the absence of the development of a mass understanding of the nature of capital—that capital is the result of the social labor of the collective worker—the need to survive the ravages of neoliberal and repressive policies produces only the desire for a fairer society, the search for a better share for the exploited and excluded: in short, barbarism with a human face.
(3) A critical aspect in the battle to go beyond capitalism is the recognition that human capacity develops only through human activity, only through what Marx understood as “revolutionary practice,” the simultaneous changing of circumstances and self-change. Real human development does not drop from the sky in the form of money to support survival or the expenditures of popular governments upon education and health. In contrast to populism, which produces people who look to the state for all answers and to leaders who promise everything, the conception which truly challenges the logic of capital in the battle of ideas is one which explicitly recognizes the centrality of self-management in the workplace and self-government in the community as the means of unleashing human potential—i.e., the idea of socialism for the twenty-first century.
(4) But, the idea of this socialism cannot displace real capitalism. Nor can dwarfish islands of cooperation change the world by competing successfully against capitalist corporations. You need the power to foster the new productive relations while truncating the reproduction of capitalist productive relations. You need to take the power of the state away from capital, and you need to use that power when capital responds to encroachments—when capital goes on strike, you must be prepared to move in rather than give in. Winning the “battle of democracy” and using “political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie” remains as critical now as when Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto.
Consider these preconditions. Are they being met by the new Latin American governments on the left? On the contrary, for the most part, we can see the familiar characteristics of social democracy—which does not understand the nature of capital, does not attack the logic of capital ideologically, does not believe that there is a real alternative to capitalism, and, not surprisingly, gives in when capital threatens to go on strike.
“We can’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs,” announced the social democratic premier of British Columbia in Canada (in the 1970s when I was party policy chairman). Here, crystallized, is the ultimate wisdom of social democracy—the manner in which social democracy enforces the logic of capital and ideologically disarms and demobilizes people.
Venezuela, however, is going in a different direction at this point. While the Bolivarian Revolution did not start out to build a socialist alternative (and its continuation along this path is contested every step of the way), it is both actively rejecting the logic of capital and also ideologically arming and mobilizing people to build that alternative.
The Initial Venezuelan Path
Although the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 focused upon the development of human capacity, it also retained the support for capitalism of earlier constitutions. That constitution guarantees the right of property (Article 115), identifies a role for private initiative in generating growth and employment (Article 299), and calls upon the state to promote private initiative (Article 112). And, support for continued capitalist development was precisely the direction of the initial plan developed for 2001–07. While rejecting neoliberalism and stressing the importance of the state presence in strategic industries, the focus of that plan was to encourage investment by private capital—both domestic and foreign—by creating an “atmosphere of trust.”
To this was to be added the development of a “social economy”—conceived as an “alternative and complementary road” to the private sector and the public sector. But, it is significant how little a role was conceived for self-managing and cooperative activities. Essentially, this was a program to incorporate the informal sector into the social economy; it is necessary, the plan argued, “to transform the informal workers into small managers.” Accordingly, family, cooperative, and self-managed micro-enterprises were to be encouraged through training and micro-financing (from institutions such as the Women’s Development Bank) and by reducing regulations and tax burdens. The goal of the state was explicitly described as one of “creating an emergent managerial class.”
The social economy, thus, was to play the role it plays in Brazil and elsewhere—islands of cooperation nurtured by states, NGOs, Grameen-type banks, and church charities and serving as positive shock absorbers for the economic and political effects of capitalist globalization. Of course, if seriously pursued, this could make things easier for the unemployed and excluded, the half of the Venezuelan working class in the informal sector, by providing them with a better opportunity for survival. But, the social economy was not envisioned in the 2001–07 plan as an alternative to capitalism (except insofar as survival within the nooks and crannies of global capitalism constitutes an alternative).
A Third Way for Venezuela: it would turn its back on neoliberalism, would change the distribution of oil rents by acting against the state within the state that was the national oil company (PDVSA), and would move via an active state in the direction of the “endogenous development” supported by structuralist economists. The goal, in short, was a different capitalism. The Bolivarian Revolution at its outset clearly belonged in the Good Left.
But, it also contained a potential subversive element—its theme of human development. The Bolivarian Constitution is unequivocal in indicating that human beings develop their capacity only through their own activity. Not only does Article 62 declare that participation by people is “the necessary way of achieving the involvement to ensure their complete development, both individual and collective,” but that constitution specifically focuses upon democratic planning and participatory budgeting at all levels of society and (as in Article 70) upon “self-management, co-management, cooperatives in all forms” as examples of “forms of association guided by the values of mutual cooperation and solidarity.” With its emphasis upon a “democratic, participatory and protagonistic” society, the Bolivarian Constitution definitely contains the seeds of the social economy, the seeds of socialism for the twenty-first century.
And, those seeds didn’t drop from the sky. They came from the social movements that were allied with Hugo Chávez’s struggle to throw out the Fourth Republic (and that, through membership in the new Constituent Assembly, introduced those seeds directly into the constitution); and, they came from the self-described “subversive in Miraflores” himself—Chávez, the prisoner who wrote in 1993, “the sovereign people must transform itself into the object and the subject of power. This option is not negotiable for revolutionaries.”
Of course, contradictory elements such as those found in the Bolivarian Constitution are not unique, and potentially subversive seeds often produce nothing. We are all familiar with governments elected as agencies of working people which, once elected, send the people home to rest for the next election. Further, there is much sad experience with the manner in which those social movements then proceed to self-police themselves—with the result that the seeds wither. In Venezuela, however, class struggle nurtured the seeds of that social economy so that it increasingly was seen as the alternative to capitalist development.
Venezuela:
A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin America
by Michael A. Lebowitz
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes From
the Editors
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael A. Lebowitz is author of Beyond Capital: Marx's Political Economy of the Working Class (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Build It Now: Socialism for the Twenty-First Century (Monthly Review Press, 2006), and The Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development (Monthly Review Press, forthcoming in 2008). Portions of this essay were presented as “Going Beyond Survival: Making the Social Economy a Real Alternative” at the Fourth International Meeting of the Solidarity Economy, July 21–23, 2006, at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Fair wages, a fair day’s work! Through their struggles within capitalism, it has often been possible for workers and citizens to secure themselves some share of the benefits of social labor. Capitalist globalization and the offensive of neoliberal state policies, however, have encroached upon all those gains from past struggles; and the answer to those who were surprised to find those victories ephemeral was the mantra of TINA—there is no alternative.
Yet, as the devastation of the capitalist offensive has become obvious, opposition has emerged especially in Latin America. We warned you this would happen, say the hucksters and self-promoters; instead of the good times ahead promised from the neoliberal medicine prescribed from the 1980s on, Latin America experienced (in the words of Jorge G. Castañeda) “the persistence of dismal poverty, inequality, high unemployment, a lack of competitiveness, and poor infrastructure” (“Latin America’s Left Turn,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006). The left (“rightly foretold” by the prophets) has returned.
This means that hope has returned. Working people around the world look to Latin America these days for the demonstration that there is an alternative, that a better world is possible. But, are they right to look to Latin America? Is a real alternative emerging or is it merely a negotiation of better terms in the implicit contract with capitalist globalization? Is Latin America breaking with capitalism or is it struggling for fairness?
The Good Left and the Bad Left
Of course, we know that all lefts are not the same. And, indeed, that is a constant theme among commentators of all varieties. While few would divide Latin America in accordance with dietary practices as did Alvaro Vargas Llosa (Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez, and Evo Morales being designated as “carnivores”—Washington Post, August 6, 2006), for many there is simply the Good Left and the Bad Left. What they have in common, according to Castañeda, is that they stress “social improvements,” “egalitarian distribution of wealth,” “sovereignty,” and “democracy” (over the presumed opposite package of macroeconomic orthodoxy, wealth creation, international cooperation, and governmental effectiveness). What makes the Bad Left bad, though, is essentially described by one word—“populism.”
When they hear the term populism, Latin American intellectuals reach for their incense. Partly that is because the term conveys people, masses, the unwashed in motion. When Castañeda declares populism to be “nationalist, strident, and close-minded,” it is hard not to think of this as his description of the masses themselves. But, there is more to it (or, rather, there is another aspect of this). When he describes as among the characteristics of populists in power that they “nationalized large sectors of their countries’ economies, extending well beyond the so-called commanding heights” and captured “natural resource or monopoly rents, which allowed them to spend money on the descamisados, the ‘shirtless,’ without raising taxes on the middle class,” you know that what makes the Bad Left really bad is its attack on capital.
Small wonder, then, that the Good Left is said to include the governments of Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil (and maybe even Nestor Kirchner’s Argentina), while the Bad Left invariably revolves around Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales. Given that the distance from Chávez appears to be the true measure of all things, one might conclude that Ecuador’s Rafael Correa will also fall into the category of the Bad.
Yet, here is where this classification system breaks down. How do we distinguish between an attack on capitalism as such and an attack on the current policies and practices of capitalism? Between a struggle for a new economic system, on the one hand, and a struggle for fairness on the part of international creditors, in trade relations, and in the distribution of resource rents, on the other? Distinguishing between these may be harder than it appears at first sight.
After all, even a process of despotic inroads upon capital (of a long march which wrests, “by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie,” in the words of Marx and Engels) is certain to be described as mere reformism by those for whom anything less than storming the heights immediately—nationalizing everything with workers’ control now—is simply acquiescence to international capital. Abstract idealists for whom the correlation of forces (internal and external) and the concept of process mean less than the pamphlets they have underlined always sing the same tune of betrayal (changing only the names of those who have spurned their overtures). But, it does not mean that they are wrong in particular cases.
How can we identify an attack on capitalism as such? Is an alternative to capitalism being built in the new left governments of Latin America?
Identifying an Alternative to Capitalism
What constitutes a real alternative to capitalism? I suggest that it is a society in which the explicit goal is not the growth of capital or of the material means of production but, rather, human development itself—the growth of human capacities. We can see this perspective embodied in the Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela—in Article 299’s emphasis upon “ensuring overall human development,” in the declaration of Article 20 that “everyone has the right to the free development of his or her own personality,” and in the focus of Article 102 upon “developing the creative potential of every human being and the full exercise of his or her personality in a democratic society.”
In these passages (which are by no means the whole of that constitution), there is the conception of a real alternative—an economy whose logic is not the logic of capital. “The social economy,” President Hugo Chávez said in September 2003, “bases its logic on the human being, on work, that is to say, on the worker and the worker’s family, that is to say, in the human being.” That social economy, he continued, does not focus on economic gain, on exchange values; rather, “the social economy generates mainly use-value.” Its purpose is “the construction of the new man, of the new woman, of the new society.”
These are beautiful ideas and beautiful words, but they are, of course, only ideas and words. The first set comes from a constitution and the second comes from the regular national educational seminar known as Aló Presidente. How can such ideas and words be made real? Let me suggest four preconditions for the realization of this alternative to capitalism.
(1) Any discussion of structural change must begin from an understanding of the existing structure—in short, from an understanding of capitalism. We need to grasp that the logic of capital, the logic in which profit rather than satisfaction of the needs of human beings is the goal, dominates both where it fosters the comparative advantage of repression and also where it accepts an increase in slave rations.
(2) It is essential to attack the logic of capital ideologically. In the absence of the development of a mass understanding of the nature of capital—that capital is the result of the social labor of the collective worker—the need to survive the ravages of neoliberal and repressive policies produces only the desire for a fairer society, the search for a better share for the exploited and excluded: in short, barbarism with a human face.
(3) A critical aspect in the battle to go beyond capitalism is the recognition that human capacity develops only through human activity, only through what Marx understood as “revolutionary practice,” the simultaneous changing of circumstances and self-change. Real human development does not drop from the sky in the form of money to support survival or the expenditures of popular governments upon education and health. In contrast to populism, which produces people who look to the state for all answers and to leaders who promise everything, the conception which truly challenges the logic of capital in the battle of ideas is one which explicitly recognizes the centrality of self-management in the workplace and self-government in the community as the means of unleashing human potential—i.e., the idea of socialism for the twenty-first century.
(4) But, the idea of this socialism cannot displace real capitalism. Nor can dwarfish islands of cooperation change the world by competing successfully against capitalist corporations. You need the power to foster the new productive relations while truncating the reproduction of capitalist productive relations. You need to take the power of the state away from capital, and you need to use that power when capital responds to encroachments—when capital goes on strike, you must be prepared to move in rather than give in. Winning the “battle of democracy” and using “political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie” remains as critical now as when Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto.
Consider these preconditions. Are they being met by the new Latin American governments on the left? On the contrary, for the most part, we can see the familiar characteristics of social democracy—which does not understand the nature of capital, does not attack the logic of capital ideologically, does not believe that there is a real alternative to capitalism, and, not surprisingly, gives in when capital threatens to go on strike.
“We can’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs,” announced the social democratic premier of British Columbia in Canada (in the 1970s when I was party policy chairman). Here, crystallized, is the ultimate wisdom of social democracy—the manner in which social democracy enforces the logic of capital and ideologically disarms and demobilizes people.
Venezuela, however, is going in a different direction at this point. While the Bolivarian Revolution did not start out to build a socialist alternative (and its continuation along this path is contested every step of the way), it is both actively rejecting the logic of capital and also ideologically arming and mobilizing people to build that alternative.
The Initial Venezuelan Path
Although the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 focused upon the development of human capacity, it also retained the support for capitalism of earlier constitutions. That constitution guarantees the right of property (Article 115), identifies a role for private initiative in generating growth and employment (Article 299), and calls upon the state to promote private initiative (Article 112). And, support for continued capitalist development was precisely the direction of the initial plan developed for 2001–07. While rejecting neoliberalism and stressing the importance of the state presence in strategic industries, the focus of that plan was to encourage investment by private capital—both domestic and foreign—by creating an “atmosphere of trust.”
To this was to be added the development of a “social economy”—conceived as an “alternative and complementary road” to the private sector and the public sector. But, it is significant how little a role was conceived for self-managing and cooperative activities. Essentially, this was a program to incorporate the informal sector into the social economy; it is necessary, the plan argued, “to transform the informal workers into small managers.” Accordingly, family, cooperative, and self-managed micro-enterprises were to be encouraged through training and micro-financing (from institutions such as the Women’s Development Bank) and by reducing regulations and tax burdens. The goal of the state was explicitly described as one of “creating an emergent managerial class.”
The social economy, thus, was to play the role it plays in Brazil and elsewhere—islands of cooperation nurtured by states, NGOs, Grameen-type banks, and church charities and serving as positive shock absorbers for the economic and political effects of capitalist globalization. Of course, if seriously pursued, this could make things easier for the unemployed and excluded, the half of the Venezuelan working class in the informal sector, by providing them with a better opportunity for survival. But, the social economy was not envisioned in the 2001–07 plan as an alternative to capitalism (except insofar as survival within the nooks and crannies of global capitalism constitutes an alternative).
A Third Way for Venezuela: it would turn its back on neoliberalism, would change the distribution of oil rents by acting against the state within the state that was the national oil company (PDVSA), and would move via an active state in the direction of the “endogenous development” supported by structuralist economists. The goal, in short, was a different capitalism. The Bolivarian Revolution at its outset clearly belonged in the Good Left.
But, it also contained a potential subversive element—its theme of human development. The Bolivarian Constitution is unequivocal in indicating that human beings develop their capacity only through their own activity. Not only does Article 62 declare that participation by people is “the necessary way of achieving the involvement to ensure their complete development, both individual and collective,” but that constitution specifically focuses upon democratic planning and participatory budgeting at all levels of society and (as in Article 70) upon “self-management, co-management, cooperatives in all forms” as examples of “forms of association guided by the values of mutual cooperation and solidarity.” With its emphasis upon a “democratic, participatory and protagonistic” society, the Bolivarian Constitution definitely contains the seeds of the social economy, the seeds of socialism for the twenty-first century.
And, those seeds didn’t drop from the sky. They came from the social movements that were allied with Hugo Chávez’s struggle to throw out the Fourth Republic (and that, through membership in the new Constituent Assembly, introduced those seeds directly into the constitution); and, they came from the self-described “subversive in Miraflores” himself—Chávez, the prisoner who wrote in 1993, “the sovereign people must transform itself into the object and the subject of power. This option is not negotiable for revolutionaries.”
Of course, contradictory elements such as those found in the Bolivarian Constitution are not unique, and potentially subversive seeds often produce nothing. We are all familiar with governments elected as agencies of working people which, once elected, send the people home to rest for the next election. Further, there is much sad experience with the manner in which those social movements then proceed to self-police themselves—with the result that the seeds wither. In Venezuela, however, class struggle nurtured the seeds of that social economy so that it increasingly was seen as the alternative to capitalist development.
Friday, August 10, 2007
Venezuela: Is Chavez in Control?
This is interesting but I am quite suspicious of it. There is nothing at all about foreign involvement in trying to destroy the Chavez government. The old elites are supposedly destroyed--elite stores apparently just depend upon corrupt govt. officials for clients! The corruption story could very well be right but certainly the old elites are still there and kicking. They organise plenty and try to sabotage Chavez at every opportunity.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/34312/print
By Ivan Briscoe
Created 2007-08-09 17:50
Lands have been confiscated, foreign companies driven out and utilities
renationalised, but even so there is a special place in Venezuela for
Louis Vuitton. The immaculate store in the Sambil shopping-mall now
ranks as the firm's most successful in the whole of Latin America,
shifting several hundred thousand-dollar carpetbags week in week out.
"We have a mix", explains the extremely reticent shop manager, flown in
days before from Paris. "We have older clients, and we have newer
ones."
Not far to the east the free flow of wealth has also engulfed Petare,
the giant settlement of breeze-block houses, sticking like a biblical
citadel to the hills of Caracas valley. Here there are new blue
water-cisterns on every house, concrete supports to halt mudflows,
Cuban
ophthalmologists, education and literacy programmes. There are
subsidised food stores, committees fighting for residents' property
rights, community sports facilities. But it is best not to leave home
after 7 pm: Petare is also home to a plague of drive-by shootings and
erratic teenage gunfire.
"Before it was static, now there's hope. Now it's all mobile", declares
Miren Eguiguren, a Basque emigrant who for thirty-seven years has
struggled to bring basic education and social services to the district
through the /Casa de Nazareno/ centre. "Everything is broken, and there
is total movement."
*Caracas**'s wonderland*
Venezuela, as many like to observe, tongue in cheek, is now a
"wonderland." The rhetoric emanating from President Hugo Chávez is of
revolution, socialism and, as he declared in a television _interview_ ,
a "war of all the people" against the pretensions of "imperialism". In
the country beyond the /Palacio de Miraflores/, fortunes are being made
at lightning pace, and the only blood-war is between the people, poor
against poor.
Condemnations of creeping dictatorship, meanwhile, rain down both from
abroad (foreign governments, international bodies) and at home (the new
student movement). Even two months before the free-to-air license for
Radio Caracas Televisión (_RCTV_ ) was rescinded in April 2007,
Condoleezza Rice had _accused_ Chávez of "destroying his own country,
economically, politically." The litany of power-concentration since the
December 2006 elections has indeed proved indigestible: the
congressional vote to hand eighteen-month "special powers" to the
president; the creation of a united ruling party (the _/Partido
S//o//cialista Unido de Venezuela/_ [4] ) that entails the effective
dissolution of others in broad sympathy with the "Bolivarian
revolution"; the creeping ideology of total militarisation; and the
venom directed towards any attempt at opposition. Accused by the
country's bishops of sponsoring a "Marxist-Leninist" takeover, Chávez
let rip in customary style: "either you're ignorant", he told the
priests, "or you're cheating, lying perverts."
Supporters of the president point to his ever increasing majority in
three presidential elections, and his enormous, undeniable popularity
in
deprived neighbourhoods. Both sides of the debate repeat the same old
axioms and historical references; there seems little room for nuance or
compromise. And to prove the point, his critics have unearthed a new
ideological bogeyman, supposedly cherished by certain /chavista/
ministers: the German-Mexican sociologist _Heinz Dieterich_ , whose
"21st-century socialism" entails the use of computer networks to decide
who should get what, providing the long-awaited
"mathematical-conceptual
solution of the problem of objective value."
The frenzied impasse over Chávez's democratic credentials or
digitalised
Marxism, however, utterly fails to capture the contradictions of the
Venezuelan street. Just as the president's socialism jostles uneasily
with the habits of an oil-rich state, the conviction that a new tyranny
is settling into place ignores abundant evidence that the government's
greatest battle, which it may be losing, is to keep control of its own
/proceso/. Venezuela may now be more or less democratic than during its
forty years of two-party oligarchy; the arguments (as a July 2007
_report_ by Coletta A Youngers for the _Washington Office on Latin
America_ underscores) cut both ways. But a truth that cannot be avoided
is that without effective steerage, a revolution - democratic, populist
or dictatorial - sinks little deeper than a television show. And it is
in the effort to make /chavismo/ stick, and the resistance this
produces, that the true identity of this regime will emerge.
*Two loopholes
*
It is crime, the leading concern of 85% of Venezuelans according to a
poll conducted in 2006, that most confounds the government's
expectations. Loath to punish the wayward poor, Chávez consistently
skirts the issue. If anything, his model for a solution can be found in
_/23 de Enero/_ (23 January), a district of mean tower-blocks and
hillside tenements in western Caracas, where tight community
organisation - including armed groups, such as the radical Tupamaros -
have made the streets relatively safe to walk.
Juan Contreras has lived all his life in the district. A veteran of the
leftwing _/Coordinadora Simón Bolívar/_, from which the Tupamaro
group
emerged, he now runs a community newspaper and radio station, occupying
a building that was once the local headquarters of the metropolitan
police. "I was the culprit for anything and everything that happened
here", he recalls. "The police came and took you to the station. Then
it
was whack, whack, whack, and when they'd whacked you twenty times,
they'd switch the television on."
On the day of an unannounced visit, dozens of young children are
listening to a classical musical recital in the courtyard where local
suspects were once dragged. Leashed monkeys play in a tree. Seventy
brand-new Chinese computers, all with broadband connections, sit idle
in
an adjoining hall; the electricity doesn't work, and the ministry is
not
picking up the phone. But Contreras is unfazed: "Never before in forty
years would we even have got computers!", he proclaims.
The /barrio/, however, is an exception. Around fifty people are killed
in Caracas every weekend, clogging public hospitals with the corpses of
young men: victims of revenge killings, gang wars, narcotic highs and
pure bad luck. Total murder statistics for the country suggest at least
16,000 are being killed each year; so far in 2007, this rate has risen
by 15%. Guns, a community teacher says in Petare, "are easier to buy
than a bag of flour", and the murder of choice is carried out now by an
adolescent pillion-passenger firing a pistol from a speeding motorbike.
"A few weeks ago, I was telling a 15-year-old kid from around here that
he had a nice face, so why was he involved in all this business",
recalls _Miren Eguiguren_. "But it was too late. He was shot dead a few
days ago. It was what he deserved. He'd killed ten people himself."
Comprehensive reform of the country's 135 different police forces is
pending, but few in the shanty-town /cerros/ around Caracas are ever
likely to trust officers long associated with "social cleansing",
corruption, and kidnapping. The sheer complexity of recasting the
country's security forces and judiciary instead generates systematic
inertia, at most punctuated by an occasional politically-motivated
purge, or a quick tamper with the courts - which often serves to
undermine judicial competence. Chávez is accused by his critics of
sympathising with criminal outlaws, yet his indulgence does not stretch
too far: convicted offenders still end up beached in Latin America's
most hellish jail system, short of space and food, where around 250
inmates have been killed so far this year.
For a revolution bent on encouraging solidarity and social ownership,
the current crime wave serves as a kind of manic, bipolar disorder.
Senior police officers, evidently ignorant of Bolivarian etiquette,
freely hand out their advice on how one should behave when driving
one's
car: "distrust accidents, distractions, and injured people in the
road",
one inspector recently told /El Universal /newspaper.
The siege of the egalitarian, cooperative ethic vaunted by Chávez and
his ministers is even more marked in the nation's economy. Vast sums of
_oil money_ have certainly reached the poorest areas, while also
spawning bridges across the Orinoco river, a new "socialist city", a
flyover to the airport and nine glimmering football stadia, created for
the _Copa America_ tournament of June-July 2007. Yet the outlay on such
investments - public spending has increased by 60% as a proportion of
GDP since 2000 - has brought, inevitably, an inflationary tide, which
the government is attempting to rein in through price controls, a fixed
currency-rate, debt emissions and nationalisations. "Rest assured, we
will not introduce any economic policy that affects the interests of
the
poor", finance minister _Rodrigo Cabezas_ has asserted.
His pledge, made on the heels of the International Monetary Fund's call
for an interest rate rise to 40%, must nevertheless be treated with
caution. For an economy drip-fed by the dollar revenues of oil exports,
protecting the poor has in practice incurred a great bloating of
imports, particularly food from Colombia and Brazil. Venezuela's own
farm sector, essential to Chávez's ideal of agrarian resettlement, is
hobbling along, stymied by its high prices and menaced by state
takeover. Instead of putting into place a system of progressive
taxation, the desperate race to keep purchasing power up has seen taxes
slashed.
Meanwhile, there is serious money to be made. No minister seems willing
to explain the treatment of billions of dollars in foreign bonds -
including the $4.2 billion of Argentine paper-debt bought over the last
two years - which are resold on the quiet, at the official
exchange-rate, to handpicked local banks. Their resale to Venezuelans
needing dollars, seemingly at the black market exchange-rate, nets 100%
profits.
The web of economic controls, social programmes and bilateral deals
with
foreign countries affords further opportunities for personal enrichment
at almost every level of officialdom. Cases cited by the press and
analysts are numerous and staggering: abuse of funds for poor people's
housing; a $100 million swindle in a deal to build Iranian factories;
the mismanagement of Fonden, the trust-fund from oil revenues destined
for social development, now totalling over $15 billion.
Even stripped of most of its powers, the national assembly - /chavista/
from head to toe - has made a modicum of effort to track government
spending. Its audit commission, however, is a regular target for
threats, while one of its members has endured a brief "express
kidnapping". "When it comes to extra money for the executive, we
approve
it overnight", explained the commission's chairman, Ángel Landeta.
"But
when it concerns controlling revenues, things change."
The feast of corrupt earnings, comparable in the opinion of one
academic
with excellent government contacts to the Sandinistas' annexation of
various Nicaraguan state companies in 1990 (the so-called /piñata/),
is
not a novelty in Venezuela; it is doubtful that it is worse than under
the infamous presidency of _Jaime Lusinchi_ of 1984-89. But this very
persistence of graft sits uncomfortably with a government whose
electoral base lies in the clamour for equality and respect, and which
obliges its military - whose officers run hundreds of state funds and
bodies - to chant everyday the new war-cry: /Patria, socialismo o
muerte/ (fatherland, socialism or death).
Teodoro Petkoff, editor of _/Tal Cual/_ newspaper and one of Chávez's
most incisive critics, baptises it "the government of Hummers and
Audis." As the new /chavista/ rich join old Venezuelan money in
shopping-trips to Louis Vuitton, the shame around exhibiting one's
wealth has started to fade. With a chortle, the 75-year-old _former
guerrilla_ leader pulls out the July 2007 edition of /Etiqueta/
magazine, bearing on its cover a young woman with a thick gold
bracelet.
Inside, Petkoff points to a photo-story on a wedding in Caracas's most
exclusive country-club, featuring the release of white doves, two
fireworks displays and a VIP suite, where illustrious guests such as
Chávez's interior minister and his former vice-president could
expatiate
in private.
*Sabotage and parallel states*
A former strategic assistant to the president, who spent three years
working in the _Miraflores Palace_ until 2006, declares that Chávez is
perfectly aware of his underlings' excesses. "Dozens of people", he
says, are employed by the president to monitor his ministries. But the
political dynamics of high office which he reveals suggest that one
man,
messianic though he might appear to his followers, is unable to force
through his desires. "My experience is that at most times, what Chávez
promises is not done."
Elected in 1998 after a bandwagon campaign, without a formal political
party structure supporting him, Chávez has long had to rely on the
state
apparatus he inherited, and the leaders of the pre-existing political
parties that have grouped behind him. Within the president's offices,
these factions spar with each other for spoils while mouthing an
impeccable faith in the revolution. The result, according to the former
adviser, is systematic "sabotage.... Those who really want to change
the
country are kicked out of power."
Increasingly isolated from his pack of hungry acolytes, Chávez readily
admits his own solitude. Speaking with the Associated Press in one
recent interview, he even appeared to have absorbed some of his
government's own dissonance: "my life doesn't belong to me."
The president's favoured alternative strategy, ritually deplored by his
opponents, has been to bypass the state apparatus entirely. A parallel
universe of government has emerged, structured first around the social
missions, now numbering fifteen, and reaching directly into the honey
pot of the state oil company /Petróleos de Venezuela SA/ _(PdVSA)_,
where presidential control is absolute and no media prying is
tolerated.
It would appear that the next step is the creation of 25,000 community
councils, funded straight from a presidential commission to the tune of
an estimated $3 billion a year, and effectively short-circuiting
municipal and regional authorities. Congress has been emasculated.
Pro-Chávez political parties are being fused into one. The national
reserve, Venezuela's 2-million-strong citizens' militia, is edging out
the _professional military_ from public duties; in July 2007, the
reserve's former chief, Gustavo Rangel Briceño, become the _defence
minister_.
As a result, and for the first time in over five years, both sides of
Venezuela's giant political chasm agree on one fundamental issue: the
state is not working as it should.
*Power and schisms*
There, however, the consensus ends. The principal ideologues of the
revolution trust that this parallel machinery - the "postmodern" state
in the words of _Juan Carlos Monedero_, a Spanish academic and
prominent
ideological aide to Chávez - will somehow devour the carcass of the
old
graft-tainted bureaucracy. In some cases, such as the extraordinarily
successful, Cuban-led /Barrio Adentro /health programme, the modest
octagonal clinics built in poor communities will act as the springboard
for reform that is due to end in a total reconstruction of the public
health service. In other cases, such as the new-look oil industry or
the
Bolivarian universities, critics round on official blacklists and a
debasement of professional standards. Meanwhile, anyone who has the
money rushes to the private sector: half of all private
health-insurance
policies are now contracted by state officials.
The multiple battles over state power and the place of revolution feed
straight into the future of Venezuela's democracy. Standing high in the
ranks of geopolitical superstardom, Chávez is usually portrayed by
foreign media - such as in his bid for indefinite re-election - as the
owner of a gargantuan ego. But on the ground, what matters more is his
avowed determination to make sure his political project outlives his
career: "Human beings are transitory", he declared in June. "The party
must be eternal, the most powerful revolutionary motor."
As the means to institutionalise his creed, Chávez has opted for an
ever
greater concentration of power, radiating outwards through the
community
councils and the PSUV party. The problem is that the returns on this
power are endlessly diminishing: in certain regions the new
5-million-strong party, apparently joined by every opportunist in the
land, has more members than people who voted for Chávez in the last
election. "The president has a tendency to centralise, with the idea
that he can supervise matters more directly", argues _Margarita López
Maya_, a highly respected _social historian_ from Caracas's Central
University. "But more centralisation ends in less capacity to control.
It's madness. You need checks and balances."
The genetic code of /chavismo/, however, is deeply charismatic. "If
there's a problem with the taxis, the taxi-drivers want to speak with
Chávez. If there's a protest of street sellers they want to speak with
Chávez", explains Contreras in the /23 de Enero /neighbourhood.
Inserting a free-thinking layer of authority between the president and
his /pueblo/ thus risks displeasing everybody. Should Chávez's grip on
power actually diminish as a result, there is absolutely no guarantee,
given the vested interests of party and state officials, that it will
be
replaced by a flow of participation from the communities below; should
it increase, the accusations of violations of democracy will mount, the
diversion of resources by Venezuela's new elite will continue, and the
Bolivarian movement will slowly but surely run into the ground.
Two other factors are set to play pivotal roles in the government's
evolution. Fattened on a diet of electoral victories, the components
parts of /chavismo/ have grown restive. Schisms and splits have always
characterised the movement, but the last few months have been thick
with
internal friction, at the heart of which is the very same military from
which the coup-leader of 1992 emerged. No one knows precisely the level
of opposition to Chávez within the armed forces, yet it is evident -
and
he admits it - that certain officers dislike him and his "war of the
all
the people" intensely. One retired general and stalwart supporter,
Alberto Müller Rojas, recently described the government as being in a
"pre-anarchic" state, with the president sitting atop "a nest of
scorpions". The outgoing defence minister Raúl Baduel, meanwhile,
mounted a strident attack on irresponsible wealth distribution during
his farewell speech in late July. Small wonder that the president tours
the world buying new weapons for his generals.
If the threat of a military coup is an immediate concern - and it was
the army which unseated Chávez in the brief 2002 putsch - then a more
slow-burning source of tension can be found in the questionable allure
of "21st century socialism". A visit to any of Caracas' hill
settlements
gives the lie to any notion that the poor long for collective
ownership:
small businesses operate from shadowy ground floors, while residents of
/23 de Enero/ plaster their slum houses with stucco and inlay them with
balustrades. Even Contreras, a life-long Marxist, is willing to let the
locals crave home improvements and upward mobility.
"Some call it socialism, some calls it communism or participative
democracy, but I guarantee that work, education, housing and leisure
are
the means to create the greatest sum of happiness for our people. You
choose the name you want."
Opinion-poll work in these communities has thrown up fascinating
insights. Far from looking to a collectivist future, the popular mood
appears satisfied with the damage inflicted on the status of
Venezuela's
old elites. In the words of Oscar Schemel, head of the Hinterlaces
agency - which has conducted over 200 focus groups across the country -
the era of "social revenge" by the poor has now ended; it is so far
uncertain what will replace it. "The new citizen is not a socialist,
but
a liberal. There was a struggle of classes, but it was not
antagonistic.
The poor did not want to annihilate the upper classes, but demanded a
new class relation: to be able to have what they have, to enjoy their
opportunities."
Hugo Chávez, however, is the child of antagonism. Throughout 2006, his
heckling of George Bush and veiled threats to established property
rights served to identify and demonise the old, Miami-bound class
enemy.
Schemel's research, which is unique in Venezuela, suggests this
approach
might be now be foundering on its own success: the mass anxiety, the
rush to arm the poor and the hysteria over a US invasion stirred by
Chávez are slowly losing their relevance to daily life to the extent
that /chavismo/ beds down in power.
"There's an incredible plan of control, manipulation and propaganda",
argues Schemel, insisting that crime and corruption form an integral
part of these control mechanisms. "But eventually this will contradict
the democratic culture of the country and the new aspirations. Chávez
has said that to be poor is good, and to be rich is bad. Over 80% of
Venezuelans reject this statement."
Reputedly stronger than ever, reportedly on the verge of a totalitarian
takeover, Chávez is in fact, for the first time since 2001, starting
to
face the contradictions of a movement born from a high tide of public
despair. Sticking fanatically to the evil of the empire and the war of
the people has served him well; the old opposition from Venezuela's
elite has been utterly destroyed. Somewhere within Chávez's movement,
however, there is bound to emerge over the next five to ten years a
challenge, be it through established party or state interests, a
military coup, or popular discontent from below. It may not look very
democratic. It may indeed be violent. But at some stage the revolution
must stop its tailspin.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/34312/print
By Ivan Briscoe
Created 2007-08-09 17:50
Lands have been confiscated, foreign companies driven out and utilities
renationalised, but even so there is a special place in Venezuela for
Louis Vuitton. The immaculate store in the Sambil shopping-mall now
ranks as the firm's most successful in the whole of Latin America,
shifting several hundred thousand-dollar carpetbags week in week out.
"We have a mix", explains the extremely reticent shop manager, flown in
days before from Paris. "We have older clients, and we have newer
ones."
Not far to the east the free flow of wealth has also engulfed Petare,
the giant settlement of breeze-block houses, sticking like a biblical
citadel to the hills of Caracas valley. Here there are new blue
water-cisterns on every house, concrete supports to halt mudflows,
Cuban
ophthalmologists, education and literacy programmes. There are
subsidised food stores, committees fighting for residents' property
rights, community sports facilities. But it is best not to leave home
after 7 pm: Petare is also home to a plague of drive-by shootings and
erratic teenage gunfire.
"Before it was static, now there's hope. Now it's all mobile", declares
Miren Eguiguren, a Basque emigrant who for thirty-seven years has
struggled to bring basic education and social services to the district
through the /Casa de Nazareno/ centre. "Everything is broken, and there
is total movement."
*Caracas**'s wonderland*
Venezuela, as many like to observe, tongue in cheek, is now a
"wonderland." The rhetoric emanating from President Hugo Chávez is of
revolution, socialism and, as he declared in a television _interview_ ,
a "war of all the people" against the pretensions of "imperialism". In
the country beyond the /Palacio de Miraflores/, fortunes are being made
at lightning pace, and the only blood-war is between the people, poor
against poor.
Condemnations of creeping dictatorship, meanwhile, rain down both from
abroad (foreign governments, international bodies) and at home (the new
student movement). Even two months before the free-to-air license for
Radio Caracas Televisión (_RCTV_ ) was rescinded in April 2007,
Condoleezza Rice had _accused_ Chávez of "destroying his own country,
economically, politically." The litany of power-concentration since the
December 2006 elections has indeed proved indigestible: the
congressional vote to hand eighteen-month "special powers" to the
president; the creation of a united ruling party (the _/Partido
S//o//cialista Unido de Venezuela/_ [4] ) that entails the effective
dissolution of others in broad sympathy with the "Bolivarian
revolution"; the creeping ideology of total militarisation; and the
venom directed towards any attempt at opposition. Accused by the
country's bishops of sponsoring a "Marxist-Leninist" takeover, Chávez
let rip in customary style: "either you're ignorant", he told the
priests, "or you're cheating, lying perverts."
Supporters of the president point to his ever increasing majority in
three presidential elections, and his enormous, undeniable popularity
in
deprived neighbourhoods. Both sides of the debate repeat the same old
axioms and historical references; there seems little room for nuance or
compromise. And to prove the point, his critics have unearthed a new
ideological bogeyman, supposedly cherished by certain /chavista/
ministers: the German-Mexican sociologist _Heinz Dieterich_ , whose
"21st-century socialism" entails the use of computer networks to decide
who should get what, providing the long-awaited
"mathematical-conceptual
solution of the problem of objective value."
The frenzied impasse over Chávez's democratic credentials or
digitalised
Marxism, however, utterly fails to capture the contradictions of the
Venezuelan street. Just as the president's socialism jostles uneasily
with the habits of an oil-rich state, the conviction that a new tyranny
is settling into place ignores abundant evidence that the government's
greatest battle, which it may be losing, is to keep control of its own
/proceso/. Venezuela may now be more or less democratic than during its
forty years of two-party oligarchy; the arguments (as a July 2007
_report_ by Coletta A Youngers for the _Washington Office on Latin
America_ underscores) cut both ways. But a truth that cannot be avoided
is that without effective steerage, a revolution - democratic, populist
or dictatorial - sinks little deeper than a television show. And it is
in the effort to make /chavismo/ stick, and the resistance this
produces, that the true identity of this regime will emerge.
*Two loopholes
*
It is crime, the leading concern of 85% of Venezuelans according to a
poll conducted in 2006, that most confounds the government's
expectations. Loath to punish the wayward poor, Chávez consistently
skirts the issue. If anything, his model for a solution can be found in
_/23 de Enero/_ (23 January), a district of mean tower-blocks and
hillside tenements in western Caracas, where tight community
organisation - including armed groups, such as the radical Tupamaros -
have made the streets relatively safe to walk.
Juan Contreras has lived all his life in the district. A veteran of the
leftwing _/Coordinadora Simón Bolívar/_, from which the Tupamaro
group
emerged, he now runs a community newspaper and radio station, occupying
a building that was once the local headquarters of the metropolitan
police. "I was the culprit for anything and everything that happened
here", he recalls. "The police came and took you to the station. Then
it
was whack, whack, whack, and when they'd whacked you twenty times,
they'd switch the television on."
On the day of an unannounced visit, dozens of young children are
listening to a classical musical recital in the courtyard where local
suspects were once dragged. Leashed monkeys play in a tree. Seventy
brand-new Chinese computers, all with broadband connections, sit idle
in
an adjoining hall; the electricity doesn't work, and the ministry is
not
picking up the phone. But Contreras is unfazed: "Never before in forty
years would we even have got computers!", he proclaims.
The /barrio/, however, is an exception. Around fifty people are killed
in Caracas every weekend, clogging public hospitals with the corpses of
young men: victims of revenge killings, gang wars, narcotic highs and
pure bad luck. Total murder statistics for the country suggest at least
16,000 are being killed each year; so far in 2007, this rate has risen
by 15%. Guns, a community teacher says in Petare, "are easier to buy
than a bag of flour", and the murder of choice is carried out now by an
adolescent pillion-passenger firing a pistol from a speeding motorbike.
"A few weeks ago, I was telling a 15-year-old kid from around here that
he had a nice face, so why was he involved in all this business",
recalls _Miren Eguiguren_. "But it was too late. He was shot dead a few
days ago. It was what he deserved. He'd killed ten people himself."
Comprehensive reform of the country's 135 different police forces is
pending, but few in the shanty-town /cerros/ around Caracas are ever
likely to trust officers long associated with "social cleansing",
corruption, and kidnapping. The sheer complexity of recasting the
country's security forces and judiciary instead generates systematic
inertia, at most punctuated by an occasional politically-motivated
purge, or a quick tamper with the courts - which often serves to
undermine judicial competence. Chávez is accused by his critics of
sympathising with criminal outlaws, yet his indulgence does not stretch
too far: convicted offenders still end up beached in Latin America's
most hellish jail system, short of space and food, where around 250
inmates have been killed so far this year.
For a revolution bent on encouraging solidarity and social ownership,
the current crime wave serves as a kind of manic, bipolar disorder.
Senior police officers, evidently ignorant of Bolivarian etiquette,
freely hand out their advice on how one should behave when driving
one's
car: "distrust accidents, distractions, and injured people in the
road",
one inspector recently told /El Universal /newspaper.
The siege of the egalitarian, cooperative ethic vaunted by Chávez and
his ministers is even more marked in the nation's economy. Vast sums of
_oil money_ have certainly reached the poorest areas, while also
spawning bridges across the Orinoco river, a new "socialist city", a
flyover to the airport and nine glimmering football stadia, created for
the _Copa America_ tournament of June-July 2007. Yet the outlay on such
investments - public spending has increased by 60% as a proportion of
GDP since 2000 - has brought, inevitably, an inflationary tide, which
the government is attempting to rein in through price controls, a fixed
currency-rate, debt emissions and nationalisations. "Rest assured, we
will not introduce any economic policy that affects the interests of
the
poor", finance minister _Rodrigo Cabezas_ has asserted.
His pledge, made on the heels of the International Monetary Fund's call
for an interest rate rise to 40%, must nevertheless be treated with
caution. For an economy drip-fed by the dollar revenues of oil exports,
protecting the poor has in practice incurred a great bloating of
imports, particularly food from Colombia and Brazil. Venezuela's own
farm sector, essential to Chávez's ideal of agrarian resettlement, is
hobbling along, stymied by its high prices and menaced by state
takeover. Instead of putting into place a system of progressive
taxation, the desperate race to keep purchasing power up has seen taxes
slashed.
Meanwhile, there is serious money to be made. No minister seems willing
to explain the treatment of billions of dollars in foreign bonds -
including the $4.2 billion of Argentine paper-debt bought over the last
two years - which are resold on the quiet, at the official
exchange-rate, to handpicked local banks. Their resale to Venezuelans
needing dollars, seemingly at the black market exchange-rate, nets 100%
profits.
The web of economic controls, social programmes and bilateral deals
with
foreign countries affords further opportunities for personal enrichment
at almost every level of officialdom. Cases cited by the press and
analysts are numerous and staggering: abuse of funds for poor people's
housing; a $100 million swindle in a deal to build Iranian factories;
the mismanagement of Fonden, the trust-fund from oil revenues destined
for social development, now totalling over $15 billion.
Even stripped of most of its powers, the national assembly - /chavista/
from head to toe - has made a modicum of effort to track government
spending. Its audit commission, however, is a regular target for
threats, while one of its members has endured a brief "express
kidnapping". "When it comes to extra money for the executive, we
approve
it overnight", explained the commission's chairman, Ángel Landeta.
"But
when it concerns controlling revenues, things change."
The feast of corrupt earnings, comparable in the opinion of one
academic
with excellent government contacts to the Sandinistas' annexation of
various Nicaraguan state companies in 1990 (the so-called /piñata/),
is
not a novelty in Venezuela; it is doubtful that it is worse than under
the infamous presidency of _Jaime Lusinchi_ of 1984-89. But this very
persistence of graft sits uncomfortably with a government whose
electoral base lies in the clamour for equality and respect, and which
obliges its military - whose officers run hundreds of state funds and
bodies - to chant everyday the new war-cry: /Patria, socialismo o
muerte/ (fatherland, socialism or death).
Teodoro Petkoff, editor of _/Tal Cual/_ newspaper and one of Chávez's
most incisive critics, baptises it "the government of Hummers and
Audis." As the new /chavista/ rich join old Venezuelan money in
shopping-trips to Louis Vuitton, the shame around exhibiting one's
wealth has started to fade. With a chortle, the 75-year-old _former
guerrilla_ leader pulls out the July 2007 edition of /Etiqueta/
magazine, bearing on its cover a young woman with a thick gold
bracelet.
Inside, Petkoff points to a photo-story on a wedding in Caracas's most
exclusive country-club, featuring the release of white doves, two
fireworks displays and a VIP suite, where illustrious guests such as
Chávez's interior minister and his former vice-president could
expatiate
in private.
*Sabotage and parallel states*
A former strategic assistant to the president, who spent three years
working in the _Miraflores Palace_ until 2006, declares that Chávez is
perfectly aware of his underlings' excesses. "Dozens of people", he
says, are employed by the president to monitor his ministries. But the
political dynamics of high office which he reveals suggest that one
man,
messianic though he might appear to his followers, is unable to force
through his desires. "My experience is that at most times, what Chávez
promises is not done."
Elected in 1998 after a bandwagon campaign, without a formal political
party structure supporting him, Chávez has long had to rely on the
state
apparatus he inherited, and the leaders of the pre-existing political
parties that have grouped behind him. Within the president's offices,
these factions spar with each other for spoils while mouthing an
impeccable faith in the revolution. The result, according to the former
adviser, is systematic "sabotage.... Those who really want to change
the
country are kicked out of power."
Increasingly isolated from his pack of hungry acolytes, Chávez readily
admits his own solitude. Speaking with the Associated Press in one
recent interview, he even appeared to have absorbed some of his
government's own dissonance: "my life doesn't belong to me."
The president's favoured alternative strategy, ritually deplored by his
opponents, has been to bypass the state apparatus entirely. A parallel
universe of government has emerged, structured first around the social
missions, now numbering fifteen, and reaching directly into the honey
pot of the state oil company /Petróleos de Venezuela SA/ _(PdVSA)_,
where presidential control is absolute and no media prying is
tolerated.
It would appear that the next step is the creation of 25,000 community
councils, funded straight from a presidential commission to the tune of
an estimated $3 billion a year, and effectively short-circuiting
municipal and regional authorities. Congress has been emasculated.
Pro-Chávez political parties are being fused into one. The national
reserve, Venezuela's 2-million-strong citizens' militia, is edging out
the _professional military_ from public duties; in July 2007, the
reserve's former chief, Gustavo Rangel Briceño, become the _defence
minister_.
As a result, and for the first time in over five years, both sides of
Venezuela's giant political chasm agree on one fundamental issue: the
state is not working as it should.
*Power and schisms*
There, however, the consensus ends. The principal ideologues of the
revolution trust that this parallel machinery - the "postmodern" state
in the words of _Juan Carlos Monedero_, a Spanish academic and
prominent
ideological aide to Chávez - will somehow devour the carcass of the
old
graft-tainted bureaucracy. In some cases, such as the extraordinarily
successful, Cuban-led /Barrio Adentro /health programme, the modest
octagonal clinics built in poor communities will act as the springboard
for reform that is due to end in a total reconstruction of the public
health service. In other cases, such as the new-look oil industry or
the
Bolivarian universities, critics round on official blacklists and a
debasement of professional standards. Meanwhile, anyone who has the
money rushes to the private sector: half of all private
health-insurance
policies are now contracted by state officials.
The multiple battles over state power and the place of revolution feed
straight into the future of Venezuela's democracy. Standing high in the
ranks of geopolitical superstardom, Chávez is usually portrayed by
foreign media - such as in his bid for indefinite re-election - as the
owner of a gargantuan ego. But on the ground, what matters more is his
avowed determination to make sure his political project outlives his
career: "Human beings are transitory", he declared in June. "The party
must be eternal, the most powerful revolutionary motor."
As the means to institutionalise his creed, Chávez has opted for an
ever
greater concentration of power, radiating outwards through the
community
councils and the PSUV party. The problem is that the returns on this
power are endlessly diminishing: in certain regions the new
5-million-strong party, apparently joined by every opportunist in the
land, has more members than people who voted for Chávez in the last
election. "The president has a tendency to centralise, with the idea
that he can supervise matters more directly", argues _Margarita López
Maya_, a highly respected _social historian_ from Caracas's Central
University. "But more centralisation ends in less capacity to control.
It's madness. You need checks and balances."
The genetic code of /chavismo/, however, is deeply charismatic. "If
there's a problem with the taxis, the taxi-drivers want to speak with
Chávez. If there's a protest of street sellers they want to speak with
Chávez", explains Contreras in the /23 de Enero /neighbourhood.
Inserting a free-thinking layer of authority between the president and
his /pueblo/ thus risks displeasing everybody. Should Chávez's grip on
power actually diminish as a result, there is absolutely no guarantee,
given the vested interests of party and state officials, that it will
be
replaced by a flow of participation from the communities below; should
it increase, the accusations of violations of democracy will mount, the
diversion of resources by Venezuela's new elite will continue, and the
Bolivarian movement will slowly but surely run into the ground.
Two other factors are set to play pivotal roles in the government's
evolution. Fattened on a diet of electoral victories, the components
parts of /chavismo/ have grown restive. Schisms and splits have always
characterised the movement, but the last few months have been thick
with
internal friction, at the heart of which is the very same military from
which the coup-leader of 1992 emerged. No one knows precisely the level
of opposition to Chávez within the armed forces, yet it is evident -
and
he admits it - that certain officers dislike him and his "war of the
all
the people" intensely. One retired general and stalwart supporter,
Alberto Müller Rojas, recently described the government as being in a
"pre-anarchic" state, with the president sitting atop "a nest of
scorpions". The outgoing defence minister Raúl Baduel, meanwhile,
mounted a strident attack on irresponsible wealth distribution during
his farewell speech in late July. Small wonder that the president tours
the world buying new weapons for his generals.
If the threat of a military coup is an immediate concern - and it was
the army which unseated Chávez in the brief 2002 putsch - then a more
slow-burning source of tension can be found in the questionable allure
of "21st century socialism". A visit to any of Caracas' hill
settlements
gives the lie to any notion that the poor long for collective
ownership:
small businesses operate from shadowy ground floors, while residents of
/23 de Enero/ plaster their slum houses with stucco and inlay them with
balustrades. Even Contreras, a life-long Marxist, is willing to let the
locals crave home improvements and upward mobility.
"Some call it socialism, some calls it communism or participative
democracy, but I guarantee that work, education, housing and leisure
are
the means to create the greatest sum of happiness for our people. You
choose the name you want."
Opinion-poll work in these communities has thrown up fascinating
insights. Far from looking to a collectivist future, the popular mood
appears satisfied with the damage inflicted on the status of
Venezuela's
old elites. In the words of Oscar Schemel, head of the Hinterlaces
agency - which has conducted over 200 focus groups across the country -
the era of "social revenge" by the poor has now ended; it is so far
uncertain what will replace it. "The new citizen is not a socialist,
but
a liberal. There was a struggle of classes, but it was not
antagonistic.
The poor did not want to annihilate the upper classes, but demanded a
new class relation: to be able to have what they have, to enjoy their
opportunities."
Hugo Chávez, however, is the child of antagonism. Throughout 2006, his
heckling of George Bush and veiled threats to established property
rights served to identify and demonise the old, Miami-bound class
enemy.
Schemel's research, which is unique in Venezuela, suggests this
approach
might be now be foundering on its own success: the mass anxiety, the
rush to arm the poor and the hysteria over a US invasion stirred by
Chávez are slowly losing their relevance to daily life to the extent
that /chavismo/ beds down in power.
"There's an incredible plan of control, manipulation and propaganda",
argues Schemel, insisting that crime and corruption form an integral
part of these control mechanisms. "But eventually this will contradict
the democratic culture of the country and the new aspirations. Chávez
has said that to be poor is good, and to be rich is bad. Over 80% of
Venezuelans reject this statement."
Reputedly stronger than ever, reportedly on the verge of a totalitarian
takeover, Chávez is in fact, for the first time since 2001, starting
to
face the contradictions of a movement born from a high tide of public
despair. Sticking fanatically to the evil of the empire and the war of
the people has served him well; the old opposition from Venezuela's
elite has been utterly destroyed. Somewhere within Chávez's movement,
however, there is bound to emerge over the next five to ten years a
challenge, be it through established party or state interests, a
military coup, or popular discontent from below. It may not look very
democratic. It may indeed be violent. But at some stage the revolution
must stop its tailspin.
Wednesday, April 4, 2007
Chavez declares partial booze ban
This seems hardly the way to garner mass support for his programs. It seems heavy handed and against his own interests. Probably most of his own supporters enjoy their beer and liquor. To control the evident excesses among Venezuelan imbibers a more nuanced policy is surely more appropriate. Maybe next he will have a department of virtue and vice as did the Taliban and now again even present day Afghanistan.
Venezuelan booze ban starts run on liquor stores
Last Updated Sat, 31 Mar 2007 16:57:37 EDT
The Associated Press
For beer and whiskey-loving Venezuelans, Easter this year won't be an alcohol-soaked drinking fest. President Hugo Chavez has imposed a ban on alcohol sales during Holy Week in an attempt to reduce accidents and crimes, prompting a run on liquor stores. The decree prohibits alcohol sales on Holy Thursday, Good Friday and Easter Sunday next week. A more limited ban, restricting sales to between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m., including at restaurants and bars, went into effect Friday and will last through April 9. The sudden, unprecedented measure confused many Venezuelans who raced to stash up before Friday, thinking that would be their last chance to buy for more than a week. "People are desperate, above all because the majority found out at the last minute," said Jose Manuel Fernandes, a liquor store owner in Caracas, as he struggled to meet the demands of dozens of customers yelling for bottles and cases of their preferred drink. Industry figures show that Venezuela is among the top producers and consumers of beer in Latin America, while whiskey and rum are also popular spirits. Despite laws that prohibit the consumption of alcohol in public areas, Venezuelans can often be seen drinking on street corners or sometimes even driving with a beer in hand. Close to a hundred deaths and thousands of injuries are reported every year during the Easter holiday, which authorities attribute largely to alcohol consumption. Chavez has a tendency to enforce his views on the public: enraged by the sight of children unloading beer crates in the slums, he ordered beer trucks off the street last year. Some suspected the latest measure has more to do with Chavez's friendly ties with Iran, where Islamic law forbids alcohol. "I got nervous. I thought Chavez had prohibited the sale of liquor, seeing how he talks about Cuba, socialism and the [Iranian] ayatollahs," Enrique Salazar, 67, said Friday after buying three bottles of whiskey to last him through the holiday. "I don't drive so I'm not a danger to anybody," Salazar said. "Instead of prohibiting [sales], they should throw drunks who drive in jail." Police rarely crack down on public alcohol consumption or screen drivers for drinking. The majority of Venezuelans show strong support for Chavez, who has said he wants to lead a socialist revolution in the country. But they have been less enthusiastic about his attempts to curb drinking, including his announcement in October banning the beer trucks that sell alcohol directly on the street. Chavez reassured the public at the time he had no plans to forbid alcohol in Venezuela, but he passionately warned about the dangers of excessive alcohol consumption, blaming it for a degeneration of society.
Venezuelan booze ban starts run on liquor stores
Last Updated Sat, 31 Mar 2007 16:57:37 EDT
The Associated Press
For beer and whiskey-loving Venezuelans, Easter this year won't be an alcohol-soaked drinking fest. President Hugo Chavez has imposed a ban on alcohol sales during Holy Week in an attempt to reduce accidents and crimes, prompting a run on liquor stores. The decree prohibits alcohol sales on Holy Thursday, Good Friday and Easter Sunday next week. A more limited ban, restricting sales to between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m., including at restaurants and bars, went into effect Friday and will last through April 9. The sudden, unprecedented measure confused many Venezuelans who raced to stash up before Friday, thinking that would be their last chance to buy for more than a week. "People are desperate, above all because the majority found out at the last minute," said Jose Manuel Fernandes, a liquor store owner in Caracas, as he struggled to meet the demands of dozens of customers yelling for bottles and cases of their preferred drink. Industry figures show that Venezuela is among the top producers and consumers of beer in Latin America, while whiskey and rum are also popular spirits. Despite laws that prohibit the consumption of alcohol in public areas, Venezuelans can often be seen drinking on street corners or sometimes even driving with a beer in hand. Close to a hundred deaths and thousands of injuries are reported every year during the Easter holiday, which authorities attribute largely to alcohol consumption. Chavez has a tendency to enforce his views on the public: enraged by the sight of children unloading beer crates in the slums, he ordered beer trucks off the street last year. Some suspected the latest measure has more to do with Chavez's friendly ties with Iran, where Islamic law forbids alcohol. "I got nervous. I thought Chavez had prohibited the sale of liquor, seeing how he talks about Cuba, socialism and the [Iranian] ayatollahs," Enrique Salazar, 67, said Friday after buying three bottles of whiskey to last him through the holiday. "I don't drive so I'm not a danger to anybody," Salazar said. "Instead of prohibiting [sales], they should throw drunks who drive in jail." Police rarely crack down on public alcohol consumption or screen drivers for drinking. The majority of Venezuelans show strong support for Chavez, who has said he wants to lead a socialist revolution in the country. But they have been less enthusiastic about his attempts to curb drinking, including his announcement in October banning the beer trucks that sell alcohol directly on the street. Chavez reassured the public at the time he had no plans to forbid alcohol in Venezuela, but he passionately warned about the dangers of excessive alcohol consumption, blaming it for a degeneration of society.
Friday, March 2, 2007
Castro compared to Chavez
This is an interesting article. I am no expert on either Castro or Chavez but from my limited knowledge Whitford's article conforms with what I know (or think I know!)
By the way Castro has not smoked cigars for some time now. If Whitford gets that wrong what else might he get wrong!
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ben_whitford/2007/03/chvez_is_no_castro.html
Chávez is no Castro
Neither the excesses nor the achievements of the Venezuelan leader are
in the same béisbol-park as his cigar-puffing neighbour.
Ben Whitford
March 1, 2007 9:30 PM
Hugo Chávez likes to style himself as a revolutionary. When he won
reelection last year, having finally broken the back of the domestic
opposition, he dedicated the victory to "the Bearded One": his friend
and mentor, Fidel Castro. Since then he's painted himself as the aging
Cuban's heir apparent, nationalizing Venezuela's largest
telecommunications and electricity companies and moving to take a
majority share in foreign-owned oil-drilling operations along the
Orinoco belt.
From his bombastic policies to his trademark red beret, everything
about the Venezuelan leader's revolutionary streak is carefully
calibrated to stir up strong feelings in supporters and critics alike.
The American right's demonization of Chávez is in large part a
knee-jerk reaction to his outspoken praise for Castro and mimicry of
the Cuban's brand of revolutionary socialism. For much the same
reasons, as George Galloway showed yesterday, Chávez inspires
something close to infatuation among certain sections of the British
left. In Chávez's Bolivarian revolution, both sides hear echoes of
Havana, 1959, and are respectively appalled or enthralled.
The truth of the matter, however, is somewhat more complicated. Chávez
is no Castro: neither his excesses nor his achievements are in the
same béisbol-park as those of his cigar-puffing neighbor. The former
paratrooper is a more moderate breed of caudillo, using the rhetoric
of revolution to manipulate both his enemies and his allies, at home
and abroad.
Chávez has little time for the checks and balances of liberal
democracy. Both the Supreme Court and the National Assembly are
stuffed with his cronies; his knack for gaming the country's electoral
system makes Karl Rove look like Jefferson Smith; and he recently gave
himself the right to govern by decree well into 2008.
But if Chávez loads the decks, he is at least still playing the game.
He welcomes the legitimacy of being the more-or-less
democratically-elected leader of a more-or-less democratic country. He
may occasionally close down a TV station he dislikes, but he also
tolerates a robust and highly critical news media and allows
Venezuelans to gather in their thousands to demonstrate against him.
And while there are unsettling rumors of political detentions,
Venezuela has nothing to rival Cuba's systematic suppression of
dissent.
Venezuela is a troubled nation [aren't they all? -- JD], then, but
hardly a totalitarian one. Neither, however, is it in the throes of
Cuban-style social revolution. Say what you like about Castro: in the
face of overwhelming odds, he gave Cuba a world-class health service,
a thriving biotech industry, and a free and flourishing education
system. Under his rule, despite America's misguided economic blockade
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cuba's infant mortality
rates fell below those of America; literacy soared. These achievements
don't begin to justify Castro's awful human rights record, but they
are astonishing feats of social engineering.
Chávez, with far greater resources and in the face of far fewer
obstacles, has accomplished far less. He has presided over a period of
enormous wealth - oil was $12 a barrel when he took office, and stands
at over $60 a barrel today - but has little to show for it besides a
hundred thousand AK47s and a hefty stack of frequent flyer miles [from
Chávez's globe-trotting diplomacy]. By some measures social spending
has actually decreased under Chávez; poverty is still rampant;
inflation remains high; more than a million Venezuelans remain
illiterate; corruption is rife; crime rates are rocketing.
Worse, many of Chávez's "revolutionary" programs fail to make lasting
improvements to Venezuelan society. Take Chávez's most-widely
trumpeted social program, the importation of some 20,000 Cuban doctors
to establish free local clinics for the poor. While the program has
done some good in the poorest barrios, it does little to fix
Venezuela's creaking healthcare system in the long term. When the oil
boom ends and the Cubans go home (or defect), Venezuela's poor will be
left back where they started: with a barely-functioning two-tier
health service.
The truth is that while Chávez's sympathy for the poor is probably
genuine, his "Bolivarian revolution" has sought not to impose seismic
structural changes on Venezuelan society, but rather to leverage the
country's oil wealth to temporarily paper over the cracks. Revolution,
for Chávez, was less an ideology than a gambit; in speaking so long
and so loudly of revolution, he hoped to polarize his own people and
international opinion, and thereby cement his own grasp on power.
Chavez is both a democrat and an authoritarian: opposition is too
widespread to be safely repressed, so he seeks instead to remain
broadly within the democratic mainstream, splitting and antagonizing
his critics, pushing them further to the right and then using their
very virulence to justify the concentration of power in his own hands.
In that light, preaching revolution has served Chávez well. The ragbag
of right-wingers and out-of-work oligarchs who make up the Venezuelan
opposition's leadership were sent into a predictable frothy-mouthed
frenzy by his talk of communist revolution; they now spend the bulk of
their time spluttering in reactionary outrage, attacking the model he
claims to represent rather than putting forward their own solutions to
the country's problems. His supporters, meanwhile, are too caught up
in the fervor of revolution to quibble over the erosion of their civil
liberties.
Hugo Chávez's opponents like to portray him as a clown; in fact, he's
proven remarkably shrewd. He is neither a socialist saviour nor a red
menace; rather, he is a calculating and pragmatic leader who donned
the mantle of Castro-style revolutionary socialism to wrong-foot his
opponents. In attacking America and cosying up to Cuba, Chávez has now
won the support of a broad swathe of the international left, and the
opprobrium of a still-wider tract of the American right. Both sides
are ultimately playing into his hands, validating his revolutionary
sleight-of-hand and overlooking the essential realpolitik that lies,
for good or for bad, at the heart of chavismo.
--
By the way Castro has not smoked cigars for some time now. If Whitford gets that wrong what else might he get wrong!
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ben_whitford/2007/03/chvez_is_no_castro.html
Chávez is no Castro
Neither the excesses nor the achievements of the Venezuelan leader are
in the same béisbol-park as his cigar-puffing neighbour.
Ben Whitford
March 1, 2007 9:30 PM
Hugo Chávez likes to style himself as a revolutionary. When he won
reelection last year, having finally broken the back of the domestic
opposition, he dedicated the victory to "the Bearded One": his friend
and mentor, Fidel Castro. Since then he's painted himself as the aging
Cuban's heir apparent, nationalizing Venezuela's largest
telecommunications and electricity companies and moving to take a
majority share in foreign-owned oil-drilling operations along the
Orinoco belt.
From his bombastic policies to his trademark red beret, everything
about the Venezuelan leader's revolutionary streak is carefully
calibrated to stir up strong feelings in supporters and critics alike.
The American right's demonization of Chávez is in large part a
knee-jerk reaction to his outspoken praise for Castro and mimicry of
the Cuban's brand of revolutionary socialism. For much the same
reasons, as George Galloway showed yesterday, Chávez inspires
something close to infatuation among certain sections of the British
left. In Chávez's Bolivarian revolution, both sides hear echoes of
Havana, 1959, and are respectively appalled or enthralled.
The truth of the matter, however, is somewhat more complicated. Chávez
is no Castro: neither his excesses nor his achievements are in the
same béisbol-park as those of his cigar-puffing neighbor. The former
paratrooper is a more moderate breed of caudillo, using the rhetoric
of revolution to manipulate both his enemies and his allies, at home
and abroad.
Chávez has little time for the checks and balances of liberal
democracy. Both the Supreme Court and the National Assembly are
stuffed with his cronies; his knack for gaming the country's electoral
system makes Karl Rove look like Jefferson Smith; and he recently gave
himself the right to govern by decree well into 2008.
But if Chávez loads the decks, he is at least still playing the game.
He welcomes the legitimacy of being the more-or-less
democratically-elected leader of a more-or-less democratic country. He
may occasionally close down a TV station he dislikes, but he also
tolerates a robust and highly critical news media and allows
Venezuelans to gather in their thousands to demonstrate against him.
And while there are unsettling rumors of political detentions,
Venezuela has nothing to rival Cuba's systematic suppression of
dissent.
Venezuela is a troubled nation [aren't they all? -- JD], then, but
hardly a totalitarian one. Neither, however, is it in the throes of
Cuban-style social revolution. Say what you like about Castro: in the
face of overwhelming odds, he gave Cuba a world-class health service,
a thriving biotech industry, and a free and flourishing education
system. Under his rule, despite America's misguided economic blockade
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cuba's infant mortality
rates fell below those of America; literacy soared. These achievements
don't begin to justify Castro's awful human rights record, but they
are astonishing feats of social engineering.
Chávez, with far greater resources and in the face of far fewer
obstacles, has accomplished far less. He has presided over a period of
enormous wealth - oil was $12 a barrel when he took office, and stands
at over $60 a barrel today - but has little to show for it besides a
hundred thousand AK47s and a hefty stack of frequent flyer miles [from
Chávez's globe-trotting diplomacy]. By some measures social spending
has actually decreased under Chávez; poverty is still rampant;
inflation remains high; more than a million Venezuelans remain
illiterate; corruption is rife; crime rates are rocketing.
Worse, many of Chávez's "revolutionary" programs fail to make lasting
improvements to Venezuelan society. Take Chávez's most-widely
trumpeted social program, the importation of some 20,000 Cuban doctors
to establish free local clinics for the poor. While the program has
done some good in the poorest barrios, it does little to fix
Venezuela's creaking healthcare system in the long term. When the oil
boom ends and the Cubans go home (or defect), Venezuela's poor will be
left back where they started: with a barely-functioning two-tier
health service.
The truth is that while Chávez's sympathy for the poor is probably
genuine, his "Bolivarian revolution" has sought not to impose seismic
structural changes on Venezuelan society, but rather to leverage the
country's oil wealth to temporarily paper over the cracks. Revolution,
for Chávez, was less an ideology than a gambit; in speaking so long
and so loudly of revolution, he hoped to polarize his own people and
international opinion, and thereby cement his own grasp on power.
Chavez is both a democrat and an authoritarian: opposition is too
widespread to be safely repressed, so he seeks instead to remain
broadly within the democratic mainstream, splitting and antagonizing
his critics, pushing them further to the right and then using their
very virulence to justify the concentration of power in his own hands.
In that light, preaching revolution has served Chávez well. The ragbag
of right-wingers and out-of-work oligarchs who make up the Venezuelan
opposition's leadership were sent into a predictable frothy-mouthed
frenzy by his talk of communist revolution; they now spend the bulk of
their time spluttering in reactionary outrage, attacking the model he
claims to represent rather than putting forward their own solutions to
the country's problems. His supporters, meanwhile, are too caught up
in the fervor of revolution to quibble over the erosion of their civil
liberties.
Hugo Chávez's opponents like to portray him as a clown; in fact, he's
proven remarkably shrewd. He is neither a socialist saviour nor a red
menace; rather, he is a calculating and pragmatic leader who donned
the mantle of Castro-style revolutionary socialism to wrong-foot his
opponents. In attacking America and cosying up to Cuba, Chávez has now
won the support of a broad swathe of the international left, and the
opprobrium of a still-wider tract of the American right. Both sides
are ultimately playing into his hands, validating his revolutionary
sleight-of-hand and overlooking the essential realpolitik that lies,
for good or for bad, at the heart of chavismo.
--
Sunday, February 4, 2007
Venezuela will move to nationalise oil
I wonder what would happen if Bush faced a recall vote! It will be interesting to see what will happen with respect to international oil companies' remaining shares in oil. Perhaps they will stay in a minority position. There is no mention of what if any compensation will be given if the oil fields are appropriated.
Venezuela's Chavez Sets Oil Fields Takeover for May; Says Bush Should Resign
Saturday, Feb 03, 2007 Print format
Send by email
By: Liza Figueroa-Clark – Venezuelanalysis.com
President Chavez signs the enabling law, which will allow him to pass laws by decree for the next 18 months.
Credit: ABN
Caracas, February 2, 2007 (venezuelanalysis.com)— Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced the government’s planned takeover of the Orinoco belt oil fields, and the re-nationalization of the electricity sector at an international press conference yesterday. He also responded to U.S. President George W. Bush’s “concerns” over Venezuelan democracy.
Oil fields takeover
In front of the assembled audience of foreign correspondents, President Chavez signed the Enabling Law, passed by the National Assembly Wednesday. The law will allow Chavez to pass laws by decree in eleven different areas for a period of 18 months.
At the news conference, Chavez outlined plans for Venezuela 's state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) to become the majority stakeholder in four projects in the Orinoco belt oil fields, with a minimum stake of 60%.
The Venezuelan Head of State expressed his hope that the five foreign firms operating in the Orinoco Oil Belt, which include Exxon Mobil, Chevron Corp., British Petroleum PLC, Total SA and Statoil ASA, would remain as minority partners.
"I'm sure that they [the foreign companies] are going to accept because we are going to continue being partners, but if they aren't in agreement, they are totally free to leave," he said.
However, Chavez expressed hope that “these companies cooperate. We are not causing any conflict. We want to negotiate… but I have given instructions that on May 1 all those fields should awake under our control.”
The Minister for Energy and Mines, Rafael Ramírez, who has been quoted as saying the oil fields will be seized if no agreement is reached with the international oil companies, announced, “We are going to take control as of May 1,” and explained that definitive agreements could be signed at a later date.
Chavez told the press conference that the 3 to 4 thousand workers who are currently employed by the companies operating in the Orinoco Oil Belt will become part of PDVSA once the nationalization scheme is specified, and said that they will have “all the rights and obligations of a [PDVSA] worker.”
Speaking from Miraflores Palace, Chavez explained that the nationalization process would be regulated through a law included in the Enabling Law and noted that “all the laws are aimed at national development, through the eleven areas indicated here.”
Under article 74 of the Constitution, all laws are susceptible to being annulled by popular referendum.
Chavez also said pointed out that nationalizations would always be limited “to strategic areas,” in an attempt to assuage those who fear moves to expropriate private companies.
Electricity sector nationalization
President Chavez also took the opportunity to announce that as part of the government’s recently announced nationalization plan for the energy sector, six electricity companies will be turned over to State ownership.
“The nationalization of the electrical sector is one of the first laws to be approved [because] it is a necessity, not a whim. One of the priorities is the nationalization of the electricity sector. It was a monumental mistake to have privatized it,” Chavez declared.
In January, Chavez announced a plan to nationalize strategic companies in the telecommunications, electricity, and oil sectors, in what he called a first step to deepen the socialist revolution.
The measure to nationalize the electricity sector will involve Electricidad de Caracas (EDC) and its subsidiaries in four states. “All of this will be nationalized,” Chavez said.
Chavez asserted that 87% of EDC workers, who own 1% of the company’s shares would maintain their stake, but added, “if they want to sell, they will be compensated.”
"The nationalization measure requires the enactment of a specific law and the modification of the present electricity sector law,” Chavez stated, adding that the reform to the electricity service law would, in turn, require the go ahead from the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).
Chavez will decree the new nationalization law and reform other laws in a package of legal measures that must be approved over the next 18 months while he has special powers to legislate.
Chavez’s Response to Bush
During the press conference, Chavez also personally responded to remarks made earlier this week by George W. Bush and recently designated deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte. The pair had raised concerns over Venezuela’s democracy, with Negroponte calling President Chavez “a threat to democracy.”
The Venezuelan leader condemned the U.S. war in Iraq and said that Bush and Negroponte, a former director of national intelligence, should be tried for "war crimes" committed by the U.S. military across the globe.
“The two of them are criminals. They should be tried and thrown in prison for the rest of their days,” Chavez told his audience.
The Venezuelan Head of State called on Bush to resign saying, “If he had any dignity, the president of the United States would quit. The U.S. president no longer has any political or moral capacity to govern,” he stated.
“If only the United States had a democracy like Venezuela’s. If only the people of the United States had the power to call a recall referendum,” Chavez lamented, adding, “he would be voted out of the United States’ government right away.”
“This Constitution is the broadest and the most profoundly democratic in the world, and I have no doubts about that […] this Constitution allows the people to annul laws. I would ask that this be noted,” Chavez said.
The Venezuelan constitution, passed into law by referendum in December 1999, emphasizes participation at all levels and incorporates a series of articles that enable ordinary citizens to have a direct influence over public affairs. Crucially, article 72 states that ‘all elected posts’, from the president down, can be subjected to a recall referendum after officials reach the midway point of their term in office.
In August 2004, a recall referendum on Chavez’s mandate took place, which Chavez won with 59.1% of the vote.
Venezuela's Chavez Sets Oil Fields Takeover for May; Says Bush Should Resign
Saturday, Feb 03, 2007 Print format
Send by email
By: Liza Figueroa-Clark – Venezuelanalysis.com
President Chavez signs the enabling law, which will allow him to pass laws by decree for the next 18 months.
Credit: ABN
Caracas, February 2, 2007 (venezuelanalysis.com)— Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced the government’s planned takeover of the Orinoco belt oil fields, and the re-nationalization of the electricity sector at an international press conference yesterday. He also responded to U.S. President George W. Bush’s “concerns” over Venezuelan democracy.
Oil fields takeover
In front of the assembled audience of foreign correspondents, President Chavez signed the Enabling Law, passed by the National Assembly Wednesday. The law will allow Chavez to pass laws by decree in eleven different areas for a period of 18 months.
At the news conference, Chavez outlined plans for Venezuela 's state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) to become the majority stakeholder in four projects in the Orinoco belt oil fields, with a minimum stake of 60%.
The Venezuelan Head of State expressed his hope that the five foreign firms operating in the Orinoco Oil Belt, which include Exxon Mobil, Chevron Corp., British Petroleum PLC, Total SA and Statoil ASA, would remain as minority partners.
"I'm sure that they [the foreign companies] are going to accept because we are going to continue being partners, but if they aren't in agreement, they are totally free to leave," he said.
However, Chavez expressed hope that “these companies cooperate. We are not causing any conflict. We want to negotiate… but I have given instructions that on May 1 all those fields should awake under our control.”
The Minister for Energy and Mines, Rafael Ramírez, who has been quoted as saying the oil fields will be seized if no agreement is reached with the international oil companies, announced, “We are going to take control as of May 1,” and explained that definitive agreements could be signed at a later date.
Chavez told the press conference that the 3 to 4 thousand workers who are currently employed by the companies operating in the Orinoco Oil Belt will become part of PDVSA once the nationalization scheme is specified, and said that they will have “all the rights and obligations of a [PDVSA] worker.”
Speaking from Miraflores Palace, Chavez explained that the nationalization process would be regulated through a law included in the Enabling Law and noted that “all the laws are aimed at national development, through the eleven areas indicated here.”
Under article 74 of the Constitution, all laws are susceptible to being annulled by popular referendum.
Chavez also said pointed out that nationalizations would always be limited “to strategic areas,” in an attempt to assuage those who fear moves to expropriate private companies.
Electricity sector nationalization
President Chavez also took the opportunity to announce that as part of the government’s recently announced nationalization plan for the energy sector, six electricity companies will be turned over to State ownership.
“The nationalization of the electrical sector is one of the first laws to be approved [because] it is a necessity, not a whim. One of the priorities is the nationalization of the electricity sector. It was a monumental mistake to have privatized it,” Chavez declared.
In January, Chavez announced a plan to nationalize strategic companies in the telecommunications, electricity, and oil sectors, in what he called a first step to deepen the socialist revolution.
The measure to nationalize the electricity sector will involve Electricidad de Caracas (EDC) and its subsidiaries in four states. “All of this will be nationalized,” Chavez said.
Chavez asserted that 87% of EDC workers, who own 1% of the company’s shares would maintain their stake, but added, “if they want to sell, they will be compensated.”
"The nationalization measure requires the enactment of a specific law and the modification of the present electricity sector law,” Chavez stated, adding that the reform to the electricity service law would, in turn, require the go ahead from the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).
Chavez will decree the new nationalization law and reform other laws in a package of legal measures that must be approved over the next 18 months while he has special powers to legislate.
Chavez’s Response to Bush
During the press conference, Chavez also personally responded to remarks made earlier this week by George W. Bush and recently designated deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte. The pair had raised concerns over Venezuela’s democracy, with Negroponte calling President Chavez “a threat to democracy.”
The Venezuelan leader condemned the U.S. war in Iraq and said that Bush and Negroponte, a former director of national intelligence, should be tried for "war crimes" committed by the U.S. military across the globe.
“The two of them are criminals. They should be tried and thrown in prison for the rest of their days,” Chavez told his audience.
The Venezuelan Head of State called on Bush to resign saying, “If he had any dignity, the president of the United States would quit. The U.S. president no longer has any political or moral capacity to govern,” he stated.
“If only the United States had a democracy like Venezuela’s. If only the people of the United States had the power to call a recall referendum,” Chavez lamented, adding, “he would be voted out of the United States’ government right away.”
“This Constitution is the broadest and the most profoundly democratic in the world, and I have no doubts about that […] this Constitution allows the people to annul laws. I would ask that this be noted,” Chavez said.
The Venezuelan constitution, passed into law by referendum in December 1999, emphasizes participation at all levels and incorporates a series of articles that enable ordinary citizens to have a direct influence over public affairs. Crucially, article 72 states that ‘all elected posts’, from the president down, can be subjected to a recall referendum after officials reach the midway point of their term in office.
In August 2004, a recall referendum on Chavez’s mandate took place, which Chavez won with 59.1% of the vote.
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