NATO seeks out new Afghan supply routes.

This is from asiatimes.
With attacks increasing along routes from Pakistan it is not surprising that new routes are being explored. Apparently in some cases Taliban collect fees for safe passage along Pakistani routes as well. No doubt NATO and the US are not at all happy about this.

Dec 12, 2008

NATO seeks out new Afghan supply routes
By Roger N McDermott LONDON -
On December 9, in an interview with Vremya Novostei in Moscow, ambassador Robert Simmons, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secretary general's special advisor on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, confirmed that NATO is currently discussing possible transit routes to Afghanistan with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Ukraine (the latter two representing a much longer overland supply route). NATO needs to activate additional supply routes into Afghanistan since its route through Pakistan has been attacked by militants. "Aside from the Pakistani route, emphasis is made on the route we agreed on with the Russian delegation in Bucharest. In fact, we are now working on analogous agreements with the



governments of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Ukraine. It will allow for freight traffic to the international contingent in Afghanistan via Russia and these countries," Simmons explained. Ahead of president-elect Barack Obama's widely anticipated re-concentration on Afghanistan in the spring of 2009 - additional US military forces are expected to be deployed there while Washington will likely increase pressure on its European allies to contribute more - once again Central Asia is moving to the center stage in US planning. Obama's administration will face severe testing in its effort to re-energize the "war on terror" by focusing on defeating the Taliban and finally pacifying Afghanistan. Wider challenges in this campaign will be presented in fostering a multilateral security approach that gets away from the misjudgments of the George W Bush years. These revolve around bringing Russia on board and maximizing cooperation opportunities between NATO and its Eurasian partners. Obama must overcome reservations amongst European countries, reluctant to deploy additional troops in Afghanistan, and unlock the potential dividends of widening out anti-terrorist security cooperation to be more inclusive and multilateral. Prospects for developing security cooperation in Central Asia between the various interested multilateral bodies (the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), NATO and the European Union (EU)) are limited by a number of factors and challenges. These range from the geopolitical rivalries between these organizations to the internal balancing of interests. Differences in approach, emphasis, interests and aims, coupled with a lack of mutual understanding and misinterpretations of actions or initiatives undertaken by one particular organization, all tend to militate against such cooperative dynamics. During the Bush years, these divisions became more acute. In the current political climate, cooperative steps will only be tentative, not large scale, initially aimed at building dialogue, promoting understanding and building confidence and trust. Uzbekistan: Calling for dialogue on AfghanistanAt NATO's Bucharest summit, April 2-4, Uzbekistan President Islom Karimov made an offer of practical support to the alliance in its stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Karimov's speech offered several initiatives to NATO in the areas of defense, security, ecological and humanitarian matters. A key factor in this initiative was the suggestion of revitalizing the 6+2 mechanism which fell into disuse in 2001 (which brought together representatives of states bordering Afghanistan, plus Russia and the United States), transforming this into a 6+3 role to include NATO. Karimov placed a crucial caveat on such cooperation, saying, "At the same time, the sovereign interests in maintaining the security and legislation of our country must be observed." The Bush administration failed to recognize that this is an important condition for cooperation, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels, as countries within Central Asia have experienced the tendency for Western strategic engagement in the region to be tied closely to the pursuit of political agendas or in securing some "return" on the security assistance provided to the host country. Also, at the NATO summit, Russia signed a land transit corridor agreement with NATO, which also envisages similar humanitarian support to assist in the stabilization of Afghanistan. These initiatives from Russia and Uzbekistan point the way towards finding common interests with Western states, multilateral organizations and those to which the Central Asian countries belong (CSTO/SCO). Achieving any progress in such areas, building on such initiatives and clear interest in practical cooperation, will take a commitment to dialogue from all sides, and this is precisely the door that has opened for the alliance through Karimov's offer to NATO. It is this commitment to dialogue and cooperation-building that Obama promises to pursue, including a willingness to open unconditional dialogue with Iran. Challenges for consensus-buildingThere are also limits of a political nature which could arise from the Central Asian states themselves, as some Western observers argue that any efforts to engage in NATO-CSTO dialogue raise the interests of Russia in the region, and automatically subordinates these states to Russian policy. Equally, planning staffs often suffer from institutional inertia, react slowly to subtle changes in international relations, and, in the West in particular, use networks of experts that often reinforce their preconceived ideas. Western multilateral bodies are unsure about the nature of the SCO, and its rapid evolution into security areas leads some Western analysts to claim the SCO is emerging as a military bloc. Such misconceptions, coupled with concerns in Washington on the observer status of Iran and its possible future membership in the SCO, make any possibility of cooperation with that group fraught with politically sensitive issues. One area in which all of these multilateral structures commonly agree is crucial for the promotion of stability in Central Asia is border security. Various bilateral and multilateral initiatives are currently in place, though with limited degrees of success. Border security, intelligence and customs bodies often operate blind in their efforts to combat drug trafficking. For example, the absence of drones to monitor border areas, or even access to Google Earth, which easily reveals routes being used to smuggle materials and people across rivers and through mountain trails, guarantees the continued supply of narcotics from Afghanistan transiting through the region. The introduction of sophisticated technology such as drones would prove too controversial, unless there was broad consensus reached at a multilateral level; in this specific task there would have to be participation by liaison officers representing NATO, CSTO and the SCO. Of course, border security also remains limited in its scope for improvement owing to corruption, complacency or even complicity among the security agencies in the smuggling process. This can only change by formulating assistance policies that focus on more than simply providing frontline help through training and the provision of technical equipment. It must be systemic, with the political will of the leadership of the host nation to oversee the successful implementation of time-phased programs. NATO as a key multilateral bodyNATO's experiences from sending small Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) teams into the host country to assist in assessing the implementation of agreed plans to enhance capacities could serve as a model for something potentially much more successful. One weakness of the IPAP arrangements stems from how difficult it is in practical terms to independently assess or inspect how far certain features of the program are progressing. There are cases where the NATO IPAP teams report back to NATO headquarters with a positive assessment, which simply does not reflect reality on the ground. Georgia proved to be a case in point. Such arrangements can prove potentially controversial, attracting suspicion elsewhere in Central Asia, or amongst the host country's CSTO or SCO partners. New arrangements could be developed, whereby such teams operate under the consensual authority of various multilateral bodies, which has the advantage of building trust and defusing tensions or sending the wrong signals to third parties as a result of security assistance programs. Disaster response and emergency planning are areas that may yield greater multilateral cooperation, with determined political will on the part of each of the key multilateral bodies. What could become more consensual between these organizations would be the creation of small teams of consultants that work in a country, along with the local Ministry of Emergency Situations, but with the approval and representation of experts or consultants from NATO, EU, CSTO and the SCO; targeting capacity enhancement in a manner as non-controversial and politically desensitized as possible. Intelligence effortsWithin the NATO alliance a multilateral intelligence-sharing mechanism exists, known as AC-46. This is used as a way of sharing sensitive information among alliance members that is deemed of relevance, rather than particularly significant to one member state. Of course, it is limited by the fact that intelligence agencies often wish to preserve their best intelligence for national interests, as well as problems with maintaining the classified status of the information once shared on such a wide scale. Similarly, there are critics of the CIS Anti-terrorist Center in Moscow and the SCO Regional Anti-terrorist Structure in Tashkent in terms of whether these apparatus are capable of sharing genuinely time-sensitive information of direct relevance to the security agencies tasked with countering terrorist threats. In this context, open source intelligence centers should be established, allowing greater access to regional and international expertise and analysis, operating alongside the headquarters of multilateral organizations. Into this complex mixture of multilateral organizations and their various dynamics, a new factor may be added; Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is actively garnering support within Europe to create a new European security architecture that will exclude the United States but include Russia (unlike NATO). Washington's answer lies in subtle maneuvers. Obama's administration will learn that the key to promoting strong and effective multilateral security cooperation between NATO and its Eurasian partners depends on Washington's relations with Moscow. But warmer bilateral relations with Russia should not be viewed as an alternative to fostering genuine multilateral approaches, which may serve to undercut those in Moscow whose rhetoric centers around raising the "Americans are coming" illusion. It's time to re-energize the multilateral approach. Roger N McDermott is an honorary senior fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent Canterbury (UK) specializing in defense and security issues in Russia, Central Asia and the South Caucasus.