A Crisis in Adjustable Rate Mortgages

I just wonder if the mortgage crisis along with other problems in the US economy such as the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan and the balance of trade issue will not eventually lead to a depression. I watched in amazement as the stock market reached new highs but perhaps the downward plunge has begun now.


NY Times, August 1, 2007
Economic Scene
Keep Your Eyes on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
By DAVID LEONHARDT

Two years ago, when the housing market was roaring along, I called a
mortgage broker on the West Coast and asked for some help. I told him
that I wanted to interview some recent home buyers who had taken out an

adjustable-rate mortgage — one of the big drivers of the boom — and
he
was nice enough to pass along a short list of names.

One of the buyers was a business consultant in her 40s. She told me
about her charming new house and the fact that she expected it to be a
good investment, even if it had cost a bit more than she wanted to
spend. Then I asked about her adjustable-rate mortgage.

“I don’t have an adjustable rate,” she said.

Confused, I called the broker again to see what was going on. A little
while later, I got a sheepish e-mail message from him explaining that
her loan did, in fact, have an adjustable rate. She just hadn’t
realized it.

Now, I think this was an honest misunderstanding in which the broker
believed that he had explained the terms of the loans more clearly than

he had. And the mortgage ended up being a good one for the buyer
anyway:
she recently decided to move to a new area and sold the house before
her
rate jumped.

But the fact that this confusion could have occurred neatly captures
the
ridiculous state of the home buying business in 2005 and 2006. The
fallout is going to last a long time. House prices will need years to
work off their irrational values, more people are going to lose their
homes and Wall Street can probably look forward to some more nasty
surprises.

In fact, the mortgage meltdown has arrived at something of a turning
point. So far, most of the loans gone bad were among the worst of the
worst. Some were based on outright fraud, either by the lender or the
borrower. In many cases, buyers were never going to be able to make
their monthly payments and were instead banking on a rapid appreciation

in home values.

But the pool of people falling behind on their house payments is
starting to widen beyond this initial group, and adjustable-rate
mortgages are the main reason. Starting in the spring of 2005, these
mortgages began to get a lot more popular, largely because regular
mortgages no longer allowed many buyers to afford the house they
wanted.

They turned instead to a mortgage that had an artificially low interest

rate for an initial period, before resetting to a higher rate. When the

higher rate kicks in, the monthly mortgage bill typically jumps by
hundreds of dollars. The initial period often lasted two years, and two

plus 2005 equals right about now.

The peak month for the resetting of mortgages will come this October,
according to Credit Suisse, when more than $50 billion in mortgages
will
switch to a new rate for the first time. The level will remain above
$30
billion a month through September 2008. In all, the interest rates on
about $1 trillion worth of mortgages, or 12 percent of the nation’s
total, will reset for the first time this year or next. A couple of
years ago, by comparison, only a marginal amount of mortgage debt — a

few billion dollars — was resetting each month.

So all the carnage in the mortgage market thus far has come even before

the bulk of mortgages have reset. “The worst is not over in the
subprime
mortgage market,” analysts at JPMorgan recently wrote to the firm’s

clients. “The reason for our pessimism is that loans originated in
late
2005 and all of 2006, the period that saw peak origination volumes and
sharply decreased underwriting quality, are only now starting to reset
in large numbers.”

It isn’t hard to figure out what will happen when buyers who were
already stretching to afford a house are faced with suddenly higher
payments. Many will manage. They will cut back on other spending, or
they will refinance their mortgage and get a new one they can afford.
Others, like the buyer I interviewed two years ago, probably planned
all
along on selling their homes after a few years. For them, the
artificially low initial rate was a no-lose proposition.

But there are also likely to be a shocking number of people who lose
their homes. From 1994 to 2005, some 3.2 million households were able
to
buy homes thanks to subprime mortgages or other such loans, according
to
an analysis by Moody’s Economy.com. About 1.7 million of them will
probably lose their homes to foreclosure when all is said and done.
More
than half of the homeownership gains from subprime mortgages will be
erased.

The flood of those homes onto the market will further depress house
prices. So will the newfound conservatism of mortgage lenders, which
will make it harder for tomorrow’s buyers to get a mortgage. (Thank
goodness.) The S.& P./Case-Shiller index of home prices covering 10
major cities has fallen about 3 percent since its peak last summer. Two

or three years from now, JPMorgan predicts, the index will have fallen
15 to 20 percent. Adjusting for inflation, the decline will be worse.

The big unknown is whether the housing bust will cause a recession or a

bear market. Most people who have looked closely at the mortgage market

argue that the answer is no and that the damage will be contained.
Subprime loans still make up a distinct minority of the mortgage
market.
Over all, only 3.4 percent of mortgage holders are currently behind on
their payments. And as Victoria Averbukh, a former mortgage analyst at
Deutsche Bank now teaching at Cornell, points out, “The housing
market
is still a limited portion of the U.S. economy.” Consumer spending
has
slowed recently, but is still fairly strong. Corporate balance sheets
and the job market seem fine.

Rationally, the argument for optimism is pretty compelling: the
economy’s strengths do look big enough to overcome its weaknesses.
Yet
even many of the optimists confess to an uncomfortable amount of
uncertainty. There has never been a real estate bubble like the one of
the last decade. So it’s impossible to know what the bust will bring,

especially when there are still so many mortgages that are about to get

a lot more expensive.

E-mail: Leonhardt@nytimes.com

Default jitters Batter Shares of Home Lenders

If there is any downturn in the economy or with individual credit overstretched this could be a warning sign of things to come.





Default Jitters Batter Shares Of Home Lenders
Risky Mortgages Spark Concerns, Uncertainty About Fallout on Bonds
By JAMES R. HAGERTY and RUTH SIMON
February 9, 2007; Page A1

Default worries are growing at the risky end of the mortgage market.

Those worries sent some home lenders' shares plunging yesterday and
highlighted uncertainties about how many investors in mortgage-backed
securities might be vulnerable.

New Century Financial Corp. shares dropped $10.92, or 36%, to $19.24
in 4 p.m. composite trading on the New York Stock Exchange after the
big Irvine, Calif., lender disclosed late Wednesday that it expects to
report a fourth-quarter loss and will restate results for the previous
three quarters to correct accounting errors.

New Century is one of the nation's biggest specialists in "subprime"
mortgage loans, or home loans for borrowers with weak credit
histories. The company blamed its woes on"the increasing industry
trend of early-payment defaults," those that occur within the first
few months after a loan is made.

Shares of other subprime lenders, including Fremont General Corp. and
NovaStar Financial Inc., also plummeted. The combined market value of
seven U.S.-based lenders active in the subprime market dropped more
than $3.7 billion yesterday.

Contributing to the selloff was an announcement, late Wednesday, by
British banking giant HSBC Holdings PLC that problems in its
subprime-mortgage business were worse than previously indicated.
Yesterday, shares of HSBC, whose operations extend well beyond the
subprime sector, fell $2.44, or 2.7%, to $89.78 in 4 p.m. Big Board
composite trading.

Many in the industry are wondering how well investors in
mortgage-backed securities will cope as delinquencies rise. Lenders
quickly sell most subprime mortgage loans to packagers of securities,
such as investments banks, or directly to investors. The riskiest of
those securities, those that absorb some of the first losses from
defaults, are typically sold to money managers and hedge funds in the
U.S. and abroad.

"The thing none of us know, including the [Federal Reserve], is who is
holding this stuff," Richard Kovacevich, chief executive of Wells
Fargo & Co., one of the nation's biggest mortgage lenders, said in a
recent interview."The assumption is that it is well-diversified. If
it's concentrated, it's going to be a disaster."

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A report issued by Credit Suisse on Wednesday found that nearly one in
four subprime mortgage deals issued in 2006 had a delinquency rate of
at least 8% as of December. The analysis looked at loans that were at
least 60 days past due.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

As a result [of accounting scandals], the two companies' [Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac's] share of the market has plunged to about 40% at the
end of last year from 70% in 2003, according to Inside Mortgage
Finance, a trade publication.

When Fannie and Freddie dominated the market, Mr. Ranieri says, they
generally set the standards for what types of loans would be made.
Now, those standards are largely set by the risk appetites of
thousands of hedge funds, pension funds and other money managers
around the world. Emboldened by good returns on mortgage investments,
they have encouraged lenders to experiment with a profusion of loans.

Many subprime borrowers aren't required to prove their financial
health with tax forms or other documents. Lenders also sometimes rely
on computer programs, rather than human appraisers, to estimate the
value of homes.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In November, payments were at least 60 days overdue on 12.9% of
subprime loans packaged into mortgage securities, up from 8.1% a year
earlier, according to First American LoanPerformance, a research firm
in San Francisco.

Another innovation of recent years -- the collateralized debt
obligation, or CDO -- has made it possible for far more investors to
make bets on U.S. mortgages. They are akin to mutual funds. By
investing in a single CDO, investors can gain exposure to hundreds of
different mortgage securities of varying quality.

CDOs buy the bulk of the lower-rated rungs of subprime-mortgage
securities, those that take some of the first hits if defaults are
higher than expected, says Kedran Garrison, a CDO analyst at J.P.
Morgan Chase& Co. CDOs are especially attractive to investors in
Europe and Asia, as well as many in the U.S. But there is no way to
identify the biggest holders of CDO notes and shares or to know how
well they understand the risks and have hedged themselves.

That could be a problem for regulators. In 1998, the Fed convened
investment banks and worked out a rescue plan for hedge fund Long Term
Capital Management LP, which was on the verge of collapse. But in
today's splintered mortgage-securities market, the Fed wouldn't be
able to"get the involved players into a room" to work out a plan to
help a distressed institution sell off assets in an orderly manner,
says Josh Rosner, managing director of Graham Fisher& Co., a New York
investment research firm.

A spokeswoman for the Fed declined to comment.

CDOs aren't the only ones on the hook. Hedge funds, mortgage
real-estate investment trusts and the trading desks of Wall Street
firms are among those that could be hurt if their bets on the mortgage
market don't turn out as planned.

Write to James R. Hagerty atbob.hagerty@wsj.com2and Ruth Simon
atruth.simon@wsj.com3
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