The Nation Magazine and the Iranian election.

This is from the WorldSocialistwebsite.

Although this is a few days old, the media coverage continues to reflect the pro-Mousavi position as this article notes. The article also notes the connection of Mousavi to Rafsanjani. It is is interesting that most Republicans and conservatives also support the position outlined in the Nation except that many want Obama to take a much harder line against the Iranian regime. '
This article points out the class or at least economic divisions among supporters of Mousavi versus Ahmadinejad. The article could have referred to the pre-election poll taken by a western group that showed Ahmadinejad winning by a margin larger than the actual official results. Also, he should note that Rafsanjani owns many of the institutions from which the student protesters are coming!
The last few sentences are rather wishful thinking. The mullahs destroyed any competing working class movements such as the Tudeh.

The Nation magazine and the Iranian election
By Joe Kishore 16 June 2009
The Nation magazine, the voice of left-liberal supporters of Obama, has quickly weighed in to support charges of vote-rigging and a “coup d’état” in Iran. The magazine has also given its full support to the candidacy of Mirhossein Mousavi, the principal rival of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
In doing so, the Nation is joining hands with the rest of the American media, which has abandoned any pretense of journalistic objectivity in reporting the election. The allegations of fraud have been repeated without any independent investigation.
Robert Dreyfuss, the Nation’s chief commentator on foreign policy and national security, posted a blog entry under the headline, “Iran’s Ex-Foreign Minister Yazdi: It’s A Coup.” The article is dated June 13 and is time stamped at 7:24 AM—that is, about half a day after Iranian authorities released preliminary results from the election.
Mousavi had already declared the official results, showing a lopsided victory for Ahmadinejad, to be a fraud. Dreyfuss obviously accepted this claim uncritically. He could not possibly have conducted any independent investigation before he posted his blog. Nevertheless, the prominent link to Dreyfuss’ entry on the front page of the Nation’s web site is categorical, declaring, “A Rigged Election.”
In his opening paragraph, Dreyfuss writes, “It’s Saturday afternoon in Tehran, and the streets are generally quiet. But the aftermath of Iran’s rigged election, in which radical-right President Ahmadinejad and his paramilitary backers were kept in office, has left Iran’s capital steeped in anger, despair, and bitterness.”
The reference to the “radical-right” president is intended to give the impression to Nation readers that somehow Mousavi is a “left” figure. In fact, Mousavi’s main position on economic policy was to denounce Ahmadinejad’s limited handouts to poor and rural Iranians. Like Ahmadinejad, Mousavi is part of the Iranian establishment, representing a faction of the ruling elite that favors closer relations with the United States, free market policies and an opening of Iran to foreign investment, and reductions in state subsidies to the poor.
Dreyfuss’ uncritical backing for the Mousavi camp is summed up when he writes that he went to see Ibrahim Yazdi “to get some perspective on the crisis.”
He then provides the text of an interview with Yazdi, a major figure in the so-called “reformist” movement in Iran and the country’s foreign minister in the first few months after the 1979 revolution. Yazdi resigned to protest the taking of US hostages after the revolution, and he favored a general amnesty for members of the Shah’s regime. He is presently the head of the Freedom Movement of Iran, which the Iranian regime has banned for alleged links to the CIA.
Yazdi states that “the election was rigged,” citing the existence of many mobile polling places and the control of the Interior Ministry over the counting process. From this, the former foreign minister declares, “A coup d’etat? They’ve already made one!”
Exposing his class and political loyalties, Yazdi goes on to regret the fact that former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—the richest man in Iran, who is widely seen as extremely corrupt—has been losing influence. Rafsanjani is one of the major backers of Mousavi.
“In years past, [Rafsanjani] was influential, perhaps even more influential than the leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei],” Yazdi sates. “Now, with the slogans being used at Ahmadinejad’s rallies, things like ‘Death to Hashemi!’, they have created a deep rift.”
Yazdi concludes by emphasizing his conservative positions, positions shared by Mousavi. He declares, “We are not after subversion. We do not want to change the Constitution. We do want to create a viable political force that can exert its influence.”
The promotion by the American media of Mousavi has been closely linked to the foreign policy interests of the Obama administration, which the Nation magazine has consistently supported. This is documented in the writings of Dreyfuss himself over the past week and a half, beginning with a June 4 article written from Cairo entitled, “Obama Hits a Home Run.”
The “home run” refers to Obama’s speech that day in the Egyptian capital. The main aim of the speech was to provide a new face for American imperialism, one that would be better able to advance US interests in the Middle East. Dreyfuss declares, “Based on early returns from a decidedly unrepresentative sample of Arab public opinion, Obama hit a home run. I agree.”
On June 5, as he headed for Tehran, Dreyfuss penned another piece under the headline “Three Tests for Obama after ‘The Speech.’” The three tests were the Lebanese elections (held on June 7, which led to the victory of a US-backed coalition), the Iranian elections, and the future of Hamas and the Israel-Palestinian dispute.
On June 8 (“Iran’s Green Wave”), Dreyfuss openly solidarized himself with the development of a “color” revolution in Iran, a reference to the various US-backed movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that have been aimed—sometimes successfully, sometimes not—at installing governments more amenable to US interests.
“For years, the hardline clergy and their allies, including Ahmadinejad, have feared nothing more than an Iranian-style ‘color-revolution,’” Dreyfuss wrote. “Now, Mousavi—with solid establishment credentials, an Islamic revolutionary pedigree second to none, and an outspoken pro-reform message—finds himself at the head of a green parade.”
On June 9, the Nation followed its promotion of the “Green Wave” with an article on “Ahmadinejad’s Red Tide.” Dreyfuss wrote of “the red-armband-wearing, virtual fascist movement in support of reelecting President Ahmadinejad.” The reference to imminent fascism in Iran echoes the theory of “Islamo-fascism,” used by sections of liberals to justify their support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and US intervention in the Middle East.
The article reports on a rally for Ahmadinejad attended by what Dreyfuss estimates at “tens of thousands” of people. Other media reports put the figure at perhaps half a million. Dreyfuss nevertheless acknowledges the deep social divide in Iran, noting that after the rally, demonstrations by Ahmadinejad supporters brought the entire city of Tehran to a standstill for several hours.
In a passage that reveals more about the social outlook of Dreyfuss than it does about Ahmadinejad’s supporters, dripping with contempt for the working class, Dreyfuss compares the participants at Ahmadinejad’s rally to those he found much more likeable at a rally held by Mousavi:
“Instead of ‘Death to America!’ the green-clad Mousavi supporters chant: ‘Death to potatoes!’ ridiculing Ahmadinejad’s practice of giving out sacks of potatoes to his poor supporters. The women at the Mousavi rally are sheathed in scarves, but their stylish hair is visible underneath, they wear attractive makeup and pink lipstick, and below their short outer garments are visible jeans and, in many cases, high heels. At the Ahmadinejad rally, the women—in the thousands—are segregated from the men, and they are dressed head to toe in all-covering black.”
In the days leading up to the election, Dreyfuss penned several other columns favoring the candidate of choice for the “high-heeled.” These included one on June 10 (“Iran’s Vote, Obama’s Challenge”) in which he praised the “powerful and wily” former president Rafsanjani and his “blistering letter attacking Ahmadinejad”; one on June 11 (“Iran’s Election Tension”), in which he declared, “There’s no denying the political and social movement that is building against the president, mostly around Mousavi’s brilliant campaign”; and a final article on June 12 (“Iranians Poised for Change”).
In this last article on the election itself, Dreyfuss contradicted his previous account of Ahmadinejad’s “Red Tide” by declaring that he was now seemingly unable to find a single supporter of Ahmadinejad anywhere in Tehran. “I went off in search of Ahmadinejad voters today in Tehran. They are not easy to find.”
This shift—from masses of “red-armband-wearing virtual fascists” to a complete absence of support—helps explain the post-election analysis. If everyone supported Mousavi, his defeat, ipso facto, was a fraud and a coup.
There are certain parallels between the social milieu for which Dreyfuss speaks in the US and the main social base of support for Mousavi. Through the vehicle of the Obama administration, a layer of the complacent middle class around the Nation has made its peace with American imperialism.
Individuals such as Dreyfuss are working actively to promote the foreign policy interests of the American government, now with its new face. Through the promotion of illusions in Obama, the Nation and similar publications have facilitated the carrying out of extremely right-wing policies, including the continuation of the Iraq war, the expansion of the war in Afghanistan, and the multi-trillion dollar bailouts to the banks.
Similarly, Mousavi’s main base of support—as the American media itself has been compelled to recognize—comes from the upper-middle classes of the urban centers. Their opposition to Ahmadinejad is centered largely on cultural or lifestyle issues. To the extent that they have economic differences with the clerical regime, they are of a fundamentally reactionary character, hostile to the working class.
To recognize this fact is not to give any support to Ahmadinejad or the clerical establishment. There is widespread and justified hatred of the regime, particularly among Iranian youth. However, a progressive solution to the crisis in Iran will not come from the social forces represented by Mousavi. It can come only through the independent intervention of the Iranian working class on the basis of its own, socialist, program.

Even the BBC shows a glimmer of understanding of the power struggle in Iran.

This is from the BBC. This should be contrasted with CNN in its Iran 101 a supposed intro lecture on what is happening. CNN does not even mention the power struggle between Khameni and Rafsanjani and does not even have a profile of Rafsanjani as if he is of no importance! As this article points out Rafsanjani is the head of the Assembly of Experts who elect, surpervise and can theoretically dismiss the Supreme Leader. I do not even see this group mentioned in the CNN coverage. I didn't look at Fox News if anyone knows if they have done a better job let me know! The United States would no doubt like Rafsanjani to win out. He is corrupt, rich, and for accomodation with the West if it will make him even richer and more powerful! Obama is rightly being very subdued in his reactions although the State Dept. asked Twitter not to shut down for maintenance in order that protesters could continue using it. Of course the standard refrain in the western media is that Ahmadinejad stole the election rather than that Mousavi having lost is now trying to steal it through demonstrations and his ability to rally large numbers of people, at least in Tehran.

Deep rivalry
Meanwhile, a separate power play is going on at the top of the political system.

Former President Rafsanjani is backing the opposition
Ayatollah Khamenei has staked his political life on his unequivocal support for President Ahmadinejad's re-election victory.
He has many cards in his hand. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces. He is also loyally supported by the Guardian Council, which is reviewing the election result. Until now , no-one ever dared question his authority - at least openly.
But on the other side is former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who has been backing the opposition campaigns.
As the election began, it became clear he wanted revenge against President Ahmadinejad, who beat him in the presidential election four years ago.
And there is probably a deeper rivalry with the supreme leader himself, whom Mr Rafsanjani helped to power when he succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989.
The rivalry really erupted when President Ahmadinejad accused Mr Rafsanjani's family of corruption during one of the televised presidential debates.
They may be arguing over a disputed election. But they are really arguing over the future of the country. A momentous, titanic struggle, whose outcome no-one can predict
It is an accusation many Iranians might suspect is true, but the manner in which it was made caused outrage.
Mr Rafsanjani wrote an unprecedented letter to the supreme leader, calling him to act, and issuing a remarkable threat.
If nothing was done, "the volcanos fed inside burning chests will appear in society, as exemplified by gatherings we have seen in streets, squares and universities".
The flames, Mr Rafsanjani warned, would spread "through the elections and beyond".
Mr Rafsanjani has some powerful tools.
He heads the Assembly of Experts, the body of clerics in charge of electing, supervising and dismissing the supreme leader.
For them to take action would indeed be unprecedented. But Mr Rafsanjani recently won re-election with a big majority. And Ayatollah Khamenei has many enemies amongst the clerical establishment.
Mr Rafsanjani also heads the Expediency Council, which mediates on disputes between other organs of government. Not to mention his almost legendary wealth.
Do not underestimate the fervour of supporters on both sides.
There may be government supporters encouraged or bussed to demonstrations, but there are many who also genuinely adore Mr Ahmadinejad.
And for the opposition, the disputed election has unleashed years of frustration over a system that prevents them from meeting their aspirations.
They may be arguing over a disputed election. But they are really arguing over the future of the country. A momentous, titanic struggle, whose outcome no-one can predict.

Rafsanjani's gambit backfires.

This is an interesting take on the Iranian election. Even though it would seem that Bhadrakumar may be quite wrong about Rafsnjani's being defeated he gives a lot of background of the kind that is missing from most western mainstream articles. It would seem that the action on the street is actually just a colorful backdrop that can be blown out of all proportion by the western media which loves demonstrations especially when combined with government violence.
The important conflict is within the elites backstage as the Shark Rafsanjani the huge power broker has assembled a motley coalition including Mousavi to dislodge both Ahmedinejad and Khatemi from power. It remains to be seen who will win but as far as US policy is concerned Mousavi may be only slightly more open to compromise than Ahmedinejad. Earlier in his career Mousavi was a hard liner and very anti-western as the article shows. No where else I have seen these details about his early career.


Rafsanjani's gambit backfires
By M K Bhadrakumar
Iranian politics is never easy to decode. The maelstrom around Friday's presidential election
intrigued most avid cryptographers scanning Iranian codes. So many false trails appeared that it became difficult to decipher who the real contenders were and what the political stakes were. In the event, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei won a resounding victory. The grey cardinal of Iranian politics Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has been dealt a crushing defeat. Is the curtain finally ringing down on the tumultuous career of the "Shark", a nickname Rafsanjani acquired in the vicious well of the Iranian Majlis (parliament) where he used to swim dangerously as a political predator in the early years of the Iranian Revolution as the speaker? By the huge margin (64%) with which President Mahmud Ahmedinejad won, it is tempting to say that like the great white
sperm whale of immense, premeditated ferocity and stamina in Herman Melville's epic novel Moby Dick, Rafsanjani is going down, deeply wounded by the harpoon, into the cold oblivion of the sea of Iranian politics. But you can never quite tell. The administration of President Barack Obama in the United States could see through the allegorical mode of the Iranian election and probably anticipate the flood of destruction that would follow once vengeance is unleashed. It did just the right thing by staying aloof, studiously detached. Now comes the difficult part - engaging the house that Khamenei presides over as the monarch of all he surveys. First, the ABC of the election. Who is Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmedinejad's main opponent in the election? He is an enigma wrapped in mystery. He impressed the Iranian youth and the urban middle class as a reformer and a modernist. Yet, as Iran's prime minister during 1981-89, Mousavi was an unvarnished hardliner. Evidently, what we have seen during his high-tech campaign is a vastly different Mousavi, as if he meticulously deconstructed and then reassembled himself. This was what Mousavi had to say in a 1981 interview about the 444-day hostage crisis when young Iranian revolutionaries kept American diplomats in custody: "It was the beginning of the second stage of our revolution. It was after this that we discovered our true Islamic identity. After this we felt the sense that we could look Western policy in the eye and analyze it the way they had been evaluating us for many years." Most likely, he had a hand in the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Ali Akbar Mohtashami, Hezbollah's patron saint, served as his interior minister. He was involved in the Iran-Contra deal in 1985, which was a trade-off with the Ronald Reagan administration whereby the US would supply arms to Iran and as quid pro quo Tehran would facilitate the release of the Hezbollah-held American hostages in Beirut. The irony is, Mousavi was the very anti-thesis of Rafsanjani and one of the first things the latter did in 1989 after taking over as president was to show Mousavi the door. Rafsanjani had no time for Mousavi's anti-"Westernism" or his visceral dislike of the market. Mousavi's electoral platform has been a curious mix of contradictory political lines and vested interests but united in one maniacal mission, namely, to seize the presidential levers of power in Iran. It brought together so-called reformists who support former president Mohammad Khatami and ultra-conservatives of the regime. Rafsanjani is the only politician in Iran who could have brought together such dissimilar factions. He assiduously worked hand-in-glove with Khatami towards this end. If we are to leave out the largely inconsequential "Gucci crowd" of north Tehran, who no doubt imparted a lot of color, verve and mirth to Mousavi's campaign, the hardcore of his political platform comprised powerful vested interests who were making a last-ditch attempt to grab power from the Khamenei-led regime. On the one hand, these interest groups were severely opposed to the economic policies under Ahmadinejad, which threatened their control of key sectors such as foreign trade, private education and agriculture. For those who do not know Iran better, suffice to say that the Rafsanjani family clan owns vast financial empires in Iran, including foreign trade, vast landholdings and the largest network of private universities in Iran. Known as Azad there are 300 branches spread over the country, they are not only money-spinners but could also press into Mousavi's election campaign an active cadre of student activists numbering some 3 million. The Azad campuses and auditoria provided the rallying point for Mousavi's campaign in the provinces. The attempt was to see that the campaign reached the rural poor in their multitudes who formed the bulk of voters and constituted Ahmadinejad's political base. Rafsanjani's political style is to build up extensive networking in virtually all the top echelons of the power structure, especially bodies such as the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, the Qom clergy, Majlis, judiciary, bureaucracy, Tehran bazaar and even elements within the circles close to Khamenei. He called into play these pockets of influence. Rafsanjani's axis with Khatami was the basis of Mousavi's political platform of reformists and conservatives. The four-cornered contest was expected to give a split verdict that would force the election into a run-off on June 19. The candidature of the former Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezai (who served under Rafsanjani when he was president) was expected to slice off a chunk of IRGC cadres and prominent conservatives. Again, the fourth candidate, Mehdi Karrubi's "reformist" program was expected to siphon off support from Ahmedinejad, by virtue of his offer of economic policies based on social justice such as the immensely popular idea of distributing income from oil among the people rather than it accruing to the government's budget. Rafsanjani's plot was to somehow extend the election to the run-off stage, where Mousavi was expected to garner the "anti-Ahmedinejad" votes. The estimation was that at the most Ahmedinejad would poll in the first round 10 to 12 million votes out of the 28 to 30 million who might actually vote (out of a total electorate of 46.2 million) and, therefore, if only the election extended to the run-off, Mousavi would be the net beneficiary as the votes polled by Rezai and Karrubi were essentially "anti-Ahmadinejad" votes. The regime was already well into the election campaign when it realized that behind the clamor for a change of leadership in the presidency, Rafsanjani's challenge was in actuality aimed at Khamenei's leadership and that the election was a proxy war. The roots of the Rafsanjani-Khamenei rift go back to the late 1980s when Khamenei assumed the leadership in 1989. Rafsanjani was among Imam Khomeini's trusted appointees to the first Revolutionary Council, whereas Khamenei joined only at a later stage when the council expanded its membership. Thus, Rafsanjani always harbored a grouse that Khamenei pipped him to the post of Supreme Leader. The clerical establishment close to Rafsanjani spread the word that Khamenei lacked the requisite religious credentials, that he was indecisive as the executive president, and that the election process was questionable, which cast doubt on the legality of his appointment. Powerful clerics, egged on by Rafsanjani, argued that the Supreme Leader was supposed to be not only a religious authority (mujtahid), but was also expected to be a source of emulation (marja or a mujtahid with religious followers) and that Khamenei didn't fulfill this requirement - unlike Rafsanjani himself. The debunking of Khamenei rested on the specious argument that his religious education was in question. The sniping by the clerics associated with Rafsanjani continued into the early 1990s. Thus, Khamenei began on a somewhat diffident note and during much of the period when Rafsanjani held power as president (1989-1997), he acted low key, aware of his circumstances. The result was that Rafsanjani exercised more power as president than anyone holding that office anytime in Tehran. But Khamenei bided his time as he incrementally began expanding his authority. If he lacked standing among Iran's clerical establishment, he more than made up by attracting to his side the security establishment, especially the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC and the Basij militias. While Rafsanjani hobnobbed with the clergy and the bazaar, Khamenei turned to a group of bright young politicians with intelligence or security backgrounds who were returning home from the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war - such as Ali Larijani, the present speaker of the Majlis, Said Jalili, currently the secretary of the National Security Council, Ezzatollah Zarghami, head of the state radio and television and, indeed, Ahmadinejad himself. Power inevitably accrued to Khamenei once he won over the loyalty of the IRGC and the Basij. By the time Rafsanjani's presidency ended, Khamenei had already become head of all three branches of the government and the state media, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and even lucrative institutions such as Imam Reza Shrine or the Oppressed Foundation, which have almost unlimited capacity for extending political patronage. All in all, therefore, the power structure today takes the form of a vast patriarchal apparatus of political leadership. Thus, perceptive analysts were spot on while concluding that Ahmadinejad would never on his own volition have gone public and directly taken on Rafsanjani during the controversial TV debate on June 4 in Tehran with Mousavi. Ahmadinejad said, "Today it is not Mr Mousavi alone who is confronting me, since there are the three successive governments of Mr Mousavi, Mr Khatami and Mr Hashemi [Rafsanjani] arrayed against me." He took a pointed swipe at Rafsanjani for masterminding a plot to overthrow him. He said Rafsanjani promised the fall of his government to Saudi Arabia. Rafsanjani hit back within days by addressing a communication to Khamenei demanding that Ahmadinejad should retract "so that there would be no need of legal action". "I am expecting you to resolve the situation in order to extinguish the fire, whose smoke can be seen in the atmosphere, and to take action to foil dangerous plots. Even if I were to tolerate this situation, there is no doubt that some people, parties and factions will not tolerate this situation," Rafsanjani angrily warned Khamenei. Simultaneously, Rafsanjani also rallied his base in the clerical establishment. A clique of 14 senior clerics in Qom joined issue on his side. It was all an act of desperation by vested interests who have become desperate about the awesome rise of the IRGC in recent years. But, if Rafsanjani's calculation was that the "mutiny" within the clerical establishment would unnerve Khamenei, he misread the calculus of power in Tehran. Khamenei did the worst thing possible to Rafsanjani. He simply ignored the "Shark". The IRGC and the Basij volunteers running into tens of millions swiftly mobilized. They coalesced with the millions of rural poor who adore Ahmadinejad as their leader. It has been a repeat of the 2005 election. The voter turnout has been an unprecedented 85%. Within hours of the announcement of Ahmadinejad's thumping victory, Khamenei gave the seal of approval by applauding that the high voter turnout called for "real celebration". He said, "I congratulate ... the people on this massive success and urge everyone to be grateful for this divine blessing." He cautioned the youth and the "supporters of the elected candidate and the supporters of other candidates" to be "fully alert and avoid any provocative and suspicions actions and speech". Khamenei's message to Rafsanjani is blunt: accept defeat gracefully and stay away from further mischief. Friday's election ensures that the house of Supreme Leader Khamenei will remain by far the focal point of power. It is the headquarters of the country's presidency, Iran's armed forces, especially the IRGC. It is the fountainhead of the three branches of government and the nodal point of foreign, security and economic policies. Obama may contemplate a way to directly engage Khamenei. It is a difficult challenge. Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey. (Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)